may run through the whole scale of morality, from the deepest degree of guilt to the highest degree of virtue. Let us suppose a case -the taking of human life, for example. It is done in malice, or for gain. That is murder. It is done by the executioner, in obedience to law. That is a simple act of justice. It is done to save life. That is self-defence. It is done by accident, without design. That is no crime: Yet in all these cases the external act may be the same, the instrument the same, the effect produced the same. Evidently the moral quality lies not in the external act. Not in the Executive Volition.-Nor yet does the morality pertain to those mental states which immediately precede, and give rise to, the external act; since these are, necessarily, the same, whatever the moral character of the act. The volition which immediately precedes and produces the movement of the arm by which a blow is struck, is one and the same thing, whether that blow results in murder, or in the execution of justice, or in accidental homicide, or in self-defence. In any case, it is simply a volition to strike a blow by the movement of the arm. And so, also, of the resolution which precedes the direct volition, or effort of the will. Whatever imparts moral character to the act, taken as a whole, imparts it also to these constituent elements of the act; but in themselves, neither the external movement, nor the direct volition to move, nor the resolution or purpose to put forth such a volition, have any distinctive moral character. There is something else always to be taken into the account before we can determine the moral character of any of those elements which are involved in a moral act. - --- Consists in the Intention. That which gives character to the act, and which alone determines its moral quality, is the intention or design with which the act is performed. In the case supposed, it was the intention of one man to commit murder; he struck the blow for that purpose, with that design; and this intention constitutes his guilt. Hence he would have been really guilty of murder, in the sight of Him who knows the secrets of the heart, even had the blow failed to accomplish its purpose. The intention, the design was-murder. The intention of another man was the simple discharge of his duty as an officer of justice-a right intention, and so a right act. The design of another was to defend himself, or others, from lawless violence; and if we are satisfied that this was really his purpose, and that the act was necessary to that end, or even that he believed it to be so, we justify him at once from the imputation of crime. Still another man intended by the blow merely a certain mechanical effect; but the instrument which he wielded for that purpose, glancing from its intended course, struck down a bystander. The result was accidental. He who struck the fatal blow had no such design, and this being once ascertained, there is no longer the charge of guilt. We act upon this Rule.- In estimating the character of actions, we always proceed upon this principle. We look at the intention, the design of the doer; we seek to know what the person meant; and if we are satisfied that no wrong was intended, we exculpate him from blame; otherwise we hold him guilty. It is not so much the actual result as the intention that we look at. So, in respect to our own conduct, it is not so much what was actually accomplished, for good or ill, as what was designed and attempted, that forms the standard by which we estimate our own guilt or innocence our good or ill desert. The good man, sacrificing and toiling much for some worthy end, but all to little purpose, consoles himself by the reflection that his actions are to be weighed, not by their success, but their design; that he deserves well who meant and endeavored well. Where we are satisfied, on the other hand, that an act, however desirable in itself, is prompted by no good intention, we hesitate to assign it the rank of a virtue. A ruler requires the loyalty, love, and obedience of his subjects. That obedience they may render, however, not from loyalty or love, but from fear, or the desire of gain. With such obedience he is not satisfied. It is an obedience rendered, not for the sake of honoring or serving the ruler, but with a purely selfish design. There is no virtue in such obediThe case is the same with respect to the parent and his children, and with respect to man in his relations to the Supreme Ruler. God looks at the heart, scans the purposes of man; and as is the meaning and intention of the man, so, in his sight, is the man himself. ence. Virtue what. On the principle now established, we may define morality or virtue to be the doing right, intentionally, and because it is right. That alone is strictly a virtuous act which is done voluntarily done as right, and because it is believed to be right; in other words, which is done from a sense of duty. Whatever neglects, overlooks, or violates this rule, whatever other character it may possess, is not of the nature of true virtue. "That is a virtuous action," says Chalmers, "which a man voluntarily does on the simple ground that he ought to do it." CHAPTER V. FACULTIES OF THE MIND COGNIZANT OF RIGHT. our To explain in detail the operations of the several mental faculties, is the province of Psychology. To this it pertains to treat explicitly of the moral faculty, the power of the mind by which it perceives and recognizes moral truth, and also of the emotions awakened in view of such truth. So intimately, however, are these themes related to the Philosophy of Morals, that it seems necessary to consider them briefly in this connection. For a more full discussion of the nature and power of Conscience, the reader is referred to the sections which treat of these topics in my work on Mental Philosophy. Analysis of Conscience. When any moral act own, or that of another-is presented to our thoughts as an object of distinct consideration, the process through which the mind passes is somewhat peculiar, and will be found, if I mistake not, to comprise several distinct steps. or elements, essentially the same in all cases. There is, in the first place, an impression, or perception, more or less clear and decided, that the act in view is a right or a wrong act whichever it may be a recognition of it as such. This is an exercise of judgment, an intellectual operation. The proposition, or affirmation of the mind, in view of the case, is "That is right," or "That is not right." This decision is more or less clear and positive, in proportion as the act contemplated is more or less strongly marked in its features and general character. In some cases we hesitate, and form a doubtful opinion; in others, the decision is instantaneous and positive. No sooner is this decision reached, than there follows another mental state, the conviction or perception of obligation in respect to the act contemplated. The proposition now is, "I ought," or "I ought not." This, too, is an intellectual process, a conviction, a judgment; not unaccompanied, however, with feeling, which is the case indeed with most of our intellectual operations. That which awakens intellectual activity, awakens also some degree of feeling. Hence, we speak of feeling the truth of a proposition, or the force of an argument; of feeling our obligation to do this and that. A careful analysis, however, will show that the feeling, in this case, is distinct from the intellectual perception; that it succeeds, and is based upon such perception, and derives from it whatever character and strength it possesses. This idea of obligation, it may be further observed, relates to the past, as well as to the future. I ought to have done, or I ought not to have done, this or that, an act, the scene of which lies among the years that are long past, and in lands, it may be, remote. It extends also to the actions of others. We form our opinions, and pass our judgment, on the character and conduct of those about whom we read or hear. These persons ought, or ought not, to have done thus and thus. Further Analysis. When the obligation to a given course is perceived, there follows yet another state of mind, the approbation or disapproval of the conduct, according as it conforms to, or violates that obligation. This approving or condemning verdict is also an act of conscience, or the moral faculty-one of its specific and appropriate functions. Like the preceding, it is strictly, in the first instance, an intellectual act, an exercise of judgment, |