It is not a merely domestic issue. So far every advance in the freedom of the Dominions has been an integrating factor, because the growing appreciation by the Dominions of their responsibilities has led to their realising their vital need of the strength which comes of union. Their sense of responsibility has been temporarily obscured by war. The intoxications of victory, the achievements of each, conceal the fact, which is more than ever true, that no Dominion can stand by itself. The whole problem is to bring the Dominions, as national units, in touch with their responsibilities, to make them feel the realities of the position. Thus the participation of the Dominions in the Peace Conference was absolutely correct. It gave them their first glimpse of diplomatic realities. It enabled them to try their prentice hand. The mistakes of the individual delegates will be plain to the citizens they represent. But the only way in which the responsibilities of the Dominion Leaders for the security of their own States can be discharged is by their deliberate choice of combined and co-operative action and the rejection of everything which would prevent it. This may involve the rejection of the separate voting power in the League and the provision of some machinery by which the Empire can speak with a single voice. But it will not sacrifice the national identity of the Dominions. They could have a status in the League, take part in its subsidiary organisations and administrative activities, remaining nations, but realising their nationhood in association with their partner nations in the British Commonwealth. This conception finally rules out the idea of Imperial Federation, which would destroy the sense of responsibility in the Dominions by taking the problem of national security out of their hands and placing it in the hands of an ineffective Super-State remote from their daily life. These responsibilities must be discharged through their national institutions.

Mr Lionel Curtis, in his advocacy of Imperial Federation, has endeavoured to demonstrate the impracticability of co-operation between independent States. But he bases his arguments upon the experience of the American Colonies during the War of Independence. This does not hold for the recent war. In that conflict co-operation between the various parts of the Empire attained a high

order of success, and at Paris the British Empire Delegation gave an exhibition of co-operation which left little to be desired. When the League of Nations is established in working order, the British Delegation should be organised so as to operate in the same way.

After the magnificent example of British patriotism which the war brought forth, it is not possible to doubt the vitality of the Britannic idea. The British Commonwealth is there in spirit if we can only correctly embody it in the proper formulæ and articulate an effective system. We do not want a Bismarck to come upon us like a God from the clouds with a cast-iron constitution. We want to rely upon the spirit of the race and its welltried political capacity. This was shown better in the first days of the war than at its close, when all were suffering from war strain. The Dominion Governments never exercised a more individual and independent judgment than when they put their forces under the command of the British authorities. In that act they drew themselves up to the full stature of Nationhood. Their inability to discuss or decide questions of foreign policy, of war and peace, was a matter for which they had made no provision and which must now be attended to. But the true spirit still exists even though leadership may falter. Canada and South Africa may strain at the painter. Let it break, and their heads will immediately turn round and seek the old moorings. There is no reason to fear that the problems which face us will not be solved. We are tackling a problem which baffled the greatest Empire of the old world, the reconciliation of Empire and Liberty. We were confronted with an enemy which frankly accepted authority as its basis, and the principle of Liberty secured us the victory. There is little doubt that, if we face the position squarely and fearlessly, we shall secure an effective unity in a British Commonwealth of Nations.

F. W. EGGLESTON.

Art. 6.—THE BAGDAD RAILWAY.

FOR years men have been talking and writing of Mesopotamia and the Bagdad Railway; and bewildered with 'firmans,' 'irades,' concessions,' and 'kilometric guarantees,' have been left with the vague idea that, probably through the fault of the British Government, the Germans realised exceedingly successful commercial and financial results from their venture in Asia Minor. Now that the end of the War has rendered available information previously only accessible to Germans, it is consoling to be able to announce that, far from having made money over the Bagdad Railway, the promoters of that enterprise incurred losses which ran into millions, and that, even had the War not taken place, it is unlikely that the Bagdad Railway could ever have become a financial success.

The idea of linking up Mesopotamia with the Mediterranean by rail is of British origin. It dates back to the Fifties, when Colonel Chesney, R.E., who conducted the first accurate survey of Mesopotamia, suggested that the Euphrates Valley might be developed by giving it railway communication with the Syrian ports of Alexandretta or Suedia. The Englishman, however, turns instinctively to water rather than to land transport; and, although Mesopotamia did attract a certain amount of British enterprise, it was through Lynch's steamers, and not through Chesney's railways.

The first railway in Asiatic Turkey was built by a British Company and has remained under British control. This line received its concession in 1856, started from Smyrna, and ran up the Meander Valley to Aidin, and eventually beyond that town, being built in successive sections, each of which was worked and made a paying concern, through the consequent development of the surrounding country, before the next section was begun. The significance of this method will be

Similarly, the English S. and C. Railway was built in sections by a British Company. Like the Aidin Railway it never received a subvention from Turkey. At the end of the stipulated term of years it passed to the Turkish Government, and was thereupon given to a French Company, and became the S.C.P. (Smyrne-Cassaba-Prolongement).

seen when we come to deal with the construction of the Bagdad Railway. Unlike all other Turkish lines, the Aidin railway, as it is generally called, received no kilometric guarantee; that is, the Turkish Government did not promise to make up the revenues of the railway, should they prove insufficient, to an annual gross average return of a fixed amount per kilometre. This line has played a useful and profitable part in the development of Asia Minor; but has never been able to exercise a political influence comparable to that of the younger companies.

French railway enterprise in the Near East has, on occasion, come into conflict with that of Germany; but, from a general point of view, it can be said that the Germans abandoned to French interests the railway possibilities of European Turkey and North-West Asia Minor; and to the Russians the Black Sea Coast, keeping for themselves the great road to the East, the road to Bagdad. Nor was this at first unwelcome to the British, whose ideas in regard to Turkey were still coloured by memories of the Crimean War. Already, since 1873, a railway had existed, running from Haidar Pacha, opposite Constantinople on the Bosphorus, to Ismidt, some 90 kilometres east. It had been built for the Sultan by Wilhelm von Pressel, a German engineer who played a great part in railway construction in Asia; but had been conceded to an English Company in 1880. The Ottoman Government, in 1888, bought out the original British Company, and granted to Herr Kaulla, the representative of the Deutsche Bank, not only the concession of the Ismidt Railway, but also that for the extension of the same railway to Angora. As a result of this, the Ottoman Railway Company of Anatolia came into being, with the Deutsche Bank as the directing force behind it and the German Government ready to assist by any means in their power.

The position of the Turkish Government cannot be understood without reference to the character and aims of the reigning Sultan. Abdul Hamid II, a man whose great ability has been seldom recognised, worked throughout his life in the pursuit of one ideal-Pan-Islamism, that is, the religious and political unity of Moslems all

over the world. None of his predecessors had laid much stress on the Sultan's claim to be Commander of the Faithful and Successor of the Prophet. But after Turkey had lost the greater part of her Balkan possessions, and her cause in Europe began to appear hopeless, the idea of recovering elsewhere all, and more than all, that had been lost became particularly attractive. So far as religious primacy was concerned, Abdul Hamid's propaganda achieved speedy success. The establishment of Turkish Consuls-General in the British and Dutch East Indian possessions was the next step. Religious and political obedience are much more closely bound together in the Moslem than in the Christian world; and because the British ruled millions of Moslems in India, the Sultan abandoned the traditional Turkish policy of friendship with this country. On the other hand, it was obviously to British interest to confine the Sultan's authority as Khalif strictly to religious matters; in view of which circumstances, it is not surprising to find that, on Aug. 1, 1899, Herr Kurt Zander, of the Anatolian Railway, wrote to Herr Siemens, the Deutsche Bank representative in Constantinople: For the Sultan, the Bagdad Railway is solely a weapon against the English Khalifate policy.' On the other hand, Abdul Hamid was aware of the fact that German financiers were anxious to extend their operations towards the Persian Gulf, and had decided that, far from requesting the construction of the railway she desired, Turkey should be graciously pleased to grant on her own terms the petitions of those who desired to serve her. The success of this policy is acknowledged in a letter from Zander to Siemens of March 5, 1900.

It was originally intended that the main line of the Anatolian Railway should run through Angora to Cæsarea, and continue through or near Sivas (there were several plans) to the headwaters of the Tigris at Diarbekir; and thence down the valley to Bagdad and the Persian Gulf. Von Pressel to the last maintained that this route, or one still more northerly, would have been preferable to that adopted. But the country was difficult, and Russia watched with jealous eyes any movement towards Armenia. As a result, the extension from Angora eastwards, though provided for in the