the rules administered by foreign tribunals, and forming, therefore, part of various foreign legal systems. The treatment here adopted has two advantages. It is, in the first place, convenient for English practitioners, who are in general only concerned to determine what on a given point is the law of England. In the second place, it is correct in point of theory, for it rests on the broad distinction between rules which are strictly laws, as being part of the municipal law of one particular country (our own), and rules prevailing in other countries, which are not laws to us at all, since they do not rest on the authority of our own State; and it completely avoids the errors which have arisen from confusing the rules of so-called Private International Law, which are in strictness "laws" but are not "international," with the principles of international law properly so called, which are "international" since they regulate the conduct of nations towards each other, but are not in the strict sense of the term "laws." The fact that the law of domicil is here treated as a branch of English law should be noted. Foreign authorities, such as Story, Savigny, Foelix, &c., and the judgments of foreign tribunals, are indeed cited; but this is done simply because, in this department of law, the decisions of our courts, or, in other words, the law of England, will be found, in fact, to be influenced by the theories of eminent jurists, as also by the practice of foreign courts. This treatise has further some peculiarities of form. The law of domicil is therein reduced into a series of definite rules, which being based on statutory enactments, decided cases, or inferences drawn from authoritative dicta or admitted principles, constitute, in so far as my work has been successfully performed, a code of what may be termed the English law of domicil. These rules form the backbone of the whole treatise. They are first stated apart from any comment, and then, in the body of the work, each of them is repeated and made the subject of separate comment or explanation. The object of such explanatory comment is to elucidate the meaning of any rule requiring explanation, to state the grounds on which it rests, to call attention to the doubts which in some cases may fairly be entertained as to its correctness, and to raise, and if possible solve, doubtful questions which a rule sometimes suggests. Such a course of critical examination leads at times to the negative result that on particular points the law is so unsettled that no rule can be stated which ought to be considered as more than a conjectural inference from established principles; and I have, therefore, when a rule seemed doubtful, indicated the uncertainty by a printed query. I have, in short, applied to the law of domicil the method of stating the law which nine years ago I employed in my Treatise on Parties to an Action. The approval which, as I have reason to believe, my attempt to digest the law of parties to actions into a series of rules has received from competent judges, as well as the appearance since 1870 of numerous works based on the principle that a mass of law can best be exhibited in the form of systematic rules, has strengthened my conviction that the method I then adopted is sound, and has encouraged the hope that I may, by applying the same method to the law of domicil, at once codify and explain a branch of English law which specially needs systematic treatment. How far my attempt is successful must be left to the judgment of my readers. I may at least venture to assert that I have in no instance laid down any rule without careful consideration, and that whilst I have myself consulted the authorities for every important statement throughout this treatise, I have studied every recent work likely to throw light on my subject, except Mr. Foote's Private International Jurisprudence, which did not come into my hands. till my book was fully prepared for the printer. Of the debt I owe to Savigny, Story, Phillimore and West lake, I say the less because my obligations are patent on the face of my work. The frequent references to the writings of these and of other authors may, while they testify to the extent of my obligations, serve as a guide to the sources best worth consulting on each point dealt with in this treatise. It is at once a duty and a pleasure to express my sense of the invaluable aid which throughout the composition of this work I have received from the corrections, criticisms, and suggestions of the legal friends who have taken an interest in its progress. A. V. DICEY. TEMPLE, June, 1879. |