then perceived that to deprive a great and vigorous nation of all outlet for its colonising energies is to stop a safety-valve which, renders innocuous those explosive forces that otherwise may take more harmful directions. The result, in the case of Germany, will inevitably be that her adventurous spirits, supported by her Government, will turn their attention to the East. The Mitteleuropa plan way be revived in another form. Poland and Russia are, in any case, open fields for commercial and other forms of peaceful penetration, from which political influence will inevitably result. Such methods can be pursued in countless ways without giving the League any handle for intervention. And they are certain to be followed; for what else can Germany do? A nation of between 60 and 70 millions, as capable, in many ways, as any on earth, is not going to sit inactive within ts borders very long.

It will be replied that, whether this be so or not, it vas impossible to return any of the German colonies, irstly, because, by her treatment of the natives, at least n Africa, she had shown herself unfit to rule over bararous peoples; secondly, because she was credited, on good grounds, with the intention of raising a vast black rmy which might have overrun the whole continent nd of using her colonial ports as bases for submarine varfare; lastly, because in certain cases, it was unfair nd might have been disastrous to our self-governing Dominions to expose them to the dangers which the ontiguity of German possessions implies. These are all ood reasons; and, in the case of German S.W. Africa, few Guinea, and Samoa with other Pacific islands, the st was imperative. But with regard to her other frican possessions the matter is not equally clear. ranted that the interests of France demanded the ceson of Togoland and the Cameroons, there remains erman East Africa, which has fallen to Great Britain. Now there can be no doubt that Germany's treatment the native races was, at the outset, brutal in the xtreme; but there is good reason to believe that, if aly from considerations of self-interest, there had been nsiderable improvement in recent years. And it may remarked that, if this is to be the test, there are other ations which would have forfeited their claim to tropical

possessions long ago. In other respects we must concede that the German colonies were, latterly, well and successfully administered, and that great material development had taken place. Had we returned East Africa, we might have retained possession of its western portion, to secure the corridor, complete the Cape-to-Cairo railway, and control the great highway of the lakes. Under the supervision of the League, it would surely not have been difficult to obtain adequate guarantees against the formation of a native army, against the use of the ports for any but commercial purposes, and against abuses of power, of which forced labour is the chief. It cannot indeed be said that, considering all the circumstances, there is any injustice in the forfeiture to which Germany has been condemned; we regret it from considerations of enlightened self-interest.

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For ourselves, the possessions of the British Empire -and its responsibilities-are surely large enough with out German East Africa. We have lost terribly in this war, but, as a result, our Empire is largely increased. We could have done without this additional colony; and its restoration to Germany, under strict conditions, would have been an act of generosity which would have done more than anything else within the bounds of b possibility to pave the way to that ultimate reconcilia tion without which the world cannot attain harmony or even the League of Nations continue to exist.

We have dealt at some length with the territorial articles of the Treaty, because they are in some ways the most important, and, we may hope, the most permanent in their main results. But the territorial articles form little more than one-third of the whole; and those which follow, though mostly of a temporary nature and not unlikely to be revised, are for the immediate future not less important than the changes in the map.

A long series of military, naval and air clauses (Arts. 159-213) provides for the demobilisation of the German, and fixes the number of troops, etc., the ships of war, and the quantity of supplies which Germany may in future possess. We cannot enter into the details of these enactments; it must suffice to say that they amount to the practical disarmament of Germany. They

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may, and doubtless will, be revised when she enters the League; their object is to secure the execution of the terms of peace, and 'to render possible the initiation of a general limitation of the armaments of all nations.'

After certain stipulations regarding the repatriation of prisoners and interned civilians, and the care of graves (Arts. 214-226), the Treaty proceeds (Arts. 227230), firstly, to 'arraign William II of Hohenzollern for a supreme offence against international morality and the sanctity of treaties,' and to create a tribunal for his trial, with the right to inflict any punishment it may consider just. Secondly, other persons 'accused of acts in violation of the laws and customs of war' may be brought before the military tribunals of the Allied Powers concerned, and, if guilty, will be sentenced to punishments laid down by law.'

On the question of trying those directly guilty of the crimes which have horrified us during the last five years, there is little disagreement. No nation which believes in law and in the deterrent effect of merited punishment, or which desires to limit, so far as possible, the evils of war, can afford to pass over in silence what has been done; while some cases, such as the judicial murder of Captain Fryatt, involving (as it did) the right of self-defence, cannot be ignored without admitting a fatal departure from the recognised principles of international law. But with regard to the trial of the late Emperor there is a wide division of opinion. Outside Germany it is generally agreed that the responsibility for the war rests with that country and her allies; and that the invasion of Belgium, with all it implied, was a high crime against international morality. But that responsibility falls on the enemy countries as a whole; and they have been condignly punished. The question is whether the misdoings in question can be brought home to William II. Even in Germany the head of the State is no absolute autocrat; and the trial will involve the most difficult questions of constitutional law and practice. Considering the circumstances, and the composition of the tribunal, condemnation may be regarded as a foregone conclusion. We do not consider the want of law and precedent to be a bar to judicial proceedings; for in unprecedented circumstances law and precedent Vol. 232.—No. 460.

have to be made. But will the world at large regard as judicial a trial in which the aggrieved parties are judges, or their verdict as legal and unbiassed? ho

There would have been much more to say for trying the late Emperor on the counts to be brought against officials under the second head; for it would be unjust to try subordinates for acting on orders emanating from higher authority, while leaving that authority untouched. There can be no doubt, for instance, that the sinking of the Lusitania' and the ruthless submarine warfare could be brought home to William II; for the Emperor's control of the navy was direct and absolute. But the Allies, by restricting the charge against him to the initiation of the war and the violation of treaties, have deliberately cut themselves off from such proceedings.

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If the late Emperor had to be tried, it should at all events have been in a neutral country and before a neutral court. Even an acquittal, under these conditions, t would not have implied approval of the war; it would only have meant a refusal to regard the culprit as solely guilty. Many other considerations, such as the undesirability of making William II a martyr in the eyes of the German people, and of raising up and perpetuating & Hohenzollern legend like that of Napoleon, might be urged; but enough has perhaps been said to show why we regard the arraignment, in its actual form, as a grave mistake, and an unfortunate concession to thoughtless popular clamour.

The enactments concerning Reparation occupy Arts. 231-244, with seven long annexes which go into minute particulars. We cannot attempt to summarise them here. It must suffice to say, in the first place, that Reparation is limited to damage done in and through the war. There is no demand for Indemnities, properly so called, i.e. repayment for the costs of the war, such as were exacted by Germany after her triumphs over Austria-Hungary and France. The Allies were precluded from making such a demand by acceptance of the Fourteen Points, even with the reservation mentioned above (p. 236). There was some difference of legal opinion on this head; and it was maintained that the omission of Indemnities in that document was not prohibitive. Had the prohibition of Indemnities been

intended, they would (it is urged) have been specifically forbidden. Common sense, no less than considerations of honour, appears to exclude this interpretation. The omission was unfortunate, and was another instance of the mischievous results due to the haste and want of consideration with which Mr Wilson's programme was accepted. But the United States, it is generally understood, stood firm, and their arguments prevailed.

What probably weighed still more at the Conference was the consideration that the limit of Germany's capacity for payment, without permanent injury to her industrial activities and therefore to the commercial and financial interests of the Allies, would be reached long before the sum required for the repair of actual damages was obtained. Consequently, had Indemnities been included, the states which had suffered most in the war would have been the losers, while those which had spent most would have gained. Moreover, to calculate the actual costs, considering the enormous amount of waste, would have been an almost hopeless task.

No one who has seen the awful devastation of northern France, or who knows anything of the damages inflicted there and elsewhere, can regard the pecuniary compensation (fixed provisionally at 5,000,000,0007.) as excessive. In point of fact, it will not come anywhere near covering the destruction wrought; and it would have been fixed at a far higher figure had not enlightened self-interest intervened. Nor will the reparation in the matter of shipping come near covering our maritime losses. The net result is that we and our allies are left with an enormous addition to our National Debts, to be borne as best we may. It is true-though it seems to be generally forgotten-that some compensation is to be found in those vast and rich lands, especially Mesopotamia, that have passed under our sway; but, after all, these territorial gains cannot be set in the balance against our losses, of which the financial are the least.

With regard to the Financial clauses (Arts. 245-263), the want of space forbids more than a note that, as Germany refused to take over, in 1871, any part of the French debt on account of Alsace-Lorraine, France now recovers those provinces unburdened by any share in the German debt; and that Germany pays (as is usual in