Hungary, whose interests were bound up with those of Germany, stood to lose everything she valued, and indeed her very existence as a kingdom, through such an event; and, between the two, the Austrian Government was helpless. The change of front regarding Alsace-Lorraine indicated above shows how impossible it was for Austria to emancipate herself from the guidance of the dominant partner; and the almost pathetic apology of the Emperor Carl (April 10, 1918), followed by the patronising acceptance of the Emperor William (April 12), showed that Austria-Hungary was doomed to sink or swim with her imperious ally.

Nor were the prospects of a general peace any brighter. The German Government, whatever the Reichstag was allowed to say, had given no sign whatever of an inclination to make peace on tolerable terms. The military party still reigned supreme. The Russian revolution may have given them some moments of anxiety; but they calculated, and calculated rightly, that, whether Kerensky retained power or gave way to more extreme men, Russia was practically lost to the Entente. By this event, in spite of America, the whole aspect of the war was changed. Even Mr Wilson, who had travelled a long way from his peace-without-victory phase, had convinced himself that attempts at pacification were premature. In his reply to the Papal note of Aug. 1, after pointing out that Germany was still dominated by the military caste, he said (Aug. 27) that 'to deal with such a power by way of peace, upon the plan proposed by His Holiness, would . . . involve a recuperation of its strength and a renewal of its policy.'

We have spent some time upon these abortive efforts of 1916-17 because it seems desirable to show, on the one hand, that peace could not have been had, on any tolerable terms or with any security for the future, in those years; and, on the other, that the aims of the Allies, as publicly set forth, were practically identical with those secured by the Peace. With the opening of the year 1918, the war entered on a new phase, marked, on the one hand, by President Wilson's successive formulations of principle, and, on the other, by the great German attacks, their eventual failure, and the Allied advance

which ended the war. On Jan. 8 the President, in his message to Congress, laid down his famous Fourteen Points. On Feb. 11 he stated four principles on which territorial adjustments should be made. On July 4 he somewhat amplified these principles, and added, among the ends he was fighting for, the destruction of every arbitrary power. Finally, on Sept. 27, he stated, in general terms, the issues involved, and, speaking especially of the League of Nations, declared that impartial justice must be done, without discrimination; that every particular settlement must be consistent with the common interest of all; and that there could be no special covenants or alliances and no selfish economic combinations within the League. Attention has been so much concentrated on the Fourteen Points that Mr Wilson's subsequent utterances have often been forgotten; but it should be observed that, equally with the Fourteen Points, they form the basis of the understanding arrived at on Nov. 11. How far they have been observed in the Treaty of Peace we shall endeavour presently to ascertain.

Already, before this last utterance, the disruption of the enemy forces had begun. On Sept. 14 the Austrian Government issued an appeal to the Pope to support their proposal for a conference of the belligerent Powers. This proposal was curtly declined by Mr Wilson (Sept. 16), at greater length but with equal firmness by Mr Balfour on the same day, and by M. Clemenceau two days later. On Sept. 25 Bulgaria requested an armistice, which was granted on Sept. 30. On Oct. 5 Prince Max of Baden, now Imperial Chancellor, addressed an appeal to President Wilson, begging him to intervene in order to bring about a general armistice with a view to negotiations for peace. He found in the Fourteen Points and the President's later utterances, especially the speech of Sept. 27, a programme for general peace which he was willing to accept. Similar appeals were simultaneously addressed to the President by Austria-Hungary and Turkey.

The President replied by asking certain questions bearing on the nature of the authority by which the proposal was made, and stated that he did not feel at liberty to propose a cessation of arms so long as the

armies of the Central Powers were upon invaded soil. The German Government replied (Oct. 12) that they accepted the terms and consented to evacuation. Mr Wilson's next note (Oct. 14) informed the German Government that the armistice, the conditions of which would be fixed by the military advisers of the Allies, must be such as would secure the 'present military supremacy of their armies in the field'; and reminded them that his terms included that stated by him on July 4, the destruction of every arbitrary power that can.. of its single choice disturb the peace of the world.'

The President's reply to the Austrian note was delayed for some ten days. It was not till Oct. 18 that he informed the Austrian Government that, owing to recent events in the Empire, he could no longer be content with the autonomy for the subject races which he had demanded on Jan. 8 (Point 10), but that they, having become independent, must decide their own future. This solution was accepted by Austria on Oct. 29.

On Oct. 20 the German Government assured the President that a complete change in the constitution having taking place, power in Germany now rested on a popular basis. Thereupon the President, taking note of this change and of the pledges given by the German Government, informed them (Oct. 23) that he had submitted the proposal for an armistice to the Powers 'associated' with the United States. At the same time he doubted whether the change of system effected in Germany was adequate, and repeated his declaration that he could deal only with veritable representatives of the German people.' If it had to deal with the military masters and monarchical autocrats of Germany' now or hereafter, his Government must demand, not peace negotiations, but surrender.' The abdication of the German Emperor

was the result.

On Oct. 29 the German authorities repeated their assurances that their Government was now, de facto and de jure, a popular government, to which the military powers were subordinated. The Allies having intimated to the President their willingness to make peace with Germany on the terms laid down in his address of Jan. 8, and the principles of settlement enunciated in his subsequent addresses,' with certain qualifications,' the

President, on Nov. 5, communicated this decision to the German Government. The qualifications' were only two. Firstly, the Allies pointed out that clause 2 of the Fourteen Points, concerning the Freedom of the Seas, was open to various interpretations, some of which they could not accept'; secondly, they made it clear that, under the term 'restoration,' mentioned in Points 7, 8 and 11, they understood that 'compensation would be made by Germany for all damages done to civilian population by land, by sea, and from the air.' Mr Wilson expressed his agreement with the second 'qualification' but said nothing about the first.

From the moment when the last Presidential note was despatched, the cessation of hostilities proceeded with rapidity. Bulgaria had, as we have seen, left the field on Sept. 30. On Oct. 31 an armistice was concluded with Turkey; on Nov. 3 one with Austria-Hungary. No serious difficulties were experienced with either of these Powers; but it took somewhat longer to reduce our principal antagonist to terms. On Nov. 7 the German delegates received the conditions from Marshal Foch. They made a strenuous resistance, and obtained certain not unimportant modifications, mainly in regard to the amount of matériel to be surrendered and the time allowed for evacuation. The armistice was signed on Nov. 11, and hostilities ceased the same day.

With regard to the conditions then imposed on Germany we do not propose to offer any observations, for they only embodied a temporary agreement. Many of the stipulations, such as the surrender of ships and matériel, and the evacuation of territory, were indeed final, but they were not terms of peace; they were but steps towards it. We need only say that, severe as the terms undoubtedly were, they were necessary in order to secure the object stated by Mr Wilson in two of his recent notes as indispensable, viz. to secure the military supremacy of the Allied armies in the field,' and to leave the Allies 'in a position to enforce any arrangements that may be entered into.'

With regard to the steps which led to the armistice, it may be observed that the method of procedure adopted by Mr Wilson was fraught with serious inconveniences. His position, as at once a belligerent and a mediator, was

somewhat illogical, but did not necessarily involve grave difficulties; the attitude of Napoleon III at the close of the Crimean War was somewhat similar. But Mr Wilson was so anxious to bring hostilities to a close that he acted with undue precipitancy; and he showed so little consideration for his associates' that he began the negotiations, and even carried them on for some time, without consulting them. This seems clear from the official British declaration of Oct. 21, and still more from the semi-official telegram of Oct. 23, which says that 'the first German note [of Oct. 5] was sent to Washington for transmission to the Allies, but, before definitively communicating it to them, the President put to the Germans a series of questions,' etc.

Further, the way in which these questions were put was itself inconvenient. The series was a succession of afterthoughts, each of Mr Wilson's four notes containing fresh demands. That this was likely to irritate and alarm the Germans did not perhaps matter much, but it would have been better, not to say more considerate towards the Allies, had the whole series been carefully thought out, in consultation with them, and submitted to the Germans in one collective document. Finally, in one most important respect, he went back on his previous utterances. Having said, on Oct. 5, that he could not submit the proposal for an armistice so long as the German armies were on invaded soil, he actually submitted it before the evacuation began.

It cannot be said that the Presidential diplomacy was faultless, but the defects noted are relatively unimportant, compared with the inopportuneness of the proposal when actually made. That Mr Wilson chose his own time for this, and chose it independently, seems clear from what has preceded. When put before the Allies, it would have been very difficult, if not impossible, for obvious reasons, for them to refuse. But note the result. Had the war continued for a fortnight longer, there seems to be no doubt that the German armies would have suffered another and a far greater Sedan. Nor is it probable that, considering the rapidly increasing demoralisation of the German forces, this result would have entailed any great loss. Needless to say, it was the sacred duty of all concerned to stop the