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anticipated from its adoption. Consequently, a whole series of new problems has arisen, which did not exist for the ancients and yet whose correct solution is all important for the society of the future.

It is, therefore, important to understand what we mean by democracy and also to distinguish between the condition under which a democracy in a city state like ancient Athens functioned, and the conditions under which democracy must function in a great modern national state. In those ancient days the citizens made their voice heard directly in public assembly. Numbers were comparatively few and distances negligible, whilst there was a general insistence that every qualified citizen should perform some public service and in certain cases there was a compulsory rotation of office. The consequence was that each man had the opportunity of becoming skilled in public affairs; whilst the extreme differences of cultural level between the thinker and statesman on the one hand, and the labouring artisan on the other, did not exist, as they exist to-day. Men like Eschylus and Euripides, no less than Pericles or Alcibiades, were public characters, whose achievements were known and whose values were assessed by a wide public opinion. The arts of reading and writing did not set classes apart, and cause colleges to be specially endowed for wealthy patrons, whilst the poor picked up crumbs of a cheap learning as they might. These democracies existed before the superfine distinctions and fictions of the law had divided the nation into castes and categories, apart from that of master and slave, whose bounds it was impossible to transcend. In other words, the ancient Athenian might readily be at the same time, poet, politician, merchant and soldier, and his importance and position in society did not depend, at least to the same extent as it does in England to-day, on the possession of a satisfactory bank balance or its equivalent.

It must be obvious to all that this simple form of democracy is inapplicable to the conditions of a large modern state. Indeed it is inapplicable to the municipal government of a moderately-sized town. We have been compelled to adopt the principle of sending representatives to parliament and to council; representatives

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moreover to a large extent only known to the electorate imperfectly for a short time during contests, and seldom seen by their constituents at other times. The representative principle assumes an average mind, to be interpreted by the representative in legislative action. That being so, excuses for actions, or for failure to take action, are readily forthcoming on the score of what the constituency does or does not want. This leads to a certain amount of timidity on the part of the representatives, whose policies are sometimes those of the time-server for the sake of office. There are other points which may be noted, one the fact that a good deal of legislation, which really serves private purposes, can be pushed through and little noticed; the other, that a mass of highly complex and technical problems are discussed and settled by a heterogeneous mass of representatives, uninstructed in the technical details of the subject under discussion, and liable to make the most gross mistakes, unless they leave themselves unreservedly in the hands of the permanent officials of government departments. Moreover, there is a tendency to add the functions of the merchant and business house to state activities, a government of detailed industry by a responsible representative assisted by part of the civil service. This tendency will grow with the development of collectivism, and is one which complicates the whole issue of democracy. It will remove control to a very remote point from the operative, whereas we should endeavour to arrange that the hungry cry of the market shall be distinctly audible in the august assembly of the controllers, and this can only be done when the centre of each control is in the market itself.

There is one aspect of democracy which calls for a few words. Recognising the drawbacks of representation, as commonly understood, a refinement has been made on the idea, by the method of choosing and instructing delegates to the assembly or conference. This system prevails mostly in trade union affairs, although it is by no manner of means universal there. It may be satisfactory for certain purposes, but to extend the principle to public elected assemblies would be disastrous. It puts a premium upon the pull of interests rather than upon consideration and debate.

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The performances of any representative man have to be viewed reasonably, and by instructing him at every turn, his initiative will be curbed and his courage become a very attenuated affair. We are, therefore, faced with the problem of making modern democratic institutions function with efficiency whilst safeguarding and preserving our heritage of freedom. We must beware of the fetichism of words, for neither those of democracy, freedom, working-class control, the ballot or referendum, have virtue in themselves like that most blessed of all words, Mesopotamia. We have to think in terms of things; what the state is, and in what freedom consists and its purpose, to reconcile expediency with moral principles, to achieve at once beauty and efficiency.

It is easy by means of a referendum, for instance, to put the onus of important decisions on the whole community, a community necessarily uninstructed on details. The method is not only unsatisfactory from that point of view, but it is costly, involving a large addition to the bureaucracy and public printing press, etc. Indeed, the chief value in most ballot voting is the kind of guarantee it gives that a large dissenting minority will acquiesce in whatever decision is made.

Thus, it will be seen, the ballot vote and the representative principle, taken by themselves, will not achieve the ends we have in view. The working of the modern democratic state involves attention to a tremendous mass of detail, the grasp of which is beyond any representative or a bureaucracy located in the capital city. It is a primary axiom that the state must have unity if it is to have stability and strength. But strength will be dissipated if it endeavours to deal as a state with the most searching details of industrial and business ramifications, where administrative detail is everything. Incidentally it will truncate democracy by denying it initiative at the extremities, and render itself unstable by repressing strong desires, strengthened by increased education. For efficiency, partially digested and lop-sided views must be avoided and those with whom decisions rest must be fully informed, and, by training, be capable of understanding clearly those things with which they deal. This involves a devolution of function, a devolution which the collectivist, no less than the capitalist,

hopes to achieve by the use of officials, acting directly under the control of government.

For the foregoing reasons, and recognising the necessity for a state organisation, it seems desirable that the functions of government should be clearly defined and distinguished from those of industry and commerce. The necessary functions of the state deal with the administration of men, primarily in the great categories of defence, justice and education. Nothing should be allowed to interfere with the proper performance of any one of those important functions. The pushing of personal or syndicated interests of any description, such as happens in our business legislatures to-day, is vicious and should be avoided. To push defence to the point of aggression at the instance of armament rings, to pervert justice by money bribes, or bribes of office, or to curtail educational facilities, so that cheap boy and girl labour may still be available in factory and mill, are crimes against the community, not always recognised or punished to-day, but crimes which will be recognised in the functional democracy of to-morrow.

The productive functions of society are not matters with which the necessary state should be called upon to deal. A functional democracy would establish selfgovernment in each industry, and not only at some headquarter's place, but in the commune and in the individual workshop. This is the true sphere of shop committee and industrial council, whose functions should be two-fold; to ensure cheap and efficient production, as well as to secure the maximum opportunity to the labourer for self-expression. Not only so, but industries should be so grouped as to enable those engaged in them to deal with factory legislation concerning their own industry. Those primarily concerned and acquainted with the industrial circumstances, know the details and appreciate the difficulties and are interested in getting the best solution, away from the state assembly and its indefinite knowledge. Other functional organisations will grow up side by side with the new orientation of industry, possibly councils of consumers to regulate distribution or to advise on prices. The important thing in all considerations is to separate the spiritual functions of the state from the material functions of production and administration of things.

Thus, the old loose conception of democracy must give way before a detailed functional conception, a conception which, without curtailing liberty, but by increasing it, will justify itself by leading to efficiency and greater beauty in everyday life. There is much loose talk of social ideals; ideals nebulous and vague, where they should be hard and definite. Such talk will lead us nowhere. If functional democracy is to grow in beauty and strength, it must prove itself more efficient than other forms of social organisation-generating in its progress a demand for definite and broadly based measures of public service, whether such service be in art, education, public administration or industry. Those ideas and proposals will require to be thought out carefully and clearly formulated, for the stress of the modern world will not allow any room for vague sentimentalities and slipshod improvisations. The mass of men are prone to accept half-digested theories and to tolerate many unnecessary and undesirable things which have been dictated by strong vested material interests, even where they impinge upon and distort public service and make our social life less beautiful than it could be. The old doctrine that public good is served by each person pursuing his own selfish interest in his own way will no longer serve as a dynamic in the new society.

Our ideas of the functions of the state in relationship to the democracy we envisage, must be compact and definite, and must not be deflected by the specious contention that this detailed functional democracy will lessen the sum of liberty. Liberty is not a licence, but a discipline, and the society which puts itself most definitely under great moral and aesthetic laws, which fears indeed to transgress them, even under great provocation, is the society which is most free and stable. And in the day of achievement, when the protagonists of the historical leviathan shall yield to a higher law, when the last vestiges of the political means of exploitation shall have disappeared, then for the first time will flourish the necessary state, looking after education, justice, national health and foreign affairs, in a democracy in which creative effort will have full scope and the human spirit no the state.

GENERve in terror o

UNIVERSITY OF GEOGOW. THOMSON.

ATHENS,

CEORCIA

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