them, and it is pointed out in the History' (1. p. 237), that such preparations as had been made by them were 'necessarily of a very general character, made for the most part by subordinate departments, without the direction of the heads of States, without inter-allied consultation and co-operation, and with only a vague idea of how the schemes would be applied in practice. Their influence on the Conference must not, however, be under-estimated. Their labours had produced an enormous amount of material for the use of the men of action; and, though much of this work was wasted, much proved to be of the greatest value.'

No doubt the writer of these lines had in mind the series of Peace Hand-books produced by the Historical Section of the Foreign Office, established for the first time in 1917. Very valuable and interesting as these Hand-books are, it must have been quite impossible for the actual negotiators to become acquainted with even a small portion of their contents.

In any case, it must be evident that the plenipotentiaries of the Allied and Associated Powers had to begin their work by coming to an agreement as to the procedure to be adopted for negotiation among themselves of the provisions which would be embodied in the Peace Treaty, and that this was a difficult task, as the various countries concerned had suffered in quite different ways from the violence with which the war had been carried on by their adversaries, notably by Germany. Compare the devastation of North-Eastern France, the destruction of public buildings in Belgium, the carrying away of public and private property from these two countries, with the almost entire freedom of the British Islands from damage on land at the hands of the enemy; though, on the other hand, the destruction of a great portion of the British mercantile marine was a very serious blow to the prosperity of the country. To reconcile the French and Belgian demands for reparation with the much smaller requirements of Great Britain must have been no easy undertaking, requiring long discussion and much give and take between the representatives of the Allies.

It may seem a very small thing, but it is probable that the want of a common language between the

treaty by at least three of the principal Allied and Associated Powers. Germany ratified it on July 10, 1919, Italy on Oct. 7, Great Britain on Oct. 10, France on Oct. 12. There were, however, certain unexecuted clauses of the Armistice agreement which Germany had to fulfil before the Peace Treaty could take effect; and, until that result was obtained, by means of urgent pressure on the German Government, the procès-verbal of deposit, which custom requires, could not be signed. Thus the total period consumed between the termination of active hostilities and the resumption of peaceful relations with Germany was one year two months and nine days.

Although the Armistice was concluded so early as Nov. 11, 1918, it was obvious that peace negotiations could not be commenced until the arrival in Europe of President Wilson. He landed in France Dec. 13, came to London a fortnight later, left for Paris and Rome on the last day of the month, and finally returned to Paris on Jan. 7. The members of the British delegation began to arrive there on Jan. 4; but the Prime Minister was a week later. Mr Wilson had taken a leading part in the negotiation of the preliminaries of the Armistice. It was to him that the German Government had addressed itself on Oct. 5, 1918. Correspondence between him and the German Government on the one hand and the Governments of the Allies on the other followed; and it was agreed by the latter that the Armistice Convention and the Treaty of Peace should be based on his addresses and speeches and on the recent diplomatic correspondence. To understand what this basis was, Part IV of Chapter IX of Volume I of the History' must be carefully studied. It shows clearly that with the exception of the reservation of the European allies with respect to No. 2 of the famous Fourteen Points, namely, the so-called Freedom of the Seas,' the President had been allowed to formulate the principles on which peace should be concluded. Europe expected him to arrive with a thoroughly worked-out scheme of negotiation. But it appears that he brought nothing of the sort with him. No doubt the separate Governments had each formed an idea of what they would demand, but nothing had been settled between

·

them, and it is pointed out in the History' (1. p. 237), that such preparations as had been made by them were 'necessarily of a very general character, made for the most part by subordinate departments, without the direction of the heads of States, without inter-allied consultation and co-operation, and with only a vague idea of how the schemes would be applied in practice. Their influence on the Conference must not, however, be under-estimated. Their labours had produced an enormous amount of material for the use of the men of action; and, though much of this work was wasted, much proved to be of the greatest value.'

No doubt the writer of these lines had in mind the series of Peace Hand-books produced by the Historical Section of the Foreign Office, established for the first time in 1917. Very valuable and interesting as these Hand-books are, it must have been quite impossible for the actual negotiators to become acquainted with even a small portion of their contents.

In any case, it must be evident that the plenipotentiaries of the Allied and Associated Powers had to begin their work by coming to an agreement as to the procedure to be adopted for negotiation among themselves of the provisions which would be embodied in the Peace Treaty, and that this was a difficult task, as the various countries concerned had suffered in quite different ways from the violence with which the war had been carried on by their adversaries, notably by Germany. Compare the devastation of North-Eastern France, the destruction of public buildings in Belgium, the carrying away of public and private property from these two countries, with the almost entire freedom of the British Islands from damage on land at the hands of the enemy; though, on the other hand, the destruction of a great portion of the British mercantile marine was a very serious blow to the prosperity of the country. To reconcile the French and Belgian demands for reparation with the much smaller requirements of Great Britain must have been no easy undertaking, requiring long discussion and much give and take between the representatives of the Allies.

It may seem a very small thing, but it is probable that the want of a common language between the

principal plenipotentiaries must have been an obstacle to a complete and speedy understanding. Only one of them spoke both English and French. Two others understood English only, the fourth was unacquainted with anything but his own language and French. Consequently their conversations had to be carried on with the assistance of an interpreter; and any one who has ever had experience of conversing through that medium, must be aware what a difficult process it is, frequently involving unavoidable misunderstandings.

Some doubt has been expressed with regard to the proper designation to be applied to the negotiations between the representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers for the purpose of agreeing on the specific demands to be presented to Germany and her allies as forming the terms of peace. The Foreign Office List for 1919 gives a List of the British Delegation and Staff, under the heading of Peace Congress.' It is conceivable that a Congress of all the belligerent Powers might have been summoned to meet at Paris; and by some persons this was no doubt expected. On a previous occasion, that of the Congress of Vienna in 1814-15, its formal assembly had been preceded by somewhat lengthy negotiations in London, which failed to produce an agreement on all the points under discussion, which are well described by Mr Webster in a paper read before the Royal Historical Society in March 1913, and again in his admirable account of Congress of Vienna published as No. 153 of the Peace Hand-books. This problem, of which the resolution presented difficulties that spun out its duration by several months, reminds us of the similar trouble that was caused by the Fiume question.

Peace Congresses, beginning with that known as of Westphalia, have usually consisted of all the belligerent Powers meeting on a footing of equality, and mostly ending in the signature of a single treaty signed by all of them. This procedure was not adopted on the recent occasion, and it is obvious that it may have to be modified in accordance with the relative position of the parties when hostilities are terminated by the conclusion of an Armistice Convention. The introduction to Vol. I of the History' tells us that, according to the stricter interpretation, it was a Congress, and not a Conference,

6

that met at Paris. With this view we find it difficult to agree. Up to the time when the draft treaty was presented to Germany on May 7, the proceedings must be held to have consisted of a conference between the Allied and Associated Powers. Then it may perhaps be regarded as assuming to some extent the shape of a Congress, although it more closely resembles the negotiations for the second Treaty of Paris, when the Allied Powers presented their demands to the French Government and the latter was forced to accept them. The Conference continued its labours, and drafted treaties of peace, which were presented successively to the Austrian, Hungarian, Bulgarian, and Turkish Governments on June 2, 1919, Jan. 15, 1920, Sept. 19, 1919, and May 11, 1920, respectively. In each case discussion followed with the delegation of the Power on which the treaty was to be imposed, as the result of which modifications were introduced; and these discussions may be regarded as assimilated to the proceedings of a Congress, although the parties thereto were far from being on a footing of equality. On the whole, therefore, it seems more in accordance with facts if we continue to speak of the Peace Conference of Paris, especially as the public voice from before the meeting of the Assembly had used the term Conference.

Although the Congress of Berlin of 1878 furnishes the best model for the conduct of debate, that of Vienna in 1814 presents closer resemblance to the Conference of Paris. The parties to the Congress of Vienna were to be all the Powers which had been engaged on either side in the war terminated by the Treaty of Paris of May 30.' This was interpreted in such a liberal fashion that two hundred and sixteen chefs de mission made their appearance. The difficulty of carrying on discussions between the members of such an unwieldy assembly was so great that the plenipotentiaries of the Eight Powers which were parties to the Treaty of Paris took on themselves to represent the whole of Europe. But the real Congress consisted of the Five Great Powers. The Committee of Eight, as Mr Webster tells us, met only eight times, while the Committee of Five held forty-one meetings. How business should be carried on at a Congress is well explained in Mr Woodward's