 Certainly in this first knowledge there is nothing that assures me of its truth, excepting the clear and distinct perception of that which I state, which would not indeed suffice to assure me that what I say is true, if it could ever happen that a thing...  Selections from the Literature of Theism - Pagina 42geredigeerd door - 1904 - 472 pagina’sVolledige weergave - Over dit boek
 | Sabine Baring-Gould - 1870 - 420 pagina’s
...which perception of truth would not be sufficient to 1 Discours de la metliode, 4" partie. assure me that what I say is true, if it could ever happen that something I conceived equally clearly and distinctly should prove false. Nevertheless it seems to me... | |
 | wm.t. harris - 1870 - 396 pagina’s
...the clear and distinct perception of what I say, which indeed would not be sufficient to assure me that what I say is true, if it could ever happen that a thing which I conceived thus clearly and distinctly should prove to be false : and therefore it seems... | |
 | Sabine Baring-Gould - 1878 - 614 pagina’s
...which perception of truth would not be sufficient to 1 Discours de la methode, 4e partie. assure me that what I say is true, if it could ever happen that something I conceived equally clearly and distinctly should prove false. Nevertheless it seems to me... | |
 | René Descartes - 1880 - 498 pagina’s
...thinking thing ; but do I not therefore likewise know what is required to render me certain of a truth f In this first knowledge, doubtless, there is nothing...perception of what I affirm, which would not indeed he sufficient to give me the assurance that what I say is true, if it could ever happen that anything... | |
 | 1888 - 958 pagina’s
...thinking thing ; but do I not therefore likewise know what is required to render me certain of a truth ? In this first knowledge, doubtless, there is nothing...that what I say is true, if it could ever happen that any thing I thus clearly and distinctly perceived should prove false ; and accordingly it seems to... | |
 | Henry Maudsley - 1925 - 488 pagina’s
...thinking thing; but do I not therefore likewise know what is required to render me certain of a truth ? v In this first knowledge, doubtless, there is nothing...assurance of its truth except the clear and distinct per ception of what I affirm, which would not indeed be sufficient to give me the assurance that what... | |
 | René Descartes - 1925 - 486 pagina’s
...thing ; but. do I not therefore [likewise^ know what is required to render me curtain of a truth f In this first knowledge, doubtless, there is nothing...assurance' of its truth except the clear and distinct per ception of what I affirm, which would not indeed be sufficient to give me the assurance that what... | |
 | 1926 - 336 pagina’s
...Descartes abstracts from it, we find Descartes claiming, that, in judging "I am a thinking thing," "there is nothing that gives me assurance of its truth...except the clear and distinct perception of what I affirm."4 Comparing this, however, with the argument in the Second Meditation, we see that it is derived... | |
 | René Descartes - 1927 - 474 pagina’s
...the clear and distinct perception of that which I state, which would not indeed suffice to assure me that what I say is true, if it could ever happen that a thing which I conceived so clearly and distinctly could be false; and accordingly it seems to me... | |
 | 1926 - 344 pagina’s
...Descartes abstracts from it, we find Descartes claiming, that, in judging "I am a thinking thing," "there is nothing that gives me assurance of its truth...except the clear and distinct perception of what I affirm."4 Comparing this, however, with the argument in the Second Meditation, we see that it is derived... | |
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