Meaning and UseA. Margalit Springer Science & Business Media, 14 nov 2007 - 308 pagina's The second Jerusalem Philosophical Encounter was held in Jerusalem on April 25-28, 1976. The symposium was originally planned to celebrate the 60th birthday of Y ehoshua Bar-Hillel, philosopher and friend. But his sudden death intervened, and turned celebration into commemoration. The topic of the symposiumwas Meaning and Use. For Bar-Hillel, the question 'meaning or use?' was of great importance, one which he took as a question of priorities. Which approach to natural language is prior: the formal, semantical approach, which accords a central position to the truth functional concept of meaning and to the theory of reference, or rather the alternative approach which accords the central position to linguistic commu nication and prefers dealing with speech acts to dealing with Statements? Bar Hillel's answer to this question, in his later years, can be summed up by our title, meaning and use: neither approach deserves priority, each is equally necessary, and they both complement each other. Those familiar with Bar Hillel's uncompromising intellectual honesty would know that this answer does not reflect a superficial wish for domestic peace, but stems rather from deep and informed convictions. The issues of meaning and use dominated Bar-Hillel's intellectuallife. At the same time his day-to-day existence was guided by the idea that the meaning of life is to be found in being useful, particularly in being useful to the community of seekers of knowledge. |
Inhoudsopgave
Comments by W V Quine | 21 |
ASA KASHER What is a Theory of Use? | 37 |
JAAKKO HINTIKKA and LAURI CARLSON Conditionals Generic | 56 |
HELMUT SCHNELLE Circumstance Sentences | 93 |
MICHAEL DUMMETT What Does the Appeal to Use Do for | 123 |
Comments by Edna UllmannMargalit | 136 |
MARCELO DASCAL Conversational Relevance | 153 |
Comments by Ruth Manor | 175 |
HILARY PUTNAM Reference and Understanding | 199 |
Comments by Michael Dummett | 218 |
SAUL KRIPKE A Puzzle about Belief | 239 |
Comments by Hilary Putnam | 284 |
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A's utterance admission game antecedent argument assertion available as paperback behavior belief contexts believes that London Boston Studies Cicero circumstances cognitive equivalence Cohen and Marx concept corresponding descriptions determined discussion disquotational principle donkey Dummett English example explain expression fact force Frege Fregean G.cond₁ game rule Grice's Hesperus Hintikka idiolect implicature indicative intensional intentional object interpretation Jaakko Hintikka Jones kind language game language-games linguistic logic London is pretty Londres modal mood mood-setter Naming and Necessity natural language normal notion of truth occasion sentences philosophy of language Philosophy of Science Pierre Pierre's position possible pragmatic present principle of bivalence problem pronominalization pronoun proper names properties propositional quantifier question Quine reaction realist reference relation relevant role seems semantic network sense speaker specification speech acts statement subgame suppose theory of meaning tion translation true truth conditions truth value Tully understanding University Wartofsky words Yehoshua Bar-Hillel
Populaire passages
Pagina 8 - Counting truth in the domain of reference, as Frege did, the study of sense thus comes down to the study of reference. But how about force? In this paper I want to consider force in the only form in which I am certain that it is a feature of sentences, that is, as it serves to distinguish the moods. The question I am concerned with is, can a theory of truth explain the differences among the moods? In trying to answer this question I am responding, belatedly,2 alas, to a challenge put to me by Yehoshua...