PROSPECTS OF THE WAR. 103 CHAP. III. 1624. O t. I. prorogued. and his son about the Catholics had been broken or not, it was certain that the promise about summoning Parliament in November could not now be kept. How would it be possible to face the Commons? When Parlament once the bride was in England it would be too late to remonstrate on the conditions on which she had come. But if Parliament met before the step had been irrevocably taken, who could answer for the consequences? The Houses were therefore prorogued to the 26th of February, on the transparent pretext that London had become too unhealthy to be a safe place of meeting. Care was taken to insert in the proclamation a statement that this course had been adopted in pursuance of the advice of the Council.1 ham's war The chances of winning over the hard heads of the BuckingHouse of Commons to an unpopular domestic policy policy. with the aid of the charms of the young Queen were not very great. Unless Buckingham could escape the consequences of his actions in a blaze of military glory, he was plainly doomed to be taunted with apostasy from the cause which he had voluntarily adopted. To some extent the news which reached him from the Continent sounded hopefully in his ears. The Kings of Sweden and Denmark were bidding against one another for English support, and the Duke of Savoy was eager to make use of the English navy for designs of his own against Genoa. It was true that Buckingham 1 Proclamation, Oct. 1, Rymer, xvii. 625. The prorogation was really ordered for many weighty considerations, but principally this, that the respect of the Princess of France, and the reverence which will be given to her person when she shall be here, for those graces and virtues that shine in her, as likewise for the love and duty borne to the Prince, being all joined in her, will not only stay the exorbitant or ungentle motions that might otherwise be made in the House of Parliament, but will facilitate in his Majesty's proceedings those passages of favours, grace, and goodness which his Majesty hath promised for the ease of the Roman Catholics.' Buckingham to Nithsdale, Oct. (?); Ellis, ser. 1, iii. 179. CHAP. 1624. Oct. July. Refusal of of War to supply Mansfeld. had no money with which to pay the fleets and armies which he was busily organizing in his imagination. The supplies voted in the last session had been devoted to special objects, and he had just cut off for five months all possibility of obtaining more from a legitimate source. But financial considerations seldom obtruded themselves upon Buckingham. If the war were only once begun on a scale large enough to dazzle the world, he might safely, he fancied, throw himself upon the patriotism of the English nation. It was a hazardous policy. Armies set on foot the Council upon the chance of future supplies are apt to be less dangerous to the enemy than to their own commanders. And yet what else was to be done? An attempt had been made in vain to divert some of the subsidy money to the support of Mansfeld. The Council of War had replied by asking whether the King would give them a written declaration that he needed the money for one of those four ends mentioned in the statute.' Weston, who had been sent to ask for the money, could not say that, but he knew that it was both his Majesty's and the Prince's pleasure.' He was told distinctly that without some particular warrant in writing nothing could be done.' 1 Questions arising out of Mans feld's em 6 And even if Buckingham had been able to raise the money which he needed, was it likely that Mansfeld's ployment. armament would gain for him the good will of the House of Commons? If the force which it had been proposed to levy had been directed towards the Palatinate, such an employment would have been entirely outside the circle of ideas within which the Lower House had been moving. But by this time Buckingham had reason to question whether France was 1 Weston to Conway, July 31; S. P. Dom., clxx. 82. RICHELIEU'S PLANS. 105 III. 1624. Aug. 26. The League covery of for the re disposed to give even that amount of satisfaction to the СНАР. wishes of the King of England. On the 26th of August a league was signed between France, Venice, and Savoy for the recovery of the Valtelline; and in order to prevent the Spanish Government from bringing up fresh troops to resist the attack, it was arranged that the Duke of Savoy, with the aid of a French force, should make an attack upon Genoa, and that Mansfeld should throw himself upon Alsace and the Austrian possessions in Swabia.1 the Valtel line. and Ger Whilst James and Buckingham, therefore, were Richelieu fondly hoping to make use of Richelieu for the recon- many. quest of the Palatinate, Richelieu was planning how to make use of James and Buckingham for the reconquest of the Valtelline. Although the result of Marescot's embassy to Germany had been discouraging, Richelieu had assured the Elector of Bavaria that he need have no fear of an attack from France for at least a year, and Effiat was instructed to lay before James a plan for the pacification of Germany which bore a very close resemblance to those unsatisfactory overtures which had been made by Francesco della Rota in the preceding winter.2 Richelieu was probably right in judging that this was as much as he could persuade his master to do for some time to come; perhaps also in judging that it would be unwise for France to embark in open war till it was clear that she could find allies who could be trusted. But when Buckingham passed his neck under the yoke of the imperious Cardinal, he had certainly expected more than this. Towards the end of September Mansfeld was once 1 Siri, Mem. Rec., v. 639, 680. * Richelieu, Mém., ii. 405; Lewis XIII. to Effiat, Sept. 7; Harl. MSS., 4595, fol. 307. Sept. Mansfeld again in England. CHAP. 1624. Sept. Oct. A written engagement demanded from France. more in England, to ask again for men and money. His English troops, if he persuaded James to entrust him with any, would be allowed to land between Calais and Gravelines close to the Flemish frontier.1 The King of France, he announced, was ready to allow him to levy thirteen thousand men, and would, in conjunction with his allies, supply him with money for the purpose. But the French ministers, who had so pertinaciously demanded the strictest acknowledgment of the rights of the English Catholics, refused to bind themselves to any definite course in their military operations by a single line in writing. In the meanwhile, Lewis wrote to Effiat informing him that what was given to Mansfeld was given for the affairs of our league,' that is to say, for the support of his operations in the Valtelline. If the men could also be useful to the King of England and his son-in-law, he should be glad. After the marriage had been agreed upon, he would be able to deliberate further.3 Such was the position of affairs at the time when the English Parliament was prorogued. Buckingham, it would seem, had sold his master's honour for naught. To his thinking, indeed, the only course left to him. was to push blindly on. If he had had his way, 20,000l. would have been placed at once in Mansfeld's hands. James listened, well pleased, to the talk of the adventurer, and amused him by recommending him to ask leave of the Infanta to pass through the Spanish Netherlands on his way to the Palatinate. But there was still some prudence left in the English Court. The Council recommended a short delay till Lewis had Harl. MSS., 4595, fol. 369. Sept. 24 1 Lewis XIII to Effiat, Sept. 30 3 Lewis XIII. to Effiat, 1; Harl. MSS., 4596, fol. 33. MANSFELD AND THE FRENCH. 107 III. 1624. given a written promise to allow Mansfeld's troops to CHAP. enter France, and to permit their employment for the recovery of the Palatinate. In the meanwhile Mansfeld was to go to Holland to muster some Germans who were to take part in the expedition.1 In a few days James learned that he had reckoned without the French in respect both of the marriage and of Mansfeld's army. Carlisle and Holland were plainly told that their master's letter, even if countersigned by the Prince and a Secretary of State, would not suffice, and were informed at the same time that there could be no offensive league for the present. "To capitulate in writing," said the French ministers, "would but cast rubs in the way of their dispensation, and make it altogether impossible; since it must needs highly offend the Pope to hear they should enter into an offensive league with heretics against Catholics, and was like so far to scandalize the Catholic Princes of Germany, as this King should lose all credit with them, whom yet he hoped to win to their better party." In vain the ambassadors remonstrated. Not a line in writing could be drawn from the French ministers. They could not,' they said, condescend to anything in writing; but if the King's faith and promise would serve the turn, that should be renewed to us here, and to his Majesty likewise by their ambassador in England, in as full and ample manner as we could desire it.' A long altercation followed, and the English ambassadors broke off the interview in high dudgeon, saying that they knew not whether when the King their master should hear of this their proceeding he might not open his ear to new counsels, and embrace such offers as might come to him from other parts, and leave them 1 Rusdorf to Frederick, Oct., ; Mém., i. 379, 381; Conway to Carlisle and Holland, Hardw. St. P., i. 532. Oct. The French refuse to give one. |