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range of effective and practical criticism, where a statement of fact is open to controversy and different interpretations. The metaphysical idea of the state becomes closely connected with ideas of deity and divine sanctions, and, therefore, deeply embedded in the popular and superstitious mind. There becomes elaborated, in the course of years, a doctrine of rights for the rulers and a ritual of duties for the ruled, which in many cases are inviolate and more sacred than the canon law itself, and stand as criteria for right and wrong actions.

Is the state all that it claims to be-an inviolate god on earth, something beyond question as an idea, and beyond the judgment of the moral code of the society in which it operates, and of which it is by assumption an important functional organ? Is it truly a social institution, or are its activities anti-social and is it therefore a tyranny? Is there a necessary state, as well as an historical state; and if so are they in any way identifiable? Those are some of the questions modern men are called upon to answer, if they are to take right action in their social activities. If, as some believe, there be no necessity for the existence of a state at all, and if the activities of the historical state be anti-social and repressive of the human instinct for freedom and self-expression, it would be our duty to work for its destruction at all costs. If, on the other hand, there be an undeniable necessity for such an organisation as the state, whether or not it be the historical state we know; a necessary state whose true functions have become warped in the practical world, the problem becomes one of readjustment of social functions, a readjustment only possible by a clearer enunciation of principles. It may be that the necessary state and the historical state are identical, and that the state as we know it is a complete reflex of the condition of society at any time and answers perfectly to the needs of that society. This would mean that with the development of society the character of the state would change. With the growth of democracy and the validity of the coöperative principle in place of autocracy and competition, there would grow up a corresponding democratic state; but he would be bold who would say that the great military states of the modern world, as such, have any real correspondence to the democratic

spirit of modern times. The problem, however, is not so simple as it appears, whilst unfortunately the tendency of discussion, particularly on historical topics, is to over-simplification. It is probable that the activities of the state at any moment could be calculated, if we were able to assess at the proper values the stresses of ancient survivals and those due to functional adaptation, along with the secondary stresses of the theorists of all descriptions; for in state activities the influence of the theorist, particularly the legal theorist, is profound. The problem of the relationship of the state to democracy is further complicated by the conceptions we hold of the latter, whether we are satisfied with the political democracy we know to-day, or whether our imagination envisages a more complete functional democracy, where freedom will reside in the practical details of life and work, rather than in the widest political franchise.

It is apparent that not only is there a wide variation of practice concerning state activities, but that there is also a wide variation of theory regarding the work the state should undertake. Unfortunately, in discussing such matters the student is faced with the decrees of bodies which must be authoritative, in some essential matters, if the fabric of civilised society is to remain intact. Many functions are performed to-day by the state and by the analogous corporate bodies of burgh and county, which we would not be prepared to admit to be the proper function of those bodies under any circumstances. Yet a body of opinion, which seeks to limit the more obvious abuses of state activity, seeks the attainment of freedom by loading the state authority, more than ever, with a multitude of functions, which if successfully imposed would defeat the ends the protagonists of collectivism have in view. That is because the conception of democracy held by such theorists and propagandists remains vague and indefinite, being, indeed, in the condition wherein it was left by the ancient Greeks. The state, when it performs such extra state functions, does so, not as a public convenience, but as a natural right pertaining to it, and we are faced today with the omniscient theory of the state, both by the defenders of monarchy and republicanism, as well as by socialists and communists.

The historical state, as we know it, has almost always been repressive of freedom and has been used as a means whereby to expropriate forcibly much of the fruits of labour. It is in this respect merely a continuation and extension of the economic exploitation of the mass of men by their more powerful neighbours which prevails in economic society. Economic exploitation is, at best, but a rough-and-ready method, and only crudely skims the cream from the milk. The state by means of carefully graded taxation, principally on articles of common consumption, performs a more scientific second skimming, which leaves the thinnest of milk for the sustenance of the labourer. No doubt the state did not come into existence for this expressed purpose. Indeed, it may sometimes have come into existence because of an inner necessity for the organisation of justice and defence, for communal defence that is, as the juristic theorists suppose. But its main purpose hitherto has been the systematic exploitation of the weak by the strong, the chief instrument for that purpose being the civil law and control of the church and army. Yet recognising all this, it is felt that if the idea of the state did not exist, it would be necessary in modern days to invent it, or at least to invent a functional organisation which would possess its main characteristics, although in some respects the orientation of function would differ considerably from that of the state to-day. Until this allimportant question of function is decided we must admit the right of men to ask themselves the question: why obey the law?

Those political philosophers who have devoted most attention to the theory of the state, have emphasised unduly its juristic aspect and have refrained almost completely from examining its practical structure from the illuminating side of sociology. Juristic considerations must necessarily emphasise strongly the question of necessity, particularly as the principal material available for detailed study is the rather cut-and-dried arrangements of feudalism. It is significant that the great proponents of feudalism, the Normans, paid close attention to questions of law, covering Europe with a network of legal restrictions and conceptions which still fetter thought and action. Perhaps it would be more

fruitful of results, however, to discuss the historical state as an organic growth of social development, carrying within itself the seeds both of inner necessity and of expediency, than as a juristic conception. It will be necessary, if we would understand the nature of the state aright, to trace its slow development from the most obscure social origins in savage society, including the ritual of magic, through all the forms of activity it has shown from those early times, in every form of state organisation, whether city, maritime, feudal, constitutional, democratic or absolutist. We have learned gradually to apply historical methods of criticism to many departments of activity, sociology, literature, æsthetics, etc.; but very little indeed to the philosophy of the state.

If the historical state be a predatory organisation mainly designed with a view to a crude form of exploitation of labour, it would seem as if we would require to seek its origins in the institution of slavery. We are beset with a difficulty, however, in the fact that slavery pre-supposes some conceptions concerning property, which could only have been made operative by an organisation like the state. It is probable, therefore, that the nucleus of the idea must be sought elsewhere. Property in its legal sense would obviously be defined by some body which already had a considerable amount of authority over the minds of the community. This would almost certainly point to primitive priesthood, dealers in magic and masters of ceremonial ritual. It is not unreasonable, therefore, to expect that the early kings were magicians, who had come to exercise a temporal as well as a spiritual sway over impressionable savage man. Nor is it a far cry from the propitiation of powerful malevolent spirits, by the performance of magical rites, to the institution of slavery. The more terrible the sacrifice, the more pleasing it was to the spirits who had such great influence on human affairs, and, therefore, it was the more efficacious. The early gods were not beneficent, but demoniacal. The uttermost offering that could be made was human sacrifice, at its highest the body of the priest-king himself. But what availed a brief spiritual authority if this were the end? Could immunity not be secured by the sacrifice of several

human victims, victims whose death would not strike at the man-power of the tribe? Thus, it may well have been that prisoners came to be saved from immediate slaughter and retained to be slain for sacrifice; but increasingly the prisoners would be made use of economically by the institution of slavery. The regulation of property in slaves, for obviously it would be difficult to preserve a community in the ownership of slaves, would give rise to laws of property and to an increased prestige to the judicial office, even if it did get separated later from the office of priest.

We may be certain, whether or not slavery arose in this fashion, that its institution was of cardinal importance in the development of human society. Even if the sense of property was developed to any degree at a prior period, as, indeed, it is in monkeys and other animals, in the shape of a personal sense of possession, it would only be with the coming of a slave economy that property in instruments of production and land would come forward, as subject matter for the early jurist. In the most primitive societies, in which the means of subsistence were procured by direct labour or by simple exchange, the absence of a state of authority would not be felt as a serious handicap to communal life. But with the growth of more complex relationships, the spoilers of life and land felt the need of a greater protection and of more authoritative sanction than they had hitherto possessed, and this they found either in the original creation of the state, or by covering themselves behind such magical or judicial bodies as existed, and transforming them. The labour of the many, as the state economy proceeded in its development, was appropriated by the few, either by open robbery and violence, or by methods which sound more euphonious to modern ears. The stronger will was imposed, and that stronger will contains the seeds of the present-day political state, with the peculiar social organisation, laws, and maxims of government with which we have become familiar.

The state theorists to-day assure us that the great and powerful corporations known as the governments of France, of England, of the United States, etc., are designed to serve the communities which reside in those

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