1849.] Difference between John and Philo. 419 the contrast between light and darkness has a physical basis, and consequently has its necessity in the opposition between the light-essence of God and the dark in. The idea, that the Logos was not known by the world simply on account of the fault of men, is foreign to Philo. The most important difference, however, appears in the circumstance, that John, while he maintains that the real Word of God became man in Jesus Christ, the only-begotten Son of God, and truly lived among men, excludes the Docetic principle of Philo's gnosis, and directs the doctrine of the Logos into the path of Christian faith in the real connection between the Divine and the human,—in the immediate Divine likeness of the whole man. Such an application of the idea of the Logos was, as has been already remarked, impossible to Philo, and to all who received the Docetic principle of the Alexandrian gnosis. When Philo calls the Logos & ans οι ἀληθινὸς ἄνθρωπος, ὁ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν ἄνθρωπος, oι ὁ κατ' εἰκόνα ἄνθρωπος, ἄνθρωπος Θεοῦ or ουράνιος, this conception is to such a degree different from the proposition of John, ô λóyos váęs ἐγένετο, that Philo says expressly, ὁ οὐράνιος [ἄνθρωπος] ἅτε κατ ̓ εἰκόνα Θεοῦ γεγονώς, φθαρτῆς καὶ συνόλως γεώδους οὐσίας άuétoxos. Thus, according to Philo, there is no immediate ἀμέτοχος. likeness of God in the man of the race of Adam, while, according to John, the Logos came to a true manifestation in actual earthly human nature. Manifestations of the Logos in history occur, it is true, in Philo; but in reality only as a symbolized idea, in visions and dreams, in transient, changing, now angelic, now human, forms. These differences between John and Philo flow, of course, from the principles of the Christian faith. That John sets them forth so distinctly is, as we have seen in the Introduction, owing to the antignostic tendency of his whole Gospel. This, however, is to be referred immediately, not to Philo and the Jewish-Alexandrian gnosis of the time, but, as we have already shown, to the false gnostic tendencies in the Christian community. Let us now turn to the special interpretation of the prologue, and see how far John has solved his problem, that of making the unity of the eternalf with the temporal personality of the Son of God conceivable in the form of the Alexandrian * Allegor. I. 49. The author does not appear to use the word eternal in a strict sense, that is, in the sense of timeless. On the contrary, he says, in page 295 of his Commentary, that the doctrine of an eternal personal Logos, in the sense of timeless (zeitlose), arose in the Church after the time of John.—Tr. doctrine of the Logos without the Alexandrian emanatism and dualism. [The author then proceeds to explain ch. i. 1-18, verse by verse. Of this explanation I shall translate only what relates to verse first, in a form somewhat abridged, and then proceed to his excursus on the prologue. -TR.] As if he intended to describe the creation anew, John says, verse first, according to the expression in Gen. i. 1, 'Er doz (), "In the beginning." In this reference to the Mosaic history of the creation, the expression is to be understood in the same sense, that is, as denoting "the beginning of things." From the connection of the prologue, especially in verse third, it more distinctly appears that this expression conveys the idea of "ante-mundane," the go TOU TOν XÓσμOV siva of ch. xvii. 5. A comparison of the verse with Prov. viii. 22-25, Jesus Sirach xxiv. 9, and with the analogous representation of the Logos in Philo, confirms this supposition. . . . . . The verb, “ was," is designed to express the idea, that John, from the historical stand-point of the "Word manifested in the flesh," sets forth, in verses first and second, his existence before this manifestation, namely, before the world; and in verses third and fourth, the activity of the lóyos in relation to the world, and in it. Whether, and how far, John regarded the Logos as ayevynios, or as лóτ лás xriosos, like Paul, (Col. i. 16,) does not appear from this passage. After John has asserted the primitive ante-mundane existence of the Logos, he adds, as a closer designation of the same, “ καὶ ὁ λόγος ἦν πρὸς τὸν Θεόν.” . . . . . If we go back to the analogous passages in Prov. xiii. 30, where wisdom. says, un nag avio, 13, that in Sirach i. 1, xai per avτov tour is Tov aiova, and in the Book of Wisdom ix. 4, where oopia is represented as the nagrdoos of the Divine throne, and finally in Philo, where the Logos is called the oлados Oɛou and the oixos Oɛou, it must be supposed, from the historical connection of the expression, that John intended to convey the idea of the most intimate immediate fellowship of the Logos with God, -the being the being near him, present with him. If the phrase “ ἦν παρὰ τῷ Θεῷ,” or “ πρὸς τῷ Θεῷ, had been used, there could be no doubt in the case. But that " πρὸς τὸν Θεόν can also, according to classical usage, have the same meaning, seems to be established by the observations of Fritsche* * Comment. ad Marc. vi. 3. Winer's Gram. § 53. h. 1849.] Exposition of John I. 1. 421 and Winer. As to New Testament usage, Mark vi. 3; Matt. xiii. 56; Mark ix. 19; Matt. xxvi. 55; 1 Cor. xvi. 6, 7; Gal. i. 1, 18, and iv. 18,- afford sufficient confirmation of such a meaning. The same thought is more plainly expressed in i. 18, “Ο ὢν εἰς τὸν κόλπον τοῦ πατρός,” and in xvii. 5, σε παρὰ σοί, 66 "" . . . It is evident from the expression, that John had not in mind the immanent Logos, but the λόγος προφορικός. Of the last proposition in the verse, “Καὶ Θεὸς ἦν ὁ λόγος,” ὁ λόγος being regarded as the subject of the proposition, there are two possible explanations. The first is, that John, by the assertion of the unity of the Logos with God (xai Osòs o λóyos), designs to guard against the idea of such a difference between the Logos and God being implied in the expression, "and the Logos was with God" (Toos Tov Oεór), as would cause this expression to be understood in a sense more or less polytheistical. In this case, the proposition" and the Logos was God" would mean that the hypostatical Logos was no other than God himself, or the immanent Logos. The second explanation is, that John designs by xai Oros ólóyos to define more closely the idea of the fellowship, or the immediate relation, of the Logos with God, which is implied in πρὸς τὸν Θεόν, so that it may not be understood in too wide or loose a sense. The first explanation is that of the ancients. It lies at the foundation of the Church doctrine of the Trinity. But, with all its plausibility, I must reject it, on the following grounds : First, why has not John more definitely expressed the supposed antithesis by a de or an alλá? The particle xai is too feeble and ambiguous to express the meaning above mentioned. Secondly, why does he not, in the second verse, which has so close a connection with the first, resume the entirely new thought which the words, according to this explanation, would contain? Further, if he had intended to express the personal unity, or unity of being, of the Logos with Otós, then the expression o Osós, that is, sós with the article, might have been expected to be used. On account of the possible ambiguity of Otos without the article, the latter should not have been omitted. Finally, what obliges us, with Theodore of Mopsuestia, to press the idea of the rigor, the tregóτns, of the Logos, which is, it is true, implied in лoos τòv Oɛóv, so closely as to be compelled to regard the following proposition, xal Θεὸς ἦν ὁ λόγος, as a monotheistic qualification or removal of it? In fact, the personal difference of the Logos would in this way be not merely limited, but altogether annihilated. But this could not have been the design of John, who in a special manner proceeds on the idea of the λόγος προφορικός. The second explanation is, on the contrary, justified by the connection, as well as by the phraseology. John intends to say that the ante-mundane Logos is noos tor Otór, that is, in such fellowship with God, stands in such a relation to him, that he may be called God. If now there is any historical, though it may be a mediate, connection between the representation of John and Philo, then is sós to be taken in the same sense in which Philo, in order to distinguish the Logos from the absolute God, ( Otós,) calls him simply eros, without the article, and even o devregos Osos, the second God, but with the express addition that this last expression is used only figuratively (v xaτazonσe). If, as we have seen, John understood by the Logos a real Divine person, and yet, as a Christian apostle, certainly adhered to the monotheistic idea of God in a higher and far purer degree (xvii. 3, 1 John v. 20) than Philo, then must he, not less than Philo, have understood the Oros vô λóyos," the word was God," in a figurative sense (ἐν καταχρήσει). Thus the meaning of Θεός would be nearly the same as that of Ocios, "Divine." But this [that is, the exact equivalence of Orios and Otos] is not allowed by New Testament usage. We must, then, take Osos without the article, in the indefinite sense of a Divine nature or a Divine being, as distinguished from the definite absolute God, ὁ Θεός, the αὐτόθεος of Origen. Thus the Θεός of John answers to the image of God (eixov tov Oɛov) of Paul, Col. i. 15. This agreement of the doctrine with that of Paul is no mean historical confirmation of our interpretation, although, in the dogmatical analysis of it, there is the disadvantage of being obliged to regard the lóyos in a subordinate relation to God. Still, however, the idea of unity of nature is implied in the representation of John. Having now finished our grammatical explanation of the prologue of John, we are able to answer the question, whether and how far John has succeeded in the object proposed to * De Somniis I. 599. Comp. Origen. Comment. in Ev. Joan. Tom. II. § 1-3. 1849.] himself, that of expressing, in the form of the Alexandrian doctrine of the Logos, the unity of the ante-mundane and eternal with the historical personality of Christ, that is, his personal preexistence; a doctrine which the Evangelist has plainly expressed in ch. viii. 58, and xvii. 5. The question is two-fold. The first claim to a satisfactory solution of it belonged to the first readers of the Gospel. Did John give an explanation of the subject satisfactory to those readers, and to those who were at the same stand-point of Christian philosophy with them? This purely historical question undoubtedly lies within the limits of an exegetical commentary. Another question, however, remains, namely, how far the doctrinal representation of the prologue is satisfactory at the present day, at our present stand-point of Christian philosophy. If the Gospel be a truly apostolical and canonical writing, this question is theologically necessary. It is a question, however, which belongs to the province of dogmatic and systematic theology, and the discussion of it belongs to an excursus rather than to a commentary on the Gospel of John. But since a comparison of the earlier and more modern modes of thinking, and of the essential idea with its forms of manifestation, must essentially contribute to a full understanding of the prologue of John, such an excursus would seem to be fully justified. I. When John says, that Jesus Christ, the only-begotten Son of God, was the Logos made man, and that the Logos was an ante-mundane, eternal, ever active, revealing hypostasis (offenbarungs-hypostase), and as such, a different hypostasis from God himself, a personal, self-conscious Divine being, it appears plain, how, according to the prevalent philosophy, or gnosis, of the times, Christ could assert that he existed before Abraham, yea, before the foundation of the world. The conception of the Logos in this sense, and in this application, was admitted and intelligible. But John says, moreover, that the Logos "became flesh." This was the peculiarly Christian word of the problem, and in this sense the conception was foreign to the Alexandrian philosophy, and in itself attended with difficulty. The greater importance John attributes to it, the more exactly, one would think, should he have defined so enigmatical a proposition. But this he has not done. When, in another part of the prologue, he speaks of the coming of the Logos "into the world," and "to his |