Governor who pointed out that he could not act in the manner laid down except by the aid of his ministers, on whose advice he would act. Other cases are the duties of Governors under the Extradition and Fugitive Offender Acts, under the Merchant Shipping Act, under the Territorial Waters Jurisdiction Act, and minor Acts; in each of them it will be seen on analysis that it is presupposed that the Governor acts with the full aid of a colonial administration, which is as much as to say that he acts on the advice of his ministers.

CHAPTER V

THE DISSOLUTION OF PARLIAMENT AND THE DISMISSAL OF MINISTERS

1. THE DISSOLUTION OF PARLIAMENT

In the cases hitherto discussed the apparent exceptions to the rule that a Governor, like the King, acts on ministerial advice rest on two grounds, either the fact that in some cases action on such advice may expose the Governor to the risk of breaking the law, which it is his duty to uphold,1 or that he has Imperial interests to consider and Imperial instructions to carry out.2 In neither of these cases does there seem to be on examination any fundamental reason for breaking the rule of responsible government, and the Governor might well be freed from legal liability and thus not put in the position of having to defy the law, and might also well be instructed to act always on ministerial advice. The only apparent exceptions to this rule which would convert him into a viceroy proper would be cases in which joint Imperial and Dominion responsibility was involved, as when British and Dominion troops were operating together in a Dominion, or when the question of the grant of Imperial honours was concerned.

But the question of the meaning of acting on ministerial responsibility brings us to a most important and characteristic difference between the constitutional practice of the United Kingdom and that of the self-governing Dominions, a difference which is often hardly realized through the vagueness of the term ministerial responsibility. In the United Kingdom it means in the first place that a minister must take responsibility for every act of the Crown; that, as the Crown can commit no wrong, if the Crown acts officially, 1 Above, chap. ii. 2 Above, chap. iv.

its action must be countersigned or otherwise adopted by ministerial authority. In the second place it means that the minister is responsible to Parliament. These two considerations are enough to establish a parliamentary form of government as opposed to constitutions such as the constitutions of the German Empire and of Prussia, where the acts of the Sovereign are covered by ministerial responsibility, but the minister is not responsible to any power except the Sovereign. But in parliamentary government as practised in the United Kingdom there must be added the further rule that the King can only act on the advice of a minister who is actually holding office, and that without such advice he cannot act. This further point differentiates the constitutional practice of the United Kingdom from that of countries like Italy and Greece, where the King can constitutionally refuse to accept the advice of ministers provided he can find other ministers, or, more strictly, persons ready to become ministers and to accept responsibility for the action of the Sovereign,

It is true that this doctrine is not always accepted as part of the received constitutional law of the country. Is it to be contended that the Sovereign would have no power to dismiss a Ministry which, having forfeited the favour of the country, clung to office with the aid of a parliamentary majority which had notoriously ceased to be in harmony with the electorate, or, still worse, without a parliamentary majority at all? Would it not be the duty of the King to decline to accept the advice of such ministers and to give the people the free right to exercise their choice of a new Ministry through the action of their representatives in Parliament? The answer to both these questions is, however, less difficult than might be expected. The essential basis of the British constitution, as it stands at present, is the close correspondence between the electorate and Parliament, which ensures that at the outset of a Parliament the Ministry of the day shall in great measure faithfully express the will of the majority of the electorate. The comparatively short duration of Parliament minimizes the

possibility of the discord between Parliament and the electorate becoming serious, while, it must be remembered, as the members of Parliament are subject to the same influences as the electorate, and also to the pressure of their constituencies, a clear change of feeling among the electors reveals itself among the members of Parliament. Of this there can be no more striking example than the resignation of Mr. Balfour's Government in 1905 when in possession nominally of a decisive parliamentary majority, which, however, through the change of feeling in the country, owing to the rise of new issues which were not present to the minds of the electors of the Parliament, had ceased to be really effective for constructional work. Even in such a case as this the balance of advantage lies in the strict application of the constitutional rule: any action of the Sovereign would have introduced yet a new factor into the situation as it existed in 1905 and have obscured the issues. Moreover, it is, and must always be, a matter of the most grave difficulty to decide whether the people really approve or not the existing Government, and it is not desirable that the Crown should be involved in action which must rest on doubtful calculation, and which in any case at once submits the person of the Sovereign to the bitterness of political discussion. In the second case the argument in favour of the inaction of the Crown is overwhelming: there is no real possibility of any Government defying Parliament for any considerable length of time: they cannot but meet Parliament every few months, and a distinct defeat in Parliament must be retrieved by an even more distinct vote of confidence, or resignation must follow.

In view of these considerations the statements that from time to time are made, that the Sovereign has a discretion to dismiss ministers1 and to dissolve Parliament, cannot be taken too seriously. It was, of course, very freely suggested during the struggle over the Parliament Act that the King should decline to accept the advice of the Ministry to give an undertaking that he would permit the use of his power 1 See, e. g., Sir C. Dilke, Journal of Royal Society of Arts, lvi. 344.

to create peers with a view to securing the passage of the Bill through the Upper House. But, while those who pressed this view were frequently indiscreet in their protest against the powerlessness of the Crown if it could not act as they wished, they ignored the fact that had the Crown acted on their advice the inevitable result would have been that the political strife would have changed from an attack on the privileges of the aristocracy to an attack on the monarchy, and the position of the Sovereign would have been gravely affected. It is easy to argue that a King who must accept the advice of his ministers serves no useful purpose, but the argument is as wrong as it is simple, and aims at the very existence of the British monarchy. The very fact that in the long run the Sovereign will act on the advice of ministers places the Crown in a position of great influence and effect when it seeks to exercise a moderating control over the action of the Government. The discussions between the Prime Minister and the King do not assume the difficult and hostile form of a dispute between equal authorities, but take the form of a discussion in which it is the clear duty of the Prime Minister and of the Cabinet of which he is the head to make every effort to meet the views of the Sovereign, and to make it clear that the action which they are taking is the deliberate will of the majority of Parliament and of the electorate. Such a position in the long run has far more effect in moderating political action than any effort made by one party to play the Crown as a pawn in their efforts to meet the tactics of the other, however unfair they may deem these tactics to be.

These theoretical arguments may be applied to the specific case of a dissolution of Parliament. It has recently been contended that the power to require a dissolution is one which rests constitutionally with the King even against the desire of his ministers. Put in its most favourable form the argument runs that no self-respecting Executive confident in the support of the country would ever withhold

1 See the discussion by Mr. James Caldwell and Mr. Swift MacNeill, Times, Sept. 22, 24, 29; Oct. 1, 1915.