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of its own so vast that until they can be solved it is difficult to foresee the attainment of complete selfgovernment within any given period; but that is no reason for refusing to consider the probable effects which its eventual surrender to Indian control will have upon the States, for any step taken now may be irrevocable and, without foresight, may easily lead to disaster.

For if the promises we have made to introduce selfgovernment into British India must be honoured, no less inviolable are those solemn engagements into which we have entered with the Princes. The tendency to regard British India as the predominant partner and simultaneously to depress or to ignore the importance of the Indian States is due wholly to the fact that the one is directly administered by the Paramount Power and the others are not. The suzerainty enjoyed and exercised by Great Britain is quite unlike the hegemony of Prussia in Germany before 1870, which rested mainly upon the military superiority of the Prussian State, and differs very largely from that rather shadowy suzerainty which England claimed over the Transvaal before the South African war, and which was at the time the subject of considerable controversy. There is nothing to suggest that there is any inherent superiority in the inhabitants of British India. It is generally admitted that the army is what it is owing to the leadership of British officers, without whom there would be serious danger of degeneration; with the same leadership there is no reason to think that the State troops would not attain the same standard. The cultivator of Mysore does not differ from the cultivator of the neighbouring British province, and the administrator in British India, though trained on British lines and perhaps more experienced than his brethren in the States, is the inheritor of European ideas of government and has yet to prove his value when deprived of British guidance and counsel. The suzerainty in India is a definite thing, elastic in its working, but in its broad lines unmistakable. There are mutual rights and mutual obligations which are unquestioned by one side as by the other; the Princes are well aware that, whatever minor causes may exist for dissatisfaction, they are personally secure save for gross incompetence or high misdemeanour, and their

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States are secure save for rebellion against the Paramount Power.

Nothing perhaps would be more distasteful to the Princes than the knowledge that the judges of their conduct, private as well as public, will be those who but for the accident of frontier would be their own humble and submissive servants. The case of the Maharaja Gaekwar of Baroda in 1875 is a vivid illustration of the situation that might again arise. He was charged with general misgovernment and specific disloyalty, which latter consisted of participation in an attempt to poison the British representative. A Commission was appointed to investigate and report, and the Commissioners were not agreed on the charge of disloyalty. Accordingly that was dropped, but the Government of India proceeded, in conformity with the policy of removing the ruler instead of extinguishing the State, to depose the Gaekwar for notorious misconduct and gross misgovernment. Now the cumulative effect of acts of State, so as to constitute gross misgovernment, must always be a matter of opinion, and the combination of conduct and government suggests that the Maharaja was tried on both personal and official grounds. It is true that two of the Commissioners were the peers of the Maharaja, but as was seen in the recent case of Indore, the position of judging a brother Prince is evidently not relished and the remaining Commissioners were Europeans. It is no disparagement to the abilities of native Indians, and no suggestion of their unfitness to govern, if we say that this makes a difference. England was the unquestioned Paramount Power, and the right of inquisition was delegated by the Viceroy, who himself was directly representing the King-Emperor. Even if it be argued that since by hypothesis India must remain part of the British Empire, and that on the analogy of the Dominions the Viceroy would still be an Englishman appointed from the Mother Country, it is matter of common knowledge that the powers of a Dominion Governor-General are very different from those of the King's representative in India, and that in fact the executive control, including the appointment of agents, would virtually rest with the democratically elected Assembly from whom, unless there is a distinct departure from the English plan, the members of the

Cabinet (or Council) will be chosen. But the agents of the Viceroy in the Indian States though they are drawn from the Civil and Military services and are usually members of the upper middle class, represent the race which, however their right may have been questioned, has, in fact, been universally recognised as ruling. Under no circumstances whatever could they have been the subjects of the Princes to whom they are accredited; no comparison can be instituted between them, and the men amongst whom they are working, not because they stand upon a different plane of intellect or capacity but simply because they belong to a different category. They represent the Paramount Power which the Princes willingly acknowledge and in which they have confidence; their successors will represent a Paramount Power which the Princes will be more inclined to repudiate, and which they will probably distrust.

The difficulty of the problem is enhanced by the extreme delicacy of introducing the affairs of the States into a scheme with which they have no concern. The Princes, some of whom are said to be in sympathy with the aspirations of British India, did not and could not openly interfere either by manifesto, by associations, or in any public manner; to ascertain exactly how they stand is a measure of prudence which implies no hostility to the politicians of British India. On the other hand, the historic report recognises, as it could hardly fail to do when one of the signatories was in special charge of their affairs, the importance of the States and of the problems connected with them. It is frankly admitted that, apart from mutual rights and obligations as set out in treaties and agreements, there are many points of contact between the Government of British India and the States. To some of these allusion has already been made, and it is unnecessary to transcribe the whole catalogue, but it is important to bear in mind that, as the Report puts it, 'a perceptible process of infiltration has been going on,' and that in view of this fact constitutional changes in British India cannot but 'react in an important manner on the Native States.' Besides assuring the Princes that all treaties will be loyally and strictly observed, and reiterating their desire to avoid interference except to the extent sanctioned by present

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usage, the authors of the Report have very little to
propose.
A Chamber of Princes as a permanent con-
sultative body; a Standing Committee of that body;
a commission of inquiry into disputes, and another,
perhaps of higher standing, to deal with cases of mis-
conduct; a change in political relations by placing the
more important States in direct correspondence with
the Government of India, and an informal conference-
similar to a joint sitting of both Houses of Parliament—
between the Council (or Chamber) of Princes and the
democratic Council of State; such are the proposals, and
it will be obvious that only one of them, or at most two,
contemplate the revolutionary alterations in the con-
stitution of India from an alien benevolent oligarchy to
a so-called responsible democracy. For the moment we
may put aside the conference. The withdrawal of the
States from the control of local Governments seems to
suggest some apprehension lest the Princes should con-
ceive some derogation of their dignity by dealing with
a Government reconstituted upon a democratic basis,
though it is only fair to add that other critics have seen
in the proposal a weakening of British control and a
deprivation of salutary advice from the more accessible
authorities.

The important paragraph in the chapter is that in which the authors outline their vision of the future:

'Looking ahead to the future we can picture India to ourselves only as presenting the external semblance of some form of "federation." The provinces will ultimately become self-governing units, held together by the Central Government, which will deal solely with matters of concern to all of them. But the matters common to the British provinces are also to a great extent those in which the Native States are interested. The gradual concentration of the Government of India upon such matters will therefore make it easier for the States while 'retaining the autonomy which they cherish in internal matters, to enter into closer association with the Central Government if they wish to do so.'

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The enigma in this passage lies in the words 'Central Government.' What sort of Central Government is contemplated? The word 'ultimately' taken in combination with a forecast of the future suggests a vision

of India, not after ten years or twenty, but in its final shape, and that shape in the aspirations of practically all her politicians will be a completely self-governing Dominion with perhaps an English Viceroy to represent the connexion with the Crown. If that is so, all the difficulties and complications we have been considering will arise. If not, then Indians are hugging a delusion.

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Now, if we consider critically the famous declaration of 1917, it will be seen that while it does not and cannot directly touch the Indian States, it leaves open to interpretation the question of their indirect inclusion in the scheme. It speaks of the increasing association of Indians in every branch of the administration and the gradual development of self-governing institutions with a view to the progressive realisation of responsible government in India.' It is quite plain that India as used here means British India, for it is absurd to suggest the 'gradual development of self-governing institutions in States which are internally autonomous. It may therefore be at least plausibly argued that 'every branch of the administration' refers only to the internal government of the country, including of course national defence, though whether foreign policy would also be included would depend upon the final control reserved by the Mother Country. It is true that the external foreign policy is a matter of great interest to the Princes whose fortunes are interwoven with those of British India and who are bound by their engagements to assist in the defence of the country. The existence within an Empire of large blocks of territory owning a general allegiance, yet admitting a limited interference by the suzerain Power while otherwise retaining full autonomy, differentiates India from any other Dominion, and indeed from any other country in the world; unparalleled conditions may require special treatment, and we need not assume that England has said the last word on systems of government, or been too proud to borrow hints from other nations. There is in the Japanese constitution a provision withdrawing the Army and Navy from popular control, and the articles are worth quoting:

'ART. XII. The Emperor determines the organisation and peace standing of the Army and Navy.'

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