OF HUMAN UNDERSTANDING.

BOOK I.-CHAP. I.

INTRODUCTION.

§ 1. An Inquiry into the Understanding, pleasant and useful.

S

INCE it

is the understanding that sets man above the reft of sensible beings, and gives him all the advantage and dominion which he has over them, it is certainly a fubject, even for its nobleness, worth our labour to inquire into. The understanding, like the eye, whilft it makes us fee and perceive all other things, takes no notice of itself; and it requires art and pains to fet it at a distance, and make it its own object. But whatever be the difficulties that lie in the way of this inquiry, whatever it be that keeps us so much in the dark to ourselves, sure I am, that all the light we can let in upon our own minds, all the acquaintance we can make with our own understandings, will not only be very pleasant, but bring us great advantage, in directing our thoughts in the search of other things.

§2. Defign.

THIS, therefore, being my purpose to inquire into the original, certainty, and extent of human knowledge, together with the grounds and degrees of belief, opinion, and affent, I shall not at present meddle with the physical confideration of the mind, or trouble myfelf to examine wherein its essence confifts, or by what motions of our spirits, or alterations of our bodies, we come to have any sensation by our organs, or any ideas in our understandings; and whether those ideas do, in their formation, any or all of them, depend on matter VOL. I.

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Introduction.

or no. These are speculations which, however curious and entertaining, I shall decline, as lying out of my way in the design I am now upon. It shall fuffice to my present purpose, to confider the difcerning faculties of a man, as they are employed about the objects which they have to do with: And I shall imagine I have not wholly misemployed myself in the thoughts I shall have on this occafion, if, in this historical plain method, I can give any account of the ways whereby our understandings come to attain those notions of things we have, and can fet down any measures of the certainty of our knowledge, or the grounds of those perfuafions which are to be found amongst men, so various, different, and wholly contradictory, and yet afferted fomewhere or other with fuch assurance and confidence, that he that shall take a view of the opinions of mankind, obfere their oppofition, and at the fame time confider the fondness and devotion wherewith they are embraced, the resolution and eagerness wherewith they are maintained, may perhaps have reason to fufpect, that either there is no fuch thing as truth at all, or that mankind hath no fufficient means to attain a certain knowledge of it.

§3. Method.

Ir is therefore worth while to search out the bounds between opinion and knowledge, and examine by what measures, in things whereof we have no certain knowledge, we ought to regulate our affent, and moderate our perfuafions. In order whereunto, I shall pursue this following method:

First, I shall inquire into the original of those ideas, notions, or whatever else you please to call them, which a man observes, and is confcious to himself he has in his mind, and the ways whereby the understanding comes to be furnished with them.

Secondly, I shall endeavour to show what knowledge the understanding hath by those ideas, and the certainty, evidence, and extent of it.

Thirdly, I shall make some inquiry into the nature and grounds of faith or opinion; whereby I mean that afTent which we give to any propofition as true, of whofe

truth yet we have no certain knowledge: And here we Chall have occafion to examine the reasons and degrees of affent.

§4. Useful to know the Extent of our Comprehenfion. Ir by this inquiry into the nature of the understanding I can discover the powers thereof, how far they reach, to what things they are in any degree proportionate, and where they fail us, I suppose it may be of use to prevail with the bufy mind of man to be more cautious in meddling with things exceeding its comprehenfion, to stop when it is at the utmost extent of its tether, and to fit down in a quiet ignorance of those things which, upon examination, are found to be beyond the reach of our capacities. We should not then perhaps be fo forward, out of affectation of an universal knowledge, to raise questions, and perplex ourselves and others with disputes about things to which our understandings are not fuited, and of which we cannot frame in our minds any clear or distinct perceptions, or whereof (as it has perhaps too often happened) we have not any notions at all. If we can find out how far the understanding can extend its view, how far it has faculties to attain certainty, and in what cases it can only judge and guess, we may learn to content ourselves with what is attainable by us in this state.

§5. Our Capacity fuited to our State and Concerns. For though the comprehenfion of our understandings comes exceeding short of the vast extent of things, yet we shall have cause enough to magnify the bountiful Author of our being for that portion and degree of knowledge he has bestowed on us, so far above all the rest of the inhabitants of this our manfion. Men have reafon to be well fatisfied with what God hath thought fit for them, fince he has given them (as St. Peter says) πάντα πρὸς ζωὴν και ευσέβειαν, whatsoever is necessary for the conveniencies of life and information of virtue, and has put within the reach of their difcovery the comfortable provifion for this life, and the way that leads to a better. How short foever their knowledge may come of an univerfal or perfect comprehenfion of whatsoever is, it yet fecures their great concernments, that they have light enough to lead them to the knowledge of their Maker, and the fight of their own duties. Men may find matter sufficient to bufy their heads, and employ their hands, with variety, delight, and fatisfaction, if they will not boldly quarrel with their own conftitution, and throw away the blessings their hands are filled with, because they are not big enough to grafp every. thing. We shall not have much reafon to complain of the narrowness of our minds, if we will but employ them about what may be of use to us, for of that they are very capable; and it will be an unpardonable, as well as childish peevishness, if we undervalue the advantages of our knowledge, and neglect to improve it to the ends for which it was given us, because there are some things that are set out of the reach of it. It will be no excufe to an idle and untoward fervant, who would not attend his business by candle-light, to plead that he had not broad funshine. The candle that is set up in us shines bright enough for all our purposes. The discoveries we can make with this ought to fatisfy us; and we shall then use-our understandings right, when we entertain all objects in that way and proportion that they are fuited to our faculties, and upon those grounds they are capable of being proposed to us, and not peremptorily or intemperately require demonftration, and demand certainty, where probability only is to be had, and which is fufficient to govern all our concernments. If we will disbelieve every thing, because we cannot certainly know-all things, we shall do much-what as wifely as he who would not use his legs, but fit still and perish, because he had no wings to fly.

§ 6. Knowledge of our Capacity, a Cure of Scepticism

and Idleness.

WHEN we know our own Arength, we shall the better know what to undertake with hopes of fuccess: And when we have well furveyed the powers of our own minds, and made fome eftimate what we may expect from them, we shall not be inclined either to fit still, and not fet our thoughts on work at all, in despair of