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Art. 2.-THE SOLUTION OF THE EGYPTIAN PROBLEM. ON Dec. 18, 1914, the date of the Declaration of the British Protectorate over Egypt, began that series of terrible mistakes in British policy with regard to that country which have culminated in the present deplorable political situation. Public opinion in Egypt anticipated that the severance of the tie with Turkey, consequent upon her decision to join the Central Powers against the Allies, would be followed by a closer connexion with Great Britain. It was generally assumed that closer connexion would take the form of annexation. There is no doubt that annexation would have been acquiesced in, and even welcomed, had it been accompanied by a promise that after the termination of the war Egypt should be given the status of a British Dominion. The Protectorate was in no way defined, and most people failed to see what change it had effected in the relations already existing between England and Egypt. It did not appear to possess any advantages, either diplomatic or otherwise, over the old régime, and only opened the door of opportunity for the Egyptian politician ever on the look-out for self-aggrandisement. Himaiya,' the Arabic equivalent for Protectorate, was the term applied to any scallywag who had, mostly by dubious means, obtained the protection of a foreign Power. It was associated in the Egyptian mind with a condition that was neither honourable nor dignified, and on that account met with instant and universal disapproval. A more unfortunate selection could not have been made. Egyptian politicians said afterwards that they had only accepted it as a war measure, but there is no evidence whatever to support their contention. In any case it rankled in their minds and served them later as a base of operations against British guidance, of which they made full use to inflame the minds of the ignorant masses of their fellow-countrymen.

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When war broke out the Khedive of Egypt, Abbas Hilmy Pasha, was in Constantinople, from which he either could not or would not return to Egypt. He was in consequence deposed by His Majesty's Government and the Khediviate was offered, with the title of Sultan

of Egypt, to Prince Hussein Kamel Pasha, the eldest living prince of the family of Mohamad Ali, and was accepted by him on the day following the declaration of the Protectorate. A letter addressed to him by His Majesty's representative in Cairo vaguely affirmed the intention of Great Britain to remain faithful to the policy, in such measure as the degree of enlightenment of public opinion might permit, of associating the governed in the task of government, and expressed the conviction of His Majesty's Government that the clearer definition of Great Britain's position in the country would accelerate progress towards self-government. A futile and pernicious document with neither value nor meaning. The Oriental does not understand literature of this kind, and looks upon it as the work of a man who does not know his own mind and at once proceeds to utilise it for his own ends. In dealing with him anything in the way of hesitation, half measures, or indecision is simply asking for trouble. The Sultan Hussein was a 'grand seigneur' and was universally respected. Amongst the rural population he had a great reputation as a good landlord and an expert farmer. He was endowed with a great charm of manner and was known for his liberality -very important assets in an Oriental country. As a young man, during the reign of his father, Ismail, he had held all the important Ministerial portfolios in the country, and was well equipped for the high function he was called upon to assume. He knew his country and countrymen, and having assented to the conditions attached to the offer of the throne, he loyally acquitted himself of his obligations. He knew when and where to impose his will, and was not a man to be trifled with or to condescend to Nationalist intrigues. What he said to his people was good in their sight, and it was very largely due to his influence and personality that Egypt gave no trouble during the war. Very unfortunately for the welfare of Egypt he died on Oct. 9, 1917. He was succeeded by his half brother Prince Ahmed Fuad, who was the choice of the British Government.

Prince Fuad at the time of his accession to the Sultanate possessed neither the popularity nor the personality of his brother, and was unable to repress that form of Nationalism which is the curse of Egypt

and which has always manifested itself when there were any weak joints in the armour of its ruler. Until Hussein's death, Rushdy Pasha had been Prime Minister, and that quick-witted and volatile politician had been kept under control by the will of his sovereign. With the removal of that restraint, Rushdy allied himself with his friend Zaghlul Pasha, the strong man of the Nationalist Party. On Nov. 10, 1918, two days after the Armistice, Zaghlul Pasha and some of his friends called at the Residency. They claimed to be the representatives of the Egyptian people, which at the time was a selfarrogated title and a gross exaggeration of fact. They laid before the High Commissioner a formal demand for the abolition of the Protectorate. Sir Reginald Wingate informed them that he was not acquainted with the intentions of His Majesty's Government in regard to the future of Egypt. A few days later Zaghlul asked for permission for himself and his colleagues to leave for England, where they wished to place the Egyptian case before the British people. That request was also refused after reference to His Majesty's Government. Then the Prime Minister, Rushdy Pasha, proposed that he and Adly Pasha should go to England and confer personally with the British Government. This was met with a polite refusal and an expression of regret on the ground that the British Ministers were too engrossed in the Peace Conference to find time for the discussion of Egyptian affairs. A great mistake was made in not acceding to the wishes of both Zaghlul and Rushdy, who were mischievous influences and better out of the country. No blame for this, however, can be attributed to Sir Reginald Wingate, who advised compliance with their desires. The refusal led to a storm of excitement and the resignation of Rushdy Pasha and his Cabinet on March 1, 1919.

There can be little doubt that during the whole period of the war, Zaghlul and his party, which at that time had comparatively few adherents, were insidiously poisoning the minds of the people against the British. In this they were aided by the recruitment of the Labour Corps in Egypt and its attendant abuses. The recruiting was carried on in the provinces with the assistance of the provincial governors, the district officers, and the

omdas (village headmen), under the nominal supervision of officers of the Egyptian Labour Corps, who for the most part were ignorant of the country, and whose main idea was to get men. This led to every kind of abuse. The omdas seized the opportunity of sending every male of the families who were opposed to them, and wreaked their vengeance upon the property and the helpless women and children who were left behind. The British civil authorities, harassed and overworked, had lost touch with the people, and the Egyptian provincial authorities were thus enabled to give an ocular demonstration of what acts of tyranny they were capable of when left to their own devices. They were, however, clever enough to impute every kind of abuse to the British, whose influence and good name amongst the peasantry, who had hitherto looked upon them as protectors against oppression, in consequence began to decline. The collections for the Red Cross degenerated into a forced levy, and the amounts fixed for each village by the native district officers were quadrupled by the omdas, who put the difference into their own pockets. The donkeys and camels of the peasantry were requisitioned for the army, and although a fair price was paid, none the less their owners deeply resented the loss of these animals, which were essential for the cultivation of their fields. On the termination of the war, such of them as had survived were sold back to them, but owing to their scarcity the price was then much higher than what they had been paid for them. Then again forage had to be requisitioned, and barley was in many cases exacted from people who did not grow it, and they had to buy it from others at the market price, a much higher figure than that which had been fixed by the native local authorities as the requisition rate. The Nationalist politicians did not fail to make use of these manifest injustices for the purposes of propaganda, but instead of imputing the blame to their own countrymen who were responsible for them, they laid it on the shoulders of the British. In this they were aided by sermons which were preached in the mosques. They well knew that unless they could secure the adherence of the peasantry, their movement was destined to fail. To reach the peasant mind they had to appeal to his

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fanaticism and his credulity, and lies were accordingly circulated about the irrigation water being cut off from his fields. Unfortunately, the cream of the Englishmen in the Ministry of the Interior were allowed to join the army, and there was no one left either to warn the British authorities of what was taking place, or to check the revolutionary spirit of the people which was being fanned into a flame. The great theological University of Al-Azhar, the centre of Moslem learning, had always been a focus of political discontent and turbulence. The very nature of its teaching made its students prone to take part in any movement which promised to upset law and order, and more especially if that law and order was tainted with a foreign origin. It had tried conclusions with Mohamad Ali, who gave it a lesson that it did not soon forget. Napoleon was no more fortunate during his occupation of Egypt, and he had to use stern measures of repression. Zaghlul found it an instrument ready to his hand, and he did not fail to avail himself of the services which it might render to his party. Nor were the students of the theological colleges of Alexandria and Tanta behindhand in seconding the efforts of their fellow-students of the Azhar. Their homes lay in every village and hamlet of Egypt, and in their character of holy men they were listened to and believed in by the peasantry in their campaign of propaganda against the British. The schoolboys, and even the little schoolgirls of four years of age, and the students of the law, medical, and engineering colleges, influenced by the Egyptian schoolmasters, joined in the campaign and became the most noisy and zealous of Zaghlul's adherents. They defied all authority, organised strikes, formed pickets to terrorise government officials from attending their offices, and even threatened their own fathers when some of the more moderate among them attempted to make them see the error of their ways. The ambition of every Egyptian who has been to school is to make government provide him with a post in the service, where he will have little to do, and unfortunately the educational curriculum only provides for such a narrow future career. Obviously with the extension of education there were more applicants than posts, and a mass of discontented, unemployable, semi

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