Paley's View.- Paley makes the foundation of property to be the law of the land, as carrying out the will and intention of the Creator. "It is the intention of God that the produce of the earth be applied to the use of man. This intention cannot be fulfilled without establishing property. It is consistent, therefore, with his will that property be established. The land cannot be divided into separate property without leaving it to the law of the country to regulate that division. It is consistent, therefore, with the same will that law should regulate the division; and, consequently, 'consistent with the will of God,' or 'right,' that I should possess that share which these regulations assign me." This resolves all right into the will of God, which is Paley's theory of right,—and it also supposes that the laws of the land are in all cases an expression of that will, which is by no means certain. Now, it is perfectly clear that law regulates the conveyance of property, defines what is and what is not property, maintains and secures to the rightful owner that which properly belongs to him. It maintains and defends, but it does not create the right to own. It regulates rather than originates that right. Constitution of the Mind.— The right, in itself considered, or in the abstract, is found, if I mistake not, in the nature and constitution of the human mind,—just as society itself originates from that same nature and constitution. This, indeed, reduces itself ultimately into the divine will; inasmuch as the nature and constitution of men are from God, and it was for him to form us with what nature, and endow us with what propensities, he pleased. Still, we need go no further than to the constitution of human nature to discover the origin of the principle in question. The desire to possess, to appropriate, lies among the native and implanted principles of the mind. It shows itself in earliest life. The child appropriates to himself the toys that are given him, and feels injured if they are taken from him by another. The structure of language shows that this is a universal principle. Whereever we find in human speech the use of possessive pronouns, or other forms of language fulfilling that office, we find the expression of this principle. Men, universally, feel that there is a right violated, a wrong done, in taking by violence or fraud that which has been appropriated by another. Hence, they demand not mere restitution, but the punishment of the offender. But while we seek in the structure of the mind itself the origin and foundation of the right of property in general of the right to appropriate, in itself consideredthe condition on which that right depends—i. e., the right to appropriate this or that thing, in any given caseis the circumstance already pointed out: namely, that labor has been originally bestowed in the acquisition of these things, and value created as the result of that labor, to which value the laborer is justly entitled, as something he has himself produced. Objection. — If it be said that we possess many things, which we call property, on which we have not bestowed labor, many values which we have not ourselves created, as, for example, property inherited or bequeathed, or the gifts of friendship, I reply, these values were originally acquired or created by labor; they became the property of the original owner in that way; and the right of possession has been conferred by him on the present posses sor. The only exception to this rule, which occurs to my mind, is the accident of discovery: as when, walking by the bank of a stream, I find a piece of gold ore, or a pearl, among its sands. In this case, there is certainly no labor bestowed on the acquisition further than that of picking up and appropriating what I have discovered. The act of appropriation constitutes my right in this case, and holds good as against others, on the ground that no one else has bestowed labor on the things in question, and therefore no one else has any claim to them. Were it otherwise, were the treasure found not a natural product, but the result of human labor, as, e. g., a bracelet of pearls, or a purse of gold coined for use, my discovery of the article would not constitute a right of possession against the claim of the real owner. Even in the case supposed, the owner of the soil in which the gold ore or the jewels is found, may present a counter claim, on the ground that, in purchasing the soil, he purchased whatever value it may produce or contain. The soil itself is his property, and no one else has a right to take away from it any of its values. In like manner, were a meteorite to fall from the sky upon my land, my right to that value would depend not merely, or so much, upon the accident of discovery, as upon my previous right to the premises, a right purchased by labor in some form. View of Whately. - Archbishop Whately, in his Logic, has made use of this very illustration to prove the opposite doctrine, viz., that the right of property does not depend, ultimately, on labor. The labor expended in the production of values is, according to him, not essential to the existence of value and to property in the same, but is merely accidental, a circumstance that, indeed, usually, but not always or necessarily, accompanies the possession of wealth. The meteorite that falls in my yard has a value quite independent of human labor. It seems to me, however, that in this instance, Whately, while attempting to correct a popular fallacy, as he regards it, has himself fallen into a still more serious error. If we look at the real wealth of the world, the chief values that constitute the property of men, we certainly do find them to be, in great proportion, the result of human labor. The exceptions are so few and so slight, as compared with the whole amount, that they scarcely deserve to be taken into the account; and instead of calling labor an accidental circumstance sometimes accompanying the possession of wealth, it were certainly much nearer the truth to call it the rule, and its exceptions the accident. Relation of the State to private Property. According to the view of some, the state is the supreme and ultimate proprietor and controller of all property. The natural right must, in all cases, be held subordinate to the public authority. It is for the state to determine what shall be considered as the property of every citizen, and no man can hold any property, or call it his own, except as under the law of the land. All individual right is thus resolved into state right. Such is the view maintained by some able writers, among others by Dr. Hickok. According to this view, the individual right to property is derived from the state. The natural right is no right unless the state sanctions it. This view seems to destroy individual right and liberty,—to merge the individual citizen, with all his rights and powers, in the state,—thus making the state all in all, as in that theory of political organization which Plato has left us. In reality, the state confers no right, as to property, which did not previously exist, and which would not have existed even had there been no such thing as a state. It confirms and establishes existing rights. It regulates the sale and transfer of property. It inquires into the validity of titles and the terms of contract, and takes care that those terms shall be fulfilled. The state is merely a social organization, contrived for the purpose of more effectually securing and maintaining the rights and liberties of the whole body of individual citizens, in other words, the public good. - It has no power, except that of the individual arms that compose its aggregate strength; no rights or authority, except such as may be conferred on it by the body politic. It owns, and can own, no property, except such as belongs to the citizens that constitute the state, either in their private, individual capacity, or as a public body. Whatever right or control of property the state has, it derived originally from the people. In order to carry out the purposes for which the state is created, it must have control and disposal of so much of the public property as is necessary to the subsistence, defence, and well-being of the state; must have power to lay out roads, levy taxes, etc.; and, whenever, in pursuance of such objects, the public claim comes into conflict with individual claim, the latter must yield to the former, on the principle that the majority govern. When, for example, the land held by any citizen is needed for some public purpose, as a road, for instance, the state has the right to take it from him for that purpose; but not without equivalent to the full value of the property taken. Otherwise, government becomes a despotism, and there is no longer security for individual right. § II.-ADVANTAGES OF THE INSTITUTION OF PROPERTY. Granting the right, which has been already discussed, the question may still arise, Of what use is the institution of property, or private possession? Why may not society hold its goods in common, every man taking from the common stock that which he needs for his own present wants, and that only? Why should one particular por |