certainly did not entail the loss of Spain. Indeed, it came as a timely aid to clearer thinking, and was bravely utilised as a taking-off place for new departure, like the Black Week' in December 1899. Galway returned by sea to Lisbon with instructions to confine himself to the defence of that capital; and at the court of Barcelona fresh plans were inaugurated. It was felt, and rightly felt, that Almanza was primarily a defeat of the Portuguese; and such being the case, it was judged inexpedient to rely upon them any further. The English soldiery, of course, were fully employed in the Low Countries. If ever the Spanish crown was to rest securely on Charles's head, resort must be had to Imperial troops and to Austria as a recruiting ground. The greedy and self-seeking Noyelles dying opportunely, application was made to Vienna for the best available field officer in the Emperor's service. Some hopes were entertained that Prince Eugene might be spared; and it is interesting to speculate what might have happened had he taken up the task where Galway laid it down. Among other effects, it is conceivable that the English troops in the Peninsula might have been permitted to serve directly under him. But Eugene could not be spared, and a golden opportunity passed. Instead, there came from Vienna a very notable soldier, Count Staremberg, who in the Imperial service was inferior to the Prince, but inferior to nobody else. With him James Stanhope was associated as Commanderin-Chief of the English troops that still remained in Catalonia. The choice was in many ways excellent, for Stanhope was undoubtedly a man of courtesy and savoir-faire; and when leadership is put in commission such qualities are beyond INTRODUCTION cxxxi all price. When the two generals met at 'Charles III's' headquarters, they set themselves to devise schemes for the entire reorganisation of the striking forces available; for recent occurrences had unravelled what time had wrought, and put back the hands of the clock. Such was the situation of things when, at the beginning of 1708, Leake returned to the Mediterranean. He found himself confronted with a double task. He was asked to bridge the gulf between Genoa and Barcelona, so that the Austrian levies could pour into the Peninsula and redress the balance of the fight; and as the battle of Almanza had deprived the allies of the Valencian harvests at the very moment when there were additional mouths to be filled, he was requested to secure at the earliest moment a suitable and commodious granary. It is hardly necessary to add that he performed with his customary silence and expedition all that was asked of him. He carried the Austrian legions from Italy to Spain; and to ensure for them a regular supply of corn he conquered the island of Sardinia. He was returning from Cagliari in the autumn of 1708, when he received a letter from General Stanhope. The victory of Oudenarde had for the moment removed all 'Charles III's' anxieties; and the withdrawal of French troops from Catalonia, consequent upon the allied triumph in the Low Countries, made it possible to employ the troops at Barcelona upon an errand outside the main field of activity. The General reported that he had obtained the royal assent to a military expedition against Minorca, and proposed to command the troops in person. He had applied to London for the necessary sanction and approval, and made little doubt that a missive, addressed to the Admiral, which he hastened to forward, embodied orders for the co-operation of the fleet. Leake, who was only too gratified to learn that his pet scheme was at last to be put into execution, tore open the letter that Stanhope named, and found urgent papers instructing him to exact from the Pope an expression of regret for having offered up prayers in time of war for the enemies of Queen Anne. The orders were far too specific to be misunderstood, and far too importunate to be set aside. And yet Leake treated them with the same independence of judgment as when he ignored (in the hour of Barcelona's trial) the Earl of Peterborough's viceregal injunctions to attend to viceregal requirements. Once more he preferred the greater to the less; and, brushing aside the Papal business, he pounced upon Minorca. He severed at a blow all external communications, and isolated the island from the outside world. The rigour of his iron blockade not unnaturally terrified the inhabitants; and knowing that the Admiral, who now held them in his grip, had already captured Iviza, Majorca, and Sardinia, they cherished no illusions as to the fate that was in store for them. It wanted but little to persuade them how to act; and, when they learned that Leake had seized a landing-place, and could send ashore at will as many troops as he pleased, they deemed it expedient to declare for King Charles,' and the Mayor of Port Mahon, the capital city, made haste to surrender his keys. Thus Minorca passed into English hands, with the sole exception of the fortress of St. Philip, whose strong works and French garrison still commanded the harbour. The surrender of the castle was merely a matter of time, for the garrison INTRODUCTION cxxxiii could expect no renewal of supplies save from the Toulon fleet. And the Toulon fleet, as past events had shown, was not prepared to risk a pitched encounter. Hunger was bound to do its work, and Fort St. Philip was doomed. On the eighth day of operations General Stanhope arrived, and was cordially welcomed. He had, during his voyage, been cudgelling his brain to discover how the fleet could be of use to him, and it is gratifying to learn that he had not been unsuccessful in finding an answer to the problem. He now informed the Admiral that Fort St. Philip must be reduced by artillery, and he expressed a hope that the Navy would put him in a position to destroy the French works with the necessary weapons. Sir John Leake willingly agreed, but found that he had undertaken a difficult task. The siege-guns were unwieldy, there was no machinery for moving them, and the only place where they could be put ashore was under the fire of the enemy. These hindrances constituted a formidable argument for relying on hunger rather than on force. But the Admiral did not think it his duty to point this out. He made it his business to overcome the almost insuperable difficulties, and the adaptability of the force he commanded paved the way to success. The seamen converted themselves into human derricks and cranes; and as they had done at Barcelona in 1705, and as they were again to do at Quebec in 1759, they lifted the heavy ordnance from the ships to the shore, cheerfully disregarding the enemy's fusillade, and counting their immense toil as worth no more thanks than sending down topmasts or weighing anchors. When the siege-pieces and mortars had been set in position, Sir John provided the best of his cxxxiv expert gunners to lay the guns, and handy men from the lower deck to serve them. And so the batteries opened fire. Meanwhile, Stanhope had been exercising his ingenuity in devising fresh modes of employing the fleet; and, with a diplomatic subtlety that served his country well and should not be overlooked, he decided that, when it came to garrisoning the island, it would be better to make use of Leake's men rather than his own. The troops that he had brought were King Charles's' troops, and, if engaged for garrison duty, might constitute for King Charles' a title to Minorca when terms of Peace were discussed. On the other hand, if Sir John's marines took upon themselves the island guard, complications of an awkward kind might be altogether avoided. It is needless to add that when the idea was broached to the Admiral he instantly acquiesced. The work being now all but complete, and the year at the fall, Leake singled out a squadron under Sir Edward Whitaker to maintain the blockade of Minorca until the hour when Fort Philip surrendered, and with the remainder of the Grand Fleet he hurried home. Those who are acutely alive to what a dramatic situation requires will probably regret that he did not remain off Port Mahon until the French in Fort Philip lowered their flag. This, however, would be to overlook the naval side of the problem Minorca was to all intents confronting him. and purposes won; but the reasons for which its conquest was undertaken had not yet had time to fructify. Port Mahon was not yet an English dockyard; could not, indeed, be converted into an English dockyard at the earliest until the winter of 1709-10. There was still no available |