disaffection, and in some parts of the information he believed that even the word sedition was found. Would it be believed, except by persons who had seen the informations, that this third libel, which was selected for prosecution, was a mere repetition of the second, which the jury had found a libel upon the king, but not upon his ministers, and which they had recommended to the merciful consideration of the court? It contained, and pretty nearly in the same language, all that had been said in the second libel, as to his Majesty's not being able to exhibit himself to his people at places of public amusement. In finding that the second libel was a libel on the king, but not on his ministers, and in recommending the author of it to mercy, the jury had told the Court, and not only the Court, but also the Attorney-general, that prosecutions for similar offences should not be continued. Such a verdict as they gave-was a verdict with a farthing damages, or rather a nonsuit to the plaintiff, and no verdict at all. Could any man, who was not acquainted with the event, have believed that any Attorney-general would have proceeded with this third information, after the castigation which he had received for bringing forward the second? The jury, which tried the second information, retired for three hours, to consider their verdict; and whilst they were retired, and before the next case was called on, lord Tenterden was stated to have said, "What do you intend to do now, Mr. Attorney?" He would not say, that that speech was a hint to the Attorneygeneral of what he ought to do; but it was something very like it, It was giving the learned gentleman time to pause, it was affording him. a locus pœnitentiæ,—it was offering him time to revolve in his own mind what he ought to do,-it was furnishing him with room in which to turn round,-it was giving him a period in which a the It man might say to himself, "This won't do." But no, learned gentleman spurned the opportunity for reflection thus kindly thrown in his way, and he said boldly and at once, I mean to go on, my lord, with the next case." The case was called on accordingly; and he must repeat, that it was, as far as the king was concerned, a repetition of the same. libel, on which, though the jury had declared it to be a libel, no judgment had been, or would be, pronounced by the Court. would have been quite as well,— perhaps much better-if the Attorney-general, instead of proceeding with that case, had put his brief into his bag, and had said that he would consider till next morning whether he would bring it to trial or not. A verdict was given, on the third information, against Mr. Alexander, and was not accompanied by any recommendation to mercy. But though that was the case, he would declare it to be quite unprecedented that an Attorney-general should proceed upon a new information to try the same identical matter which he had already tried upon That was done in a former one. this case, in breach of all the mildness, fairness and impartiality, which on former trials had characterised former Attorney-generals. But the filing of that information, he further maintained, was an usurpation of the powers and privileges of the House of Commons. The alleged libel began with narrating certain proceedings in the House; it stated, that Mr. Secretary Peel had been seen to smile, while another member was describing the distress of the country, and then proceeded to animadvert on this supposed delinquency. He (sir Charles Wetherell) did not mean to say, that there were not in this publication, many coarse, rude, impertinent, and undeserved expressions, applied to the right hon. Secretary; and if Mr. Peel had come down to the House next day to complain of them, and had moved that Mr. Alexander should be brought to their bar, in consequence of them, he did not mean to assert that the right hon. gentleman would not have acted rightly in pursuing such a course, and that the House would not have acted rightly in taking up his complaint, and in leaving Mr. Alexander to be reprehended by the Speaker. This libel was published on the 16th of June, and the House of Commons was not prorogued till the 24th. No complaint, however, was made to the House respecting Mr. Alexander's conduct, and this part of the libel was therefore nothing more than a mere individual attack upon the conduct and character of the right hon. Secretary. Assuming, then, that this publication was a libel, and for the sake of argument he was ready not only to admit that point, but also that Mr. Alexander was liable to be punished for it by that House, he contended, that when a member was attacked in a public newspaper for his conduct in that House, the Attorney-general had no right to take the vindication of that member's conduct into his hands. He had investigated that point with considerable labour, and he was in consequence decidedly of opinion, that when the privileges of that House were invaded by any newspaper, the House ought not to delegate the vindication of them to any other party. For more than a century there had been no instance of such a mode of proceeding-and it could not be made a practice, for, while it was dishonouring to the House, it was oppressive to the individual, and necessarily most partial. If Mr. Alexander had been summoned to the bar of the House in June, 1829, instead of being dragged into court for punishment in January, 1830, the case would have been disposed of long since, at least so far as the quantum of punishment was concerned. It was true, that at that time there was no Attorney-general in being, but there was such a lawofficer as the Solicitor-general; and in Wilkes's case it had been ascertained, that when there was no Attorney-general, it was competent for the Solicitor-general to exercise all his functions. Shortly afterwards an Attorneygeneral was appointed, who, as soon as he received his appointment, started with these prosecutions. If that officer had a right to file ex officio informations for libels published against members of that House, for their conduct in the House, he must have a right, and making himself, as he did, the vindicator of the privileges of parliament, it was his duty, equally to protect all. But would it ever happen, that he would put forth his official powers against a libel, in favour of the government, on the parliamentary conduct of any of its habitual and troublesome opponents? The Attorney-general would protect every minister and ministerial mem- demning the smiles of Mr. Peel in to in consequence of the Attorneygeneral's proceedings, the libeller might be subjected to tenfold the punishment which would have been inflicted on him, had he been brought before the bar of the House. The Attorney-general answered to the charge against him connected with the first libel, viz. the having substituted an ex officio information, in place of the private prosecution, that he had done nothing but what was legal, and nothing that could produce hardship or oppression to the defendant. All that had been done in regard to the private application was, that the Court had granted a rule to shew cause why a criminal information should not be filed. The information never was filed, nor meant to be proceeded in. But the Court, by granting leave to file a criminal information, had declared its opinion, that the case was a fil case for filing anex officio information. Was not this much less strong, than to file an information, after having tried in vain a grand jury? When a grand jury ignored a bill, they refused to attach to the publication any such questionable character as should make it a fit subject of inquiry; but when the Court granted leave to file an information, the Court did declare that to be the character of the libel. If it was legal, then, to follow up the former, much more must it be legal to follow up the latter by an ex officio information. Some years ago, when the present lord Plunkett filled the office of attorney-general for Ireland, it happened that a * motion was brought forward in that House for an inquiry into his conduct, not for having filed an ex officio information with the sanction of the Court, but for having filed one after a grand jury had thrown out a bill. How did that eminent individual defend himself? There were certain cases in this country in which the like thing had been done; but Mr. Plunkett wanted. no precedent in this country, because he possessed one in Ireland, the particulars of which he stated as follows:-In October, 1811, the Attorney-general for Ireland indicted a person for writing a letter, in which he charged sir E. Littleton with having received a sum of money for the appointment of an individual to the office of barrack-master. The grand jury to whom the bill was preferred, ignored it. Another bill was prepared, and sent before another grand jury. This bill was likewise thrown out, and then, in the month of November following, the Attorney-general, who was Mr. Saurin, Mr. Plunkett's predecessor, filed an ex officio information. Mr. Saurin had never been called upon to explain the grounds of his proceedings. The difference between that and the present case was very striking. He had not filed an ex officio information after a grand jury had thrownout the bill, but after the Court of King's Bench had, by its sanction, shown that the case was a fit one for being proceeded against ex officio. He was still at a loss to see where the oppression existed in Mr. Alexander's case. The supposed danger of a double trial was imaginary. Whether Mr. Alexander had been convicted or acquitted on the ex officio information, he could not have been tried again for the same offence, from whatever quarter the attempt might be made. The Attorneygeneral further mentioned, that so far from Mr. Alexander finding fault with the ex officio proceeding, he, in his paper, and his counsel before the Court, had blamed the prosecutor for not adopting that very mode, and had represented him as a person afraid to come forward on his own responsibility-anxiously shielding himself under the sanction of the Court. His reason for changing the mode of proceeding was, that he found the information, as originally framed, was not authorised, in one of its counts, by the nature of the proceeding which had been adopted. The gentleman who drew it up had considered that the libel, although personally aimed at the lord chancellor, did not rest there; but that it also cast an imputation upon the Solicitor-general, that by some corrupt means he had attained to a situation amongst the king's servants. It was likewise consider ed, that the libel cast the imputation on the whole government, of not preferring men to office upon the ground of merit, but from the corrupt motive of private gain. He concurred in this view. He thought the case ought to be put upon that ground, and the libel, therefore, assumed a higher form of malignity, in which it ought to be stated to the jury. Under those circumstances, he had no hesitation in adopting the course of proceeding ex officio, particularly as he had been invited to do so both by the defendant and his advocate. As to the second information, for a libel on the king and his ministers, the Attorney-general said, that he could not see at what the argument against it was pointed. It was not maintained that an Attorney-general exceeded his duty in prosecuting ex officio a libel against the king; and both judge and jury had declared the publication in question to be such a libel. So far there seemed to be no ground for blame. The jury indeed had found that it was no libel on ministers :-but suppose they had given a general acquittal, was there no precedent of an ex officio information for a libel, even on the king, being followed by an acquittal? SirVicary Gibbs prosecuted Mr. Perry for such a libel: the defendant was acquitted, both judge and jury declaring the publication to be no libel; yet no man had proposed to bring before the House the conduct of sir Vicary Gibbs in filing the information. To the third information, the first objection had been, that it ought not to have been tried after the verdict, and the recommendation to mercy, in the second. That was not the case. The jury on the second trial had retired, and the third trial was over before they delivered their verdict. The second objection was, that the proceeding of the Attorney-general was an usurpation of the powers of the -House of Commons, which ought to be left to deal with libels on itself and its members for their conduct in the House. Now, he had always understood, that the great objection entertained by the public to such a mode of proceeding was, that the House made itself both accuser and judge, and judge, moreover, in its own cause; and, assuredly, there was no want of precedents for the course which he had adopted. Lord Eldon, when Attorney-general, had proceeded ex officio against persons who had |