Art. 4.-STATE MORALITY.

THE question, how far the dictates of individual morality apply to the conduct of the State, is one of the highest practical importance at the present time, while it also embodies a strictly scientific problem, connected both with the axioms of ordinary ethics and with the view taken by sociology of the meaning and significance of the State. And yet, while it is true that a few politicians and constitutional lawyers have recently occupied themselves with certain aspects of the question, and that a few pamphlets dealing with it have appeared, chiefly in Germany, the students of ethics or sociology have not hitherto paid much attention to it.

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The following observations are not based upon any special moral principle, whether of transcendentalism or tilitarianism or the principle of evolution. It is possible to agree with me, irrespective of the way in which one conceives of the genesis of the ordinary moral laws. For thousands of years the human intellect has laboured Co shape the ethical constitutional laws which govern che mind and actions of men. One may conceive of these aws as the work of man, as a stage in the ordinary progress of civilisation; or as a categorical imperative with sovereign rights over human life, which needs only o be recognised ever more and more clearly. In any ase we have before us a splendid intellectual achievenent, which is becoming to an increasing extent the pint property of the whole human race. Speaking enerally, nobody in our days is in doubt as to what is Dod and honourable between man and man. Lying, eating, stealing, violence, and so forth, are not only roper subjects for the reaction of the penal laws, but so come under a common moral condemnation. And en do homage in their hearts to the great laws of otherhood, although they may be very far from alising them in their lives.

All the more surprising is it, then, that there should a great and important field of human intercourse, in

Since this article was written, two essays by the late Prof. Henry lgwick, bearing on this subject, have been reprinted, under the title ational and International Right and Wrong,' with a preface by Lord yce (Allen and Unwin, 1919).

which the applicability of the ethical laws is still regarded by the bulk of mankind as an open question. Yet this is a field with which we come in contact, so to speak, every day, and which has the greatest significance for the welfare and development of mankind. I am thinking of the Foreign Policy of States, their actions in international intercourse, trade policy, colonial policy, international controversies, treaties, war and peace.

Now it is certainly in this field that the doubt and confusion of thought are most obvious. But if we look closer, we find that this doubt and confusion really start deeper down. They actually begin at every point where men step beyond the narrowest sphere of their private life, and where co-operation with others in business and public life takes place. For, when one has to act for or on behalf of others, there come into play conflicting interests, which at times culminate in a collision of duties. One has duties both in respect of him for whom one is acting, and in respect of him towards whom one is acting. The manager of a company, for instance, may find that out of regard to the shareholders he cannot accommodate the workmen in the industry to the same extent, or act as openly and honourably towards customers or competitors, as he would have done if the business had been his own. This circumstance furnishes indeed, one of the darker sides of the widespread applica tion of the shareholding principle in industrial life which marks our time. The difference is perhaps still clearer in the contrast between the independent individual and the trustee. The individual is entitled to spend his whole fortune in charity if he likes; the trustee cannot do so for he has to safeguard the rights of others. Now the Government of a State is in the position of a trustee for the nation committed to its charge.

Here may at once be seen the reason why the above mentioned uncertainty in regard to the ethical verdict on the actions of political societies, especially of the State, occurs almost entirely in one great field of govern mental activity-the international relations of the State not its domestic functions. For there does not ente into the latter domain any collision of duties such as ha been alluded to. No one is in doubt that the Stat

ould aim at the advancement of its citizens' spiritual ad bodily welfare, in its Church policy, its educational olicy, its social policy; that the axioms of morality mould actuate the State in its labours to promote lightenment, to eliminate poverty, to help the weak, ad to promote national welfare by means of social forms, old-age and health insurance, employment reaus, factory legislation, etc.

The fundamental moral laws have thus completely ptured one side of the State's activity, namely, the ner. On the other hand, they have not conquered the cher, the outer side--the State's activity as an interational legal entity, as a member of the great society peoples. It is here, as already indicated, that we nfront a curious groping uncertainty. Practice lags finitely behind the moral conquests of advancing vilisation in all other departments of life; and theory, already remarked, has ventured but little into this eld. Wherever it has done so, opinions are divided.

From one quarter it is asserted-with greater or naller differences of statement-that the foreign policy States is practically exempt from the moral laws. If ates in their mutual relations are actuated by the evil otives which we condemn in individuals, such as vetousness, vanity, envy, desire for revenge, and the xe, they do not, according to this view, incur the same vere censure as the individual. On the contrary, States e entitled to regard solely what is in their own interest, satisfy their need of expansion at their neighbours' pense, to let force decide all disputes and the strong minate the weak. In statements built up on this ain of reasoning, it is declared that international policy s 'on the other side of good and evil,' and need not cognise a moral judgment. Societies (it is said) have no nscience; questions of foreign policy are and always ust be questions of power; self-interest is decisive, and moral consideration will, or ought to, hinder the ronger from using his power. For it follows from e law of natural selection that the strong conquers e weak; war is the only just court of appeal among oples; and the verdict of History actually consists in is, that it confers on the State which has shown its pacity for conquest the right to rule. The conclusion

of the whole matter is, that the morality of altruism o the feeling of brotherhood can only be applied between individuals, but not between States. And this conclusio is supported by quoting one or another great statesman' motto: Might before right,' 'My country, right a wrong,' and the like.

Absolutely opposed to this whole line of argumen is the other-perhaps now the most prevalent-accor ing to which the actions of the individual and those the State come under exactly the same ethical judg ment. What is wrong, dishonourable, sinful for th individual man is equally so for the society, the peopl the municipality or the State; to lie is to lie, whoev does it; likewise in the case of fraud, burglary, the murder, violence, oppression or slander; and wheth it is a horse or a province that is misappropriate whether the suppression of truth occurs in dealing wi a business customer or a foreign government, the actie incurs exactly the same moral judgment. And fro this point of view I suppose it would be added that kill some hundreds of thousands or millions of anoth State's citizens cannot at least be judged more mild than to murder a single man.

In order to see clearly what is right and wrong her one ought first to distinguish between the moral clair which on the one hand may be made upon sing persons, princes, statesmen, diplomatists, who act a behalf of the State, and those, on the other hand, whi can be made upon the State itself, considered as a willi and acting unit.

First then: Is it the duty of these single persons act as morally in affairs of State as in their own? He the answer may be, yes and no. Duty has both a negati side-to avoid wrongdoing; and a positive-service, se sacrifice. One can give away only what is one's ow not what belongs to another or to the State. But on has as little right to do wrong on others' behalf as one's own. The organ or the servant of the State com under this law. A diplomatist who tries to deceive foreign government, out of State considerations or superior orders, will feel his conscience react, if it sound. The 'necessary lie' is a very doubtful ethic

egory; and the implicit excuse cannot be considered re applicable in public than in private life.

When I say that a man can only sacrifice what is his n, not what belongs to others, but has as little right do wrong on others' behalf as upon his own, the line demarcation thus drawn is anything but clear. To difficulty of drawing it in practice may be ascribed previously mentioned doubts and collisions of duties, ich arise for the man who has to act on behalf of ers, e.g. for the manager of a limited-liability company. same applies to the organ or servant of the State. d another point comes in here. As the manager will, a rule, influence the direction of the company, with ▪ consequence that he is by no means free from ponsibility for its direction, so, to a still larger extent, 1 be the case with the servants or organs of the State inces, government, parliament, etc.), since these actually pe the will of the State, and act at their own distion on the State's behalf. Therefore the investigation the moral responsibility of individuals acting for the te blends with an investigation of the State's own ation to the claims of morality.

Can it in reality be said that any such relationship sts? In other words, can the State be considered as ually willing and acting in a responsible way? From more modern point of view, according to which the ral claims on the State and the individual are identical, inclination would doubtless be to deny this. One will ert, from that point of view, that to speak of the State willing anything and as acting is a mere façon de parler. y living creatures, it will be said, are able to act; and y human beings act under moral responsibility. The te is only an institution, a tool which men create under en circumstances to promote their aims. To say that State 'acts' only means that its leaders act in order promote their own or their fellows' interests. It is se leaders, organs, and servants who bear the moral onsibility for the State-will which they obey and the e-actions which they themselves create and carry And, as these persons, in the performance of their lic duties, are subject to the same moral standards as 7 obey in private life, the identity of the State's and the vidual's relation to the moral law is thereby conceded.