Matters of fact, which are the second objects of human reason, are not ascertained in the same manner; nor is our evidence of their truth, however great, of a like nature with the foregoing. The contrary of every matter of fact is still possible; because... Descartes, Spinoza and the New Philosophy - Pagina 159door James Iverach - 1904 - 245 pagina’sVolledige weergave - Over dit boek
| David Hume - 1758 - 568 pagina’s
...a like nature with the foregoing. The contrary of every matter of fact is ftilL poflible V becaufe it can never imply a contradiction ^ and is conceived by the mind with equal facility and diffinctn*fsr ae V ever fe conformable to reality, 'fbat tbt fan will' not rife... | |
| David Hume - 1760 - 314 pagina’s
...of a like nature with the foregoing. The contrary of every matter of fa& is ftill poffible ; becaufe it can never imply a contradiction, and is conceived by the mind with equal facility and diftin£lnefs, as if ever fo conformable to reality. That the fun *will not rife... | |
| David Hume - 1768 - 540 pagina’s
...like nature with the foregoing. The contrary of every matter of fact is ftill poffible ; becaufe k can never imply a contradiction, and is conceived by the mind with equal facility and diftinctnefs, as if ever fo conformable to reality. That the Jun -will not rife... | |
| David Hume - 1779 - 548 pagina’s
...like nature with the foregoing. ing. The contrary of every matter of fact is ftill poflible; becaufe it can never imply a contradiction, and is conceived by the mind with the fame facility and diftinctnefs, as if ever fo conformable to reality. That the fun will not rife to-morrow... | |
| David Hume - 1788 - 600 pagina’s
...of a like nature with the foregoing. The contrary of every matter of fad is ftill poffible ; becaufc it can never imply a contradiction, and is conceived by the mind with the fame facility and diftin&nefs, as if ever fix fo conformable to reality. That the fun ivill not rife... | |
| David Hume - 1804 - 552 pagina’s
...{fiVfetegoiJig. The^ontrar^.pf^y matter' of fact, is still p£^j})|e jjjfeejiwas rtbcaft 9&«es : ply a contradiction, and is conceived by the mind with...proposition, and implies no more contradiction than the affirmation, that it will rise. We should in vain, therefore, attempt to demonstrate its falsehood.... | |
| David Hume - 1809 - 556 pagina’s
...certainty and evi» dence. our evidence of their truth, however great, of a like nature with the foregoing. The contrary of every matter of fact is still possible...proposition, and implies no more contradiction, than the affirmation, that it will rise. We should in vain, therefore, attempt to demonstrate its falsehood.... | |
| David Hume - 1817 - 528 pagina’s
...same manner ; nor is our evidence of their truth, however great, of a like nature with the foregoing. The contrary of every matter of fact is still possible...proposition, and implies no more contradiction, than the affirmation, that it will rise. We should in vain, therefore, attempt to demonstrate its falsehood.... | |
| David Hume - 1825 - 526 pagina’s
...certainty and evidence. evidence of their truth, however great, of a like nature with the foregoing. The contrary of every matter of fact \ is still possible...conformable to reality. That the sun will not rise to-mwroic-, is BO less intelligible a proposition, and implies no more contradiction, than the affirmation,... | |
| David Hume - 1825 - 526 pagina’s
...facility and distinctness, as if ever so conformable to reality. That the sun will not rise to-tnorrow, is no less intelligible a proposition, and implies no more contradiction, than the affirmation, that it wiS rise. We should in vain, therefore, attempt to demonstrate its falsehood.... | |
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