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efforts of the soldiers to bring home the dire needs of the situation to successive Cabinets.

With the setting up of the Lloyd George Government in December 1916 a new political era dawned, and fresh vigour was imparted, in certain respects, to the tremendous national effort; but strategic inspiration was not apparent. Mr Churchill claims the fortunate destruction of a series of absurd conventions.'

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'The first and most monstrous of these was that the Generals and Admirals were more competent to deal with the broad issues of the war than abler men in other spheres of life.'

Much might be written about this 'most monstrous' convention, and it will be admitted that the 'abler men should prevail in council; but the underlying assumption that 'national leaders,' upon whom democracy has thoughtlessly conferred position in peace time, are able to dispense with a long study of war and to become instantly fit to stand by Cæsar and give directions,' needs qualification. Any attempt to estimate the respective contributions of these 'national leaders and of the professional chiefs to the changing scenes in the great world tragedy could only lead to interminable controversy. Both-French and British-played essential parts. Neither could perform the rôle falling to the other.

Mr Churchill pays a well-deserved tribute to the qualities of Mr Lloyd George; but, in view of his many admonitions and of his speech at the secret session of Parliament, he cannot acquit the Prime Minister of his responsibility' for not stopping the 'offensive in France.' He even makes it clear that Mr Lloyd George's curious fascination by Nivelle led to proceedings which the military chiefs regarded with grave misgivings. He is entitled to claim credit for the First Minister of the Crown, who at least sanctioned 'the convoy system, which broke the U-boat attack at sea; the forward impulsion in Palestine which overwhelmed the Turks, and the unified command which inaugurated the crowning victory in France.' But if Mr Lloyd George was really working for a Generalissimo, he moved by 'cautious, devious but persevering steps, extremely laborious and mystifying.' Even so late as November 1917 he declared in the House of Commons:

'I am utterly opposed to that suggestion [a Generalissimo]. It would not work. It would produce real friction, and might produce not merely friction between the armies, but friction between the nations and the Governments.'

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Inexorable circumstances-not Mr Lloyd George-raised Foch, 'a week ago described as a dotard," to the supreme command at Doullens on March 26, 1918.

The year 1916 opened in gloom. The Russians had suffered a series of heavy defeats, Bulgaria had entered the War, and Serbia had been over-run. General Townshend's force was imprisoned at Kut, and the relic of the Dardanelles expedition still lingered in a position of much danger at Helles. The failure of this great venture was, in Mr Churchill's view, 'fatal to Lord Kitchener'! Moltke had gone under, and on Feb. 21, 1916, Falkenhayn began his terrific attack on Verdun, which throughout the year largely ruled the course of the Western campaign. The threat to the vital Mezières-Thionville railway may have influenced von Falkenhayn; but Mr Churchill considers that this momentous decision was a German mistake of the first class, and that the French, by whom the retention of this old and dismantled fortress was treated as a point of honour,

'would have been wise to play with the Germans around Verdun, economising their forces as much as possible. . . and endeavouring to lead their enemies into a pocket or other unfavourable position.'

Space fails to discuss this and other highly disputable imaginings.

The series of great battles on the Somme are admirably described; but Mr Churchill, in accordance with the views he consistently upholds, under-rates the effects obtained at heavy cost. The mass attacks on the Somme were not far from success, and it is Ludendorff who declared that the decline of the military might of Germany dates from 1916, when we were completely exhausted on the Western front.' If, as Mr Churchill admits, 'never again did the mass of German rank and file fight as they fought on the Somme,' the cruel sacrifices of the allied armies were not all in vain. Nevertheless, in a long Memorandum of August 1916,

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circulated to the Cabinet,* and in his text, he reaches a 'sombre verdict,' and criticisms are abundant. It is pleasanter to turn to his fine tribute to Kitchener's Army of which the 'battlefields of the Somme were the graveyards.' Nowhere else is his mastery of forceful H English more worthily or more effectively employed.

The time has not yet come for an impartial judgment, in this country at least, on the causes of the most momentous failure in our naval history. Four years elapsed after the Battle of Jutland before the movements of Admiral Scheer at the critical period were understood, and fictions thus arose and became deep-rooted The earlier diagrams of the manoeuvres of the fleets were most misleading, and the evolution, which the High Seas Fleet had sedulously practised, was held to be impracticable by our naval authorities long after it had been successfully carried out three times by the German command. Mr Churchill's views, expressed three months after the event, were precise and dogmatic. 'There was,' he wrote, 'no strategic cause' impelling us to fight off the Danish coast. 'What harm does it do us if the German Fleet takes a promenade at sea?' To him, therefore, it then appeared that 'naval history records no prouder assertion of fighting superiority on the part of the stronger fleet' than the abortive action of May 31, 1916. He now describes this action with a wealth of detail, and he finds much to criticise.

In a sense, the issue may be said to have been predetermined by two untoward conditions. In the first place, the structural defects of Lord Fisher's battle cruisers helped to rob Sir D. Beatty of a decisive victory over Admiral Hipper's squadron, when he reached an interposing position with a force, nominally at least, far superior to that of his antagonist, for whom escape was apparently impossible. If the four Queen Elizabeths' had been in company with the Battle Cruiser Fleet when the action began, a smashing blow might still have been delivered; but grave defects in signalling arrangements appeared on other occasions, as Rear-Admiral Harper records, and the blame which Mr Churchill imputes to Rear-Admiral Evan-Thomas for the unfortunate delay

* By Sir F. Smith, now Lord Birkenhead.

in bringing the 5th Battle Squadron into action is not deserved.

The German battle cruisers were able to find the range and to get hits more quickly than our own,* and the destruction of the 'Indefatigable' and 'Queen Mary,' with the hair-breadth escape of the 'Lion,' occurred in the first half-hour. Mr Churchill considers that at shorter ranges our heavier shells would have shown relatively to better advantage. Incidentally, Admiral Beatty's opening action raises the whole vexed question of the policy of building battle cruisers with weak armour and ammunition hoists unprotected against a downward flash. The ruling idea was that these very fast ships, with a much heavier armament than that of their German analogues, would be able to select long ranges and to injure their opponents with a minimum of risk. Experience pointed to a different conclusion. Mr Churchill tells us that he 'recoiled from the battle cruiser type' in 1911, as did some reasoned naval opinion. What happened in the battle cruiser engagement was thus largely due to prior causes. Structural defects in this new type of warship caused the loss of more than 3300 officers and men in the three vessels sunk by explosion.

In the second place, Admiral Sir J. Jellicoe had laid down in advance his general tactical procedure in the event of a fleet action, and had explained his reasons for extreme caution. In a most important letter to the Admiralty of Oct. 30, 1914, he pointed out inter alia that

'The Germans have shown that they rely to a very great extent on submarines, mines and torpedoes, and there can be no doubt whatever that they will endeavour to make the fullest use of these weapons in a fleet action, especially since they possess an actual superiority in these particular directions.'

As the Germans could not rely on using submarines or mines except 'in waters selected by them and in the southern area of the North Sea, my object will, therefore, be to fight the fleet action in the northern portion of the North Sea.' He then proceeded to explain how

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They had, however, an advantage in visibility at this time.

the German submarines might be expected to be used, the idea being to lead the Grand Fleet on to a prepared battle area.

'If, for instance, the enemy battle fleet were to turn away from an advancing fleet, I should assume that the intention was to draw us over mines and submarines and should decline to be so drawn. I desire particularly to draw the attention of their Lordships to this point, since it may be deemed a refusal of battle, and indeed might possibly result in failure to bring the enemy to action as soon as is expected and hoped. . . .* It is quite within the bounds of possibility 7 that half of our battle fleet might be disabled by under-water attack before the guns opened fire at all, if a false move is made.'

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This momentous document was approved by Mr Churchill; but he does not accept on behalf of the Board of Admiralty any responsibility for the actual conduct' of the Battle of Jutland eighteen months later when the Grand Fleet had been powerfully reinforced. The responsibilities of the Commander-in-Chief were undoubtedly tremendous; but 'praiseworthy precaution had induced a defensive habit of mind and a scheme of tactics which hampered the Grand Fleet even when the special conditions enjoining caution did not exist.'

The exaggerated fear of torpedo attack at long ranges had been effectively exposed, just before the outbreak of war, by Admiral Sir Reginald N. Custance as a result of a careful analysis of the war performances of the under-water weapon. The battle area of May 31 could not have been prepared in advance. No submarines were present, for the sufficient reasons which Admiral Scheer has given. We had a marked superiority in torpedo craft, and our torpedoes did more destruction than those of the Germans, while the only trap, by which the 'Ostfriesland' was damaged, was laid by Admiral Jellicoe.† The officially approved tactical scheme, how

* It does not seem to have been realised that, if a retreating fleet were not followed up, a naval victory might become impossible.

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† In addition, three submarines left Harwich at 7 a.m. on May 30 for the Horns Reef Passage with orders to lie on the bottom till June 2. The change in the situation was not communicated to them, although there seems no reason why this should not have been done. They, therefore, carried out their original orders, thereby missing a good opportunity' (Admiral Harper, The Truth about Jutland'). The German Fleet must have passed over them.

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