taught him that there must needs be a superintending Providence, to influence that order which all its parts preserve, for the sake of the Whole, in their continued revolutions, would soon instruct him in the absurdity of supposing, that the same care did not extend to Man, a creature of a far nobler nature than the most considerable of inanimate beings. beings. And therefore human affairs not being dispensed, at present, agreeably to that superintendence, he must conclude, that Man shall exist after death, and be brought to a future reckoning in another life, where all accounts will be set even, and all the present obscurities and perplexities in the ways of Providence unfolded and explained. From hence Religion acquires resistless force and splendor; and rises on a solid and unshaken basis*.

Now this doctrine of a FUTURE STATE being the only support of Religion under the present and ordinary dispensations of Providence, we conclude (which was what we had to prove) that the inculcating

*Hear an unexceptionable evidence to this whole matter: Et quidem (says the free-thinking Lord Herbert) præmium bonis, & supplicium malis, vel hac invita, vel post hanc vitam dari, statuebant Gentiles.-Nihil mage congruum naturæ divinæ esse docuerant, tum philosophorum, tum theologorum Gentilium præcipuorum scholæ, quam ut bona bonis, mala malis remetiretur Deus. Cæterum quum id quoque cernerent, quemadmodum viri boni calamitatibus miseriisque oppressi heic jacerent; mali improbique e contra lautitiis omnibus affluerent; certissimis ex justitia bonitateque divina argumentis deductis, bonis post hanc vitam præmium condignum, malis pœnam dari credebant: SECUS ENIM SI ESSET, NULLAM NEQUE JUSTITIÆ NEQUE BONITATIS DIVINE RATIONEM CONSTARE POSSE. De religione Gentilium, cap. Pramium vel pæna.

рапа.

this doctrine is NECESSARY to the well-being of Society.

That it was the general sentiment of mankind, we shall see hereafter; where it will be shewn, that there never was, in any time or place, a civilized People (the jewish only excepted) who did not found their Religion on this doctrine, as being conscious it could not be sustained without it. And as for the necessity of Religion itself to Society, the very enemies of all Religion are the loudest to confess it: for, from this apparent truth, the Atheist of old formed his famous argument against the divine origin of Religion; which makes so great a figure in the common systems of infidelity. Here then, even on our adversary's confession, we might rest our cause; but that we find (so inconstant and perverse is irreligion) some modern Apologists for Atheism have abandoned the system of their predecessors, and chosen rather to give up an argument against the divine original of religion, than acknowledge the civil use of it; which with much frankness and confidence they have adventured to deny.

These therefore having endeavoured to cut away the very ground we stand upon, in proof of our proposition, it will be proper to examine their pre

tensions.

SECT. III.

THE three great Advocates for this paradox are commonly reckoned POMPONATIUS, CARDAN, and BAYLE; who are put together, without distinction: whereas nothing is more certain than that, although

Cardan

Cardan and Bayle indeed defended it, Pomponatius was of a very different opinion: but Bayle had entered him into this service; and so great is Bayle's authority, that nobody perceived the delusion. It will be but justice then to give Pomponatius a fair hearing, and let him speak for himself.

This learned Italian, a famous Peripatetic of the fifteenth century, wrote a treatise* to prove that, on the principles of Aristotle, it could not be proved that the soul was immortal: but the doctrine of the mortality of the soul being generally thought to have very pernicious consequences, he conceived it lay upon him to say something to that objection. In his xiiith chapter, therefore, he enumerates those consequences; and in the xivth, gives distinct answers to each of them. That which supposeth his doctrine to affect society, is expressed in these words: Obj. 2 "in the second place, a man persuaded of the mortality of the soul ought in no case, even in the most urgent, to prefer death to life: And so, fortitude, "which teaches us to despise death, and, when our country, or the public good requires, even t chuse

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* De Immortalitate Animæ, printed in 12mo, An. 1534. It is of him chiefly that the celebrated Melchior Canus seems to speak, in the following words: "Audivimus "Italos quosdam, qui suis & Aristoteli & Averroï tantum ❝temporis dant, quantum sacris literis ii, qui maximè sacra "doctrina delectantur; tantum vero fidei, quantum Apos"tolis & Evangelistis ii qui maximè sunt in Christi doctrinam religiosi. Ex quo nata sunt in Italia pestifera illa "dogmata de mortalitate animi, & divina circa res humanas improvidentia, si verum est quod dicitur." Opera, 1. x. c. 5. p. 446. Colon. 1605, 8vo.

86 it, would be no more. Nor on such principles "should we hazard life for a friend: on the contrary,

we should commit any wickedness rather than "undergo the loss of it: which is contrary to what "Aristotle teacheth in his Ethics*." His reply to this, in the following chapter, is that virtue requires we should die for our country or our friends; and that virtue is never so perfect as when it brings no dower with it: But then he subjoins, "Philosophers, "and the learned, only know what pleasures the "practice of virtue can procure; and what misery "attends ignorance and vice:-but men not under

standing the excellence of virtue, and deformity of "vice, would commit any wickedness rather than sub"mit to death: to bridle therefore their unruly appe"tites, they were taught to be influenced by hope of "reward, and fear of punishment."-This is enough to shew what Pomponatius thought of the necessity of Religion to the State. He gives up so much of

Secundò, quia stante animi humani mortalitate, homo in nullo casu, quantumcunque urgentissimo, deberet eligere mortem: & sic removeretur fortitudo, quæ præcipit contemnere mortem, & quod pro patria & bono publico debemus mortem eligere: neque pro amico deberemus exponere animam nostram; imo quodcunque scelus & nefas perpetrare magis quam mortem subire: quod est contra Arist. 3 Ethic. & 9 ejusdem. P.99.

+ Soli enim philosophi & studiosi, ut dicit-Arist. 6 Ethic. sciunt quantam delectationem generent virtutes, & quantam miseriam ignorantia & vitia.-Sed quod homines non cognoscentes excellentiam virtutis & fœditatem vitii, omne scelus perpetrarent, priusquam mori: quare ad refrænandum diras hominum cupiditates, data est spes præmii & timor punitionis. P.119.

the

the objection as urges the ill consequence of the doctrine of the mortality to mankind in general; but in so doing hath not betrayed the cause he undertook; which was to prove that the belief of the mortality of the soul would have no ill influence on the practice of a learned Peripatetic: he pretends not that it would have no evil influence on the gross body of mankind to the prejudice of Society. This appears from the nature and design of the treatise; written entirely on peripatetic principles, to explain a point in that philosophy: by the force of which explanation, whoever was persuaded of the mortality of the soul, must give his assent on those principles; principles only fitted to influence learned men. It was his business therefore to examine, what effects this belief would have on such, and on such only. And this, it must be owned, he hath done with dexterity enough. But that this belief would be most pernicious to the body of mankind in general, he confesses with all ingenuity. And as his own words are the fullest proof that he thought with the rest of the world, concerning the influence of Religion, and particularly of the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments, on Society, I shall beg leave to transcribe them at large. "There are

some men of so ingenuous and well framed a nature, that they are brought to the practice of "virtue from the sole consideration of its dignity; "and are kept from vice on the bare prospect of its "baseness: but such excellent persons are very rare. "Others there are of a somewhat less heroie turn "of mind; and these, besides the dignity of virtue, " and the baseness of vice, are worked upon by fame "and honours, by infamy and disgrace, to shun evil