Word and World: Practice and the Foundations of LanguageCambridge University Press, 2004 - 420 pagina's This important book proposes a new account of the nature of language, founded upon an original interpretation of Wittgenstein. The authors deny the existence of a direct referential relationship between words and things. Rather, the link between language and world is a two-stage one, in which meaning is used and in which a natural language should be understood as fundamentally a collection of socially devised and maintained practices. Arguing against the philosophical mainstream descending from Frege and Russell to Quine, Davidson, Dummett, McDowell, Evans, Putnam, Kripke and others, the authors demonstrate that discarding the notion of reference does not entail relativism or semantic nihilism. A provocative re-examination of the interrelations of language and social practice, this book will interest not only philosophers of language but also linguists, psycholinguists, students of communication and all those concerned with the nature and acquisition of human linguistic capacities. |
Inhoudsopgave
The PrisonHouse of Language | 17 |
ii Tree and demonic possession | 19 |
iii The Correspondence Theory of Meaning | 20 |
Referential Realism | 26 |
ii Semantic foundationalism | 27 |
iii Spontaneity and receptivity | 30 |
iv Hyperempiricism | 37 |
v Meaning and Prima Philosophia | 43 |
iv True as an undefined primitive | 199 |
v Assertion and registration | 200 |
vi Quine on translation Wittgenstein on ostensive definition | 203 |
Truth and Use | 207 |
ii Affirmationdenial content connectors | 208 |
iv What determines affirmationdenial content connectors? | 209 |
v Practice predication and the concept of truth | 211 |
vi Concepts and the natural world | 212 |
Out of the PrisonHouse | 45 |
ii Word and practice practice and world | 48 |
iii Truth reference and language games | 51 |
iv Resisting reductionism | 53 |
v Adequating or not adequating concepts | 56 |
vi Relative Realism | 58 |
NAMES AND THEIR BEARERS | 61 |
Russells Principle and Wittgensteins Slogan | 63 |
ii Russells Principle | 67 |
iii Knowinghow and knowingthat | 72 |
iv Names and propositions | 73 |
v Wittgensteins reservations | 77 |
vi Logic must take care of itself | 83 |
vii Meeting the demands of the Slogan | 86 |
viii The Tractatus and its failure | 88 |
ix Russells Principle and Wittgensteins Slogan | 91 |
The NameTracking Network | 95 |
ii Actual and nominal descriptions | 98 |
iii Describing and locating | 100 |
iv The whereabouts of Easthampton | 102 |
v Naming practices | 104 |
vi Some further examples | 106 |
vii The NameTracking Network | 107 |
viii Logic must take care of itself | 110 |
ix NameBearerships as nomothetic entities | 114 |
x Odysseus and Bunbury | 122 |
xi Postscript on Russell and Strawson | 124 |
Rigidity | 126 |
iii Accounting for rigidity | 129 |
Descriptions and Causes | 133 |
ii Evanss critique of the causal theory | 134 |
iii Evanss account | 136 |
iv The NameTracking Network versus the Dominant Cluster Theory | 137 |
v Cases involving misapprehension | 139 |
vi Causality versus intentionality | 142 |
vii Speakers beliefs and intentions | 143 |
viii The requirement of unique discriminability | 144 |
ix Wittgenstein and Descartes | 145 |
x Relativism and social convention | 148 |
xi Labels and real names | 150 |
xii Proper names and personal identity | 153 |
xiv The meaning of a name | 155 |
Knowledge of Rules | 159 |
ii Practices and rules | 160 |
iii The theoretical representation of linguistic competence | 162 |
iv Rulescepticism | 165 |
v Guided or random? | 168 |
vi Kripke and Dummett | 172 |
vii Martians and chessplayers | 174 |
viii A further example | 175 |
ix Kripke and his critics | 176 |
x Kripke and Wittgenstein | 177 |
xi On not answering Kripkes sceptic | 178 |
xii Goddard on counting | 179 |
xiii The meaning of signpost | 183 |
xiv Devitt and Sterelny on knowinghow | 185 |
xv Objectivity the individual and society | 186 |
xvi The difference between swimming and speaking Spanish | 188 |
xvii Wittgenstein and fullblooded conventionalism | 189 |
PROPOSITIONS | 191 |
Meaning and Truth | 193 |
ii What is it to know the truthconditions of a statement? | 194 |
iii Translation and interpretation | 195 |
viii Two further examples | 216 |
x Ostensive definition again | 222 |
xi The sensory evidence for meaning | 224 |
xii Two senses of truthconditions | 227 |
xiii Refutation of the Verifiability Theory of Meaning | 229 |
Unnatural Kinds | 231 |
iii Twin Earth | 234 |
iv Direct reference | 235 |
v Rigidity and indexicality | 236 |
vi Stereotypes | 237 |
vii The thinness of linguistic knowledge | 238 |
viii Salience and segmentation | 240 |
ix Cataloguing the world | 243 |
x Colours species kinds of stuff | 246 |
xi Linguistic and factual knowledge | 253 |
xii Indexicality rigidity and kinds | 256 |
xiii Qualified internalism | 259 |
Necessity and Grammar | 261 |
ii Two senses of logical grammar | 263 |
iii Logical grammar and conventionalism | 266 |
iv Analyticity | 270 |
v Incompatibilities of colour | 274 |
vi Intrinsic relations | 277 |
vii Essences | 278 |
PARADOXES OF INTERPRETATION | 289 |
Indeterminacy of Translation1 | 291 |
iii Quines linguist and his Native subjects | 295 |
iv Observation sentences | 296 |
v Are observation sentences sentences? | 297 |
vi Are observation sentences a part of language? | 298 |
vii Ontology and the background language | 300 |
viii Psychological and linguistic salience | 301 |
ix Nature and human decision | 305 |
x Referential Realism as the root of Quines difficulties | 306 |
Linguistic Competence1 | 309 |
iii The paradox | 310 |
iv Kripkes challenge | 312 |
v The Principle of Insulation | 313 |
vi How not to generate Kripkes Paradox | 315 |
viii The puzzle disappears | 317 |
ix Dissolution versus redescription | 318 |
xi Externalism and Russells Principle | 322 |
Paradox and Substitutivity1 | 324 |
ii Substitutivity of identicals | 325 |
iii Kripkes constraints on the construction of the puzzle | 326 |
iv Normal practices of translation and disquotation | 328 |
vii Paradigmatic roots of DQO | 329 |
viii The puzzle restated and DQO recast | 331 |
ix The puzzle as a paradox | 332 |
x Meaning | 333 |
xi Translation as based on propositional content | 335 |
xii Externalism unmasked | 337 |
xiii The root of the problem | 340 |
xiv The solution | 342 |
EPILOGUE | 345 |
Relative Realism | 347 |
ii Brains in vats | 356 |
iii MeaningRealism | 358 |
iv The idea of a logically perfect language | 364 |
v The human and the subjective | 368 |
Notes | 383 |
399 | |
Overige edities - Alles bekijken
Word and World: Practice and the Foundations of Language Patricia Hanna,Bernard Harrison Geen voorbeeld beschikbaar - 2004 |
Veelvoorkomende woorden en zinsdelen
answer appears argued argument assertion assertoric content assertoric force bearer believes that London Bunbury causal Chapter Charles Morgan concepts concerning constituted counting Dummett empiricism English entities epistemic existence externalist extralinguistic fact Frege Fregean given grasp grounds Hermiston holism human Ibid individual kind names knowledge Kripke Kripke's language linguistic linguistic expressions logical London is pretty Londres est jolie matter merely metaphysical realism mind Name-Tracking Network Native nature nomothetic notion object observation sentences ostensive definition P. T. Geach paradox philosophical philosophy of language pick Pierre believes possess practices proper name propositions Putnam puzzle question Quine Quine's reality reason Referential Realism relationship rule Russell Russell's Principle sceptic semantic semantic nihilism sense sensory sentential sign sort speak speaker specific statements supposed synonymy theory of meaning things thought Tractatus translation true truth or falsity truth-conditions Twin Earth understanding utterance Wittgenstein Wittgenstein's Slogan words