knowing any thing; or, on the other fide, question every thing, and difclaim all knowledge, because fome things are not to be understood. It is of great use to the failor to know the length of his line, though he cannot with it fathom all the depths of the ocean: It is well he knows that it is long enough to reach the bottom at fuch places as are neceffary to direct his voyage, and caution him against running upon shoals that may ruin him. Our business here is not to know all things, but those which concern our conduct. If we can find out those measures whereby a rational creature, put in that state which man is in this world, may and ought to govern his opinions, and actions depending thereon, we need not be troubled that some other things escape our knowledge.

§7. Occasion of this Effay. THIS was that which gave the first rise to this Effay concerning the Understanding; for I thought that the first step towards fatisfying several inquiries the mind of man was very apt to run into, was, to take a survey of our own understandings, examine our own powers, and fee to what things they were adapted. Till that was done, I suspected we began at the wrong end, and in vain fought for fatisfaction in a quiet and fure poffeffion of. truths that most concerned us, whilst we let loose our thoughts into the vast ocean of being, as if all that boundless extent were the natural and undoubted pofsession of our understandings, wherein there was nothing exempt from its decisions, or that escaped its comprehenfion. Thus men, extending their inquiries beyond their capacities, and letting their thoughts wander into those depths where they can find no fure footing, it is no wonder that they raise questions, and multiply difputes, which, never coming to any clear refsolution, are proper only to continue and increase their doubts, and to confirm them at last in perfect scepticifm; whereas, were the capacities of our understandings well" confidered, the extent of our knowledge once discovered, and the horizon found which fets the bounds between the enlightened and dark parts of things, be

tween what is and what is not comprehenfible by us, men would perhaps, with less scruple, acquiefce in the avowed ignorance of the one, and employ their thoughts and difcourse with more advantage and fatisfaction in the other.

§ 8. What Idea stands for.

THUS much I thought neceffary to say concerning the occafion of this inquiry into human understanding; but before I proceed on to what I have thought on this fubjet, I must here, in the entrance, beg pardon of my reader for the frequent use of the word idea, which he will find in the following treatise. It being that term which I think serves best to stand for whatsoever is the object of the understanding when a man thinks, I have used it to express whatever is meant by phantasm, notion, species, or whatever it is which the mind can be employed about in thinking; and I could not avoid frequently using it.

I prefume it will be easily granted me that there are fuch ideas in mens minds; every one is confcious of them in himself, and mens words and actions will fatisfy him that they are in others.

Our first inquiry, then, shall be, how they come into the mind.

I

CHAP. II.

NO INNATE PRINCIPLES IN THE MIND.

§ 1. The way shown how we come by any Knowledge, fufficient to prove it not Innate.

T is an established opinion amongst some men, that there are in the understanding certain innate principles, fome primary notions, Kouαὶ ἔνιοιαι, characters, as it were, stamped upon the mind of man, which the foul receives in its very first being, and brings into the world with it. It would be fufficient to convince unprejudised readers of the falseness of this supposition, if I should only show (as I hope I shall in the following parts of this difcourse) how men, barely by the use of

their natural faculties, may attain to all the knowledge they have without the help of any innate impreflions, and may arrive at certainty without any fuch original notions or principles: For I imagine any one will eafily grant, that it would be impertinent to suppose the ideas of colours innate in a creature to whom God hath given L fight, and a power to receive them by the eyes from external objects: And no less unreasonable would it be to attribute several truths to the impressions of nature and innate characters, when we may observe in ourfelves faculties fit to attain as easy and certain knowledge of them, as if they were originally imprinted on the mind.

But because a man is not permitted without censure to follow his own thoughts in the search of truth, when they lead him ever so little out of the common road, I shall fet down the reasons that made me doubt of the truth of that opinion, as an excuse for my mistake, if I be in one, which I leave to be confidered by those who with me dispose themselves to embrace truth wherever they find it.

§2. General Affent the great Argument. THERE is nothing more commonly taken for granted, than that there are certain principles, both speculative and practical (for they speak of both), universally agreed upon by all mankind, which therefore, they argue, must needs be conftant impressions, which the fouls of men receive in their first beings, and which they bring into the world with them, as neceffarily and really as they do any of their inherent faculties.

§3. Universal Confent proves nothing Innate. This argument, drawn from univerfal confent, has this misfortune in it, that if it were true, in matter of fact, that there were certain truths wherein all mankind agreed, it would not prove them innate, if there can be any other way shown how men may come to that univerfal agreement in the things they do confent in, which I prefume may be done.

§ 4. What is, is, and, It is impossible for the fame thing to be, and not to be, not univerfally affented

to.

BUT, which is worse, this argument of universal confent, which is made use of to prove innate principles, feems to me a demonstration that there are none such, because there are none to which all mankind give an universal affent. I shall begin with the Speculative, and instance in those magnified principles of demonstration, Whatsoever is, is, and, It is impoffible for the same thing to be, and not to be; which of all others I think have the most allowed title to innate. These have so settled a reputation of maxims universally received, that it will no doubt be thought strange if any one should feem to question it; but yet I take liberty to say, that these propofitions are so far from having an universal assent, that there are a great part of mankind to whom they are not so much as known.

§ 5. Not on the mind naturally imprinted, because not known to Children, Idiots, &c. For, first, it is evident that all children and idiots have not the least apprehenfion or thought of them; and the want of that is enough to destroy that univerfal affent which must needs be the necessary concomitant of all innate truths; it seeming to me near a contradiction to say, that there are truths imprinted on the foul, which it perceives or understands not; imprinting, if it fignify any thing, being nothing else but the making certain truths to be perceived; for to imprint any thing on the mind, without the mind's perceiving it, feems to me hardly intelligible. If, therefore, children and idiots have fouls, have minds, with those impressions upon them, they must unavoidably perceive them, and neceffarily know and affent to thefe truths, which since they do not, it is evident that there are no fuch impressions; for if they are not notions naturally imprinted, how can they be innate ? and if they are notions imprinted, how can they be unknown? To say a notion is imprinted on the mind, and yet at the fame time to say that the mind is ignorant of it, and never yet took notice of it, is to make this impression nothing. No proposition can be faid to be in the mind, which it never yet knew, which it was never yet confcious of; for if any one may, then, by the fame reason, all propositions that are true, and the mind is capable of ever afsenting to, may be faid to be in the mind, and to be imprinted, fince, if any one can be faid to be in the mind, which it never yet knew, it must be only because it is capable of knowing it; and so the mind is of all truths it ever shall know: Nay, thus truths may be imprinted on the mind, which it never did, nor ever shall know; for a man may live long, and die at last in ignorance of many truths which his mind was capable of knowing, and that with certainty: So that, if the capacity of knowing be the natural impression contended for, all the truths a man ever comes to know will, by this account, be every one of them innate; and this great point will amount to no more but only to a very improper way of speaking, which, whilft it pretends to affert the contrary, says nothing different from those who deny innate principles; for nobody, I think, ever denied that the mind was capable of knowing feveral truths. The capacity, they fay, is innate, the knowledge acquired: But then to what end fuch conteft for certain innate maxims? If truths can be imprinted on the understanding without being perceived, I can see no difference there can be between any truths the mind is capable of knowing, in refpect of their original; they must all be innate, or all adventitious; in vain shall a man go about to distinguish them. He therefore that talks of innate notions in the understanding, cannot (if he intend thereby any distinct fort of truths) mean such truths to be in the understanding as it never perceived, and is yet wholly ignorant of; for if these words (to be in the un-derstanding) have any propriety, they fignify to be understood; fo that, to be in the understanding, and not to be understood; to be in the mind, and never to be: perceived, is all one as to say, any thing is, and is not,. in the mind or understanding. If, therefore, these two propofitions, Whatsoever is, is, and, It is impoffible for