THEORETICAL ETHICS. CHAPTER I. THE NATURE OF RIGHT. § 1. RIGHT IN ITSELF CONsidered. Essential Attributes. The term right expresses a simple and ultimate idea; it is, therefore, incapable of analysis and definition; nor does it, like many other ideas, stand in need of definition in order to be understood. It expresses an eternal and immutable distinction, inherent in the nature of things, not the creation of arbitrary power, whether of man or God. Wherever there is voluntary action of any intelligent rational being, there is always, and always must be, a right and a wrong; and all moral action is, of necessity, either the one or the other. The distinction is one universally recognized. The idea of right lies among the simplest furniture and first principles of the human mind. It manifests itself with the dawn of reason and intelligence. It is not an idea of the schools, a distinction known only or chiefly to metaphysicians; but is the property alike of the learned and the simple, of the child and the philosopher. Opinions may vary widely as to what is, and what is not, right action; what one system or one age pronounces to be right, another system or another age may decide to be wrong; but, as to the essential difference between the right and the wrong, as ideas, or principles of action, no age or system was ever at a loss no mind, however feeble, was ever confused. This Idea, whence derived. It is a question of some importance how we come by the idea of right. Some have attributed it to fashion and education, as did Locke and his followers; others to the laws, human or divine, which forbid or sanction certain actions; others regard it as the product of a special sense, whose office it is to take cognizance of moral distinctions, as the eye perceives color, and the ear sound. Others again regard the idea of right as a simple and ultimate one, and as such underived, a primary original conception of the human mind, not innate, but connate, an elementary dictum of reason. The universality of the idea, its early manifestation in childhood, prior to education, and the influence of example, as well as the clearness and strength with which it manifests itself, in all conditions of society, and under all the varying circumstances of life,—these things go to show that the idea of right is founded in the constitution of the mind, and not derived from any source external and adventitious. Nor can those who take the opposite view give any satisfactory account of the origin of this idea; since, to attribute it to education, leaves the question still open, where did the first man, the first educator, derive his idea of it; while to ascribe it to law, human or divine, is still wider of the mark, inasmuch as law always presupposes the right, as the foundation on which it rests. To attribute, then, the origin or the idea of right to law, is to place the foundation upon the building, instead of the building upon the foundation. And as to the theory of a special sense, whose office it is to take cognizance of the right, it is sufficient to say, that there is no evidence of any such special faculty of the mind, nor is any such needed. For the further investigation of this topic, the reader is referred to the author's treatise on Mental Philosophy, in which the question, and its several theories, are more fully discussed. § 2. — Right, AS DISTINGUISHED FROM OTHER IDEAS OF SIMILAR IMPORT. Right and Duty.—Right and duty are not precisely synonymous terms, yet are nearly equivalent. We are always under obligation to do that which is right it is our duty. The right in morals once ascertained, the doing of it is, under all circumstances, a duty. Right is the foundation of obligation, and coëxtensive with it. It is the rightness of the thing that creates its binding force, and makes it obligatory upon us. There can be no moral obligation to do what is not in itself a right thing to be done. Still, right and duty, though coëxtensive, are not of precisely the same import. Right is the abstract, in itself considered. Duty is right, considered in relation to us as personal agents-as doers; obligation is the binding power of the right over us, which makes this or that a duty. Another View.— Some writers make a further distinction between obligation and duty than that which I have now indicated making obligation more comprehensive than duty. Thus a man may be obliged, by force of circumstances, or by the laws of the land, to do what is not right. Such is the view taken by Whewell, in his Elements of Morality. That which is here called obligation, however, is not really such, but rather compulsion, or necessity. No combination of circumstances, and no power of law, can |