the nature of things are the work of God; as used to denote finite intelligences, the same is true, they are the work of the Divine Intelligence, they and their original nature. But when we speak of things and the nature of things, as applicable to this discussion, we do not, of course, refer to material objects, nor yet to spiritual intelligences, but to the actions and moral conduct of intelligent. beings, created or uncreated, finite or infinite. We mean to say, that such and such acts, of an intelligent, voluntary agent, whoever he may be, are, in their very nature, right or wrong. Now, God does not create the actions of intelligent, free agents; and, of course, does not create the nature of those actions. To say that the moral character of an act is created by Deity, is simply to beg the question in dispute.

The Theory asserts what. When we say that right and wrong are inherent, then, in the very nature of things, we simply assert that certain courses of conduct are, in their very nature and essence, wrong-certain. others, right; that they are so, quite independent and irrespective of the consequences that result from them, or of the sanctions and authority with which they may be invested; that they are so, not because of the laws, either human or divine, that give them force; that they would be so, were there no law, or were it the opposite of what it is; that even the actions of Deity himself fall within the range of this universal principle; and that it does not depend on his will, or even his nature, much less on his power as Creator, to establish or abolish this immutable distinction.

We say it is in the very nature of things that the whole is greater than a part; that a straight line is the shortest distance between two points; that two straight lines cannot enclose a space. We cannot conceive the opposite to be true. It does not depend on the will of Deity whether

these things shall be so or not. He does not create these relations. They are eternal and necessary truths. In like manner, there are certain truths pertaining to the conduct of all rational and intelligent beings, certain moral distinctions, which we regard as immutable and eternal, inherent in the very nature of things. And on this firm, eternal basis rests the foundation of our moral obligation.

CHAPTER III.

Question stated.

THE RULE OF RIGHT.

What makes a thing right is one question, and how do we know it to be right, is quite another. The former was discussed in the preceding chapter; the latter is now before us. What rule have we by which to judge of the moral quality of actions? - what standard? - what means of information? The decision of the former question is not necessarily the decision also of this. That which is the ground of right, and the basis of moral obligation, is not, of necessity, the source of our knowledge respecting the right, and the rule of our duty.

The Answer. It is a sufficient answer to the question before us, to say, in general, that the will of God must be regarded as the rule of right and the standard of duty to man. The divine will, while it is not the source and ground of right as already shown is nevertheless the source of our knowledge of right, the rule of duty to us. It does not create right, but reveals it, makes it known. That will itself reposes upon the right, and is conformed to it. That will is our law. Such is the character of the Divine Being,

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and such, also, our relation to him, as Creator, Governor, Benefactor, as to make his will binding upon us, and that law, which is holy, just, and good, our rightful and only proper rule of action.

That Will, how revealed.

This rule is made known to

us in various ways. It is given, first of all, in the moral nature of man himself, who is endowed with the faculty of distinguishing between right and wrong, and is so constituted that, by the law of his nature, he approves the right and disapproves the wrong, whenever perceived. It is given also in the constitution of nature, in the ordering and arrangement of things about us; which constitution and arrangement are such as to indicate clearly the will of the Deity as to the course which we should pursue. It is given yet more fully and clearly in that revelation which he has made of his will in the sacred Scriptures.

I. In the Moral Nature of Man. Such is the constitution of the mind as to fit it for taking cognizance of moral distinctions, and, what is more, for approving the right whenever perceived, and condemning the wrong. And this moral nature and constitution of the human mind is from God, and is in itself an indication of his will. It may not, of itself, point out with clearness and definiteness, in all cases, what actions are right, and what are wrong; this may be, to some extent, a matter of opinion and judgment a matter of belief rather than of positive knowledge; yet, within certain limits, the moral nature of man decides without hesitation as to the character of given actions, and approves or condemns accordingly. It is seldom at a loss as to the great dividing lines which separate the kingdoms of right and wrong, of crime and duty. An instance of flagrant injustice or ingratitude, related in the hearing of a child, or of a savage, unbiassed by education and the restraints of civilization and society,

calls forth at once his disapproval, and awakens his indignation at the wrong. It is the voice of nature, essentially the same in all climes and ages of the world, approving the right, condemning the wrong. It is the voice of God, speaking through the moral nature and constitution which he has bestowed upon his creatures. Thus it is, that they which have not the law, "are a law unto themselves."

II. In the Constitution of Nature. The will of the Creator is further revealed in the constitution and nature of things about us. It is impossible for one of ordinary intelligence and habits of observation not to perceive a fixed connection between virtue and happiness, vice and misery, in the world. Certain courses of conduct are uniformly attended with certain results. It is the natural tendency of a certain manner of life to produce misery and evil consequences; it is the tendency of an opposite course to produce opposite results. And from this alone might be inferred, with sufficient clearness and certainty, what is the will of the Creator, as to the course which his creatures shall pursue. These results are intended, not accidental; and they are intended as an indication of the divine will.

A Case supposed. —Let us suppose, for example, the question to arise in the mind of an intelligent heathen, having no other than the light of nature to guide him, whether a life of sensual gratification—the indulgence, without restraint, of the merely animal appetites - were agreeable to the divine will. He finds such indulgence to be attended with momentary gratification, followed by subsequent misery; that it results in injury to the powers of body and of mind; that its tendency is to suffering, poverty, vice, crime. He observes these facts. He perceives them to be the legitimate and inevitable results of the constitution of nature, a part of the system of things;

and if he acknowledges the system itself to have had an intelligent originator and designer, can he be at a loss as to the intention and will of that Creator in the case supposed?

It is in this way that we may learn from the constitution of nature what is the will of our Creator. All nature has its laws. Man, as a part of the great system of nature, is no exception to the rule. Both his physical and his spiritual being have their laws. in either case, by observing the results and tendencies of different actions; and the laws of our moral nature, thus ascertained, constitute what we may call a system of natural religion.

These laws are to be learned,

Whether this is really Law. And here the question may arise, whether that which we call law in such cases as in the expression, laws of our moral nature-is really, after all, of the nature of law, properly so called; or whether it is merely advice or admonition. Certain courses of conduct, it is admitted, tend to produce misery and ruin, while other courses promote the happiness of all concerned. This is to be construed, however, it may be said, not as a law prohibiting and commanding, but as simply an indication, or admonition, as to the course which it is wisest and best for us to pursue. The suffering which follows wrongdoing is not a punishment of the wrong, but simply a warning against its future commission.

I reply: it is of no consequence to the present argument whether it be the one or the other-whether punishment or merely warning - whether law, or merely advice. In either case, it is a sufficient indication of the will of the Creator respecting the course which his creatures should pursue. It shows plainly enough what his wishes and instructions are - what he meant by constituting us as he did.