of the state to which he belongs. It is difficult to perceive the justice and ethical ground of such a distinction.

4. INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTION. By gradual usage and conventional agreement of nations, certain rules and maxims have come to be of acknowledged authority in respect to national territory and rights of jurisdiction. As against other states, every state has the unquestioned and exclusive right to its own territory. But it may often come in question, how far does that territory extend. Hence, it is important to settle all such questions according to some established rules. By the law of nations, the territory of any state is considered as extending to the forts, harbors, bays, and whatever parts of the sea are enclosed by headlands belonging to that state. Its jurisdiction also extends to the distance of a cannon-shot from the shore, along all its coasts. Within these lines its right of property and control is exclusive.

States have sometimes claimed still further jurisdiction over adjacent seas, as formerly Venice over the Adriatic, and, more recently, Turkey over the Euxine, Russia over the Baltic, and Denmark over the Sound. It sometimes happens that rivers run through different countries, in their course to the sea; in such cases there is at least a moral and commercial, if not an international right, of each state through whose territory it may pass, to the unobstructed right of the same, for purposes of commerce. In times of peace, this right is usually conceded, either tacitly or by convention; in case of hostilities between nations thus situated, the rights of commerce give way to the rights of war, and, by the usage of nations, the enemy's ships, as already stated, are lawful plunder. Even the goods of a neutral state are not exempt from this rule,

when found in an enemy's vessel, the maxim being that enemy's ships make enemy's goods.

The question sometimes arises, how far the jurisdiction of a state extends to its subjects when out of its territory; as, for example, in a ship on the high seas. It is generally conceded, that the vessels of any nation, at sea, and beyond the territorial limits of other states, are subject to the jurisdiction of the state to which they belong. So far as respects the violation of its own laws, that jurisdiction is exclusive. When an offence is committed against the common law of nations, it passes out of the exclusive jurisdiction of that particular state to which the vessel belongs, and may be punished by the proper tribunal of any country into whose ports the offender may be carried. This is the case with piracy, for example. Any ship suspected of being a pirate, may be searched by any stronger power, without regard to the flag under which she may choose or chance to sail; and those engaged in her navigation or defence may be tried, and, if convicted, be put to death, by the legal authorities of any other state, into whose ports they may be taken.

No reason can be shown why it should not be the same with the slave-trade. Such, however, is not the present construction of international law. The slave-trade is, indeed, condemned by the laws of all civilized nations; but it has been decided by the English courts, that it is not, in such a sense, a crime against the general law of nations, as to authorize the courts of one nation to try the loyal subjects of another, charged with this offence, except in case of special treaty to that effect.

The national jurisdiction extends, moreover, not merely

to its subjects and vessels on the high seas, but in some degree, and within certain limits, to its subjects in any foreign territory. The person of a sovereign, or an ambassador, passing into the territory of a foreign state, is not, in time of peace, considered as properly subject to its jurisdiction. The consuls, also, and other authorized agents and ministers of every state, exercise, to some extent, jurisdiction over their countrymen in foreign states where such ministers or agents may reside. Ships of war, in foreign ports, are exempt from local jurisdiction of the same; but not private vessels, unless by special agreement.

The general principles of state jurisdiction may be comprehended in the following maxims, as stated by jurists of distinction: First, That the laws of a state have force within the limits of its own government, and bind all its subjects, but have no force beyond those limits. Second, That, with the exceptions already stated, all persons found within the limits of a government, whether their residence is permanent or temporary, are to be deemed subjects of that government. And, inasmuch as men often pass from one state to another, in which the laws respecting rank, property, contracts, marriage, etc., may vary from those of the former, it has been generally conceded, as a maxim of state policy, that whatever laws respecting such matters are in force in the state from which one comes, the same shall be considered valid and binding on him in the state to which he goes, so far as they do not interfere with the established laws and rights of the latter, and of its citizens. Thus, a contract valid by the laws of the land in which it is made, is valid in all other countries.

Such are some of the general principles of international jurisprudence. For a fuller discussion of the subject, the

reader is referred to the works which treat particularly of these matters; and especially to Story's Conflict of Laws, Wheaton's Elements of International Law, Manning's Commentaries on the Law of Nations, as also to the commentaries of Kent, and Blackstone.

§ II. ETHICAL RELATIONS OF REPUBLICAN STATES TO EACH

OTHER.

The general principles which should regulate the intercourse of states with each other, have been pointed out in the previous sections. These principles apply, also, in the main, to the intercourse of states confederate with each other, whether as independent sovereignties, or united under one constitution as a Republic. States thus confederated, or united, sustain to each other, however, peculiar relations; and from these arise certain corresponding obligations, of a more specific nature than those already considered. I have spoken of two forms which this relation may assume that of a simple con

federation, and that of a republic.

The Confederation. In the former case, certain states, adjacent, it may be, in territory, or drawn toward each by community of interest, for purposes of mutual benefit, or for mutual defence, form themselves into a league, and deliberate, by their representatives in council, on matters of common interest or common danger. The separate cantons of Switzerland are an example of such confederation. The different provinces of Germany were formerly, and, to some extent, are still, if I mistake not, thus united. In such cases, the several states are still independent sovereignties, maintaining each its own form of government, the authority of each absolute and exclusive within its own domains, and each separated, it may be, from its neighbors by mutual jealousies and dissensions.

The congress which represents them possesses no sovereignty over any one of these states, nor over all combined; its acts are only acts of council; and any state, if dissatisfied, may at any moment withdraw from the council entirely, or refuse to execute its resolves. Such a congress may act as agent for the several states, with delegated authority, to declare and carry on war, or to make peace; to appoint ambassadors, and to conclude treaties. Such treaties and acts, however, are not binding, until they receive the assent of each sovereign state, in its separate capacity.

The Republic. Such an arrangement as that now described is a very different matter, and involves a very different relation of the several parties, from that which is implied in a Republic. The union is much closer, and more perfect, in the latter case, than in the former. The several states are no longer independent and sovereign, but they compose one whole, under one national government, and to this national government is committed the sovereignty and control of the general affairs, so far as other nations are concerned, its powers being limited and defined, however, by the constitution. Within the limits thus prescribed, its authority is complete, that is as to all things given by the states, in the first place, to its jurisdiction. All other matters remain still under the separate jurisdiction of the several states. It can raise armies, levy taxes, declare war or peace, regulate commerce, and all transactions with foreign states; in a word, may do all that any sovereign state can do, subject only to its own constitution. Our own country furnishes an example of such a Republic.

A government thus constituted derives, evidently, all its powers from the constitution. Whatever that concedes, it may do, but nothing beyond; everything else