1849.] Meaning of Hypostasis. 429 If this be the case, we have only to inquire how that gnostic form of thought or representation is to be understood. Ritter has said, "The object of the ideal theory of Plato was not to demonstrate the reality and absolute subsistence of individual things, or even of their several species and genera, but merely to establish the reality of certain ideas in the soul and the reason, which are susceptible of distinction, and may and ought to be the objects of science. This is what is meant by the reality of ideas in the Platonic theory. They are not separate, self-subsisting things, energies, or substances, but merely certain determinations in the Divine reason, admitting of distinction, according to which the True, in the phenomena of the world and in science, is ordered and arranged; they are so far real and actual as, being copied in every individual soul after the measure of its intelligence, they have corresponding to them a real determination in the reason of God, which is the true law of all, modes of existence in the world. They are said to subsist absolutely in and for themselves, because they must severally be conceived each with a determinate difference, and every entity corresponding to them with a determinate difference from every other entity, in and by itself." Looking at the subject from this point of view, it is necessary to distinguish the hypostatizing of the Logos from the permanent hypostatic personality of the same. According to the use of language† in philosophic discourse, vлóorauis primarily expresses only the reality, the real existence, of an idea, in contradistinction from mere ugaoist (appearance); hence, also, it denotes independent existence, noutaa idiar, in contradistinction from that which is derived or mediate. Philo does not use the word in connection with the Logos, though it occurs elsewhere in his writings. But we may say with truth, that he hypostatizes the Logos, that is, he ascribes to it, in a strict sense, a real existence, and, indeed, a necessary Divine existence, in contradistinction from mere ugaois, φαντασία, ἐπίνοια. The hypostatizing of the óyos in this sense presents in general, and to our apprehensions in modern times, no difficulty. But by the gnosis, or prevailing philosophy, of that time, the Logos was conceived of as a personal * History of Philosophy, Vol. II. p. 361. Eng. Trans., p. 372 of the original. On the use of vooraσis, see Bleek's Commentar zu Hebr. i. 3. VOL. XLVI. -4TH S. VOL. XI. NO. III. 37 hypostasis, as a real and proper person, out of God. This was, in that age, the immediate, appropriate expression of the thought. But, on this very account, it is not the necessary thought itself, significant for all minds in every age. If, in the connection of Christian thought, we in this age are unable to form or realize the conception of a real, absolute, Divine, personal Logos, then may the representation of such a Logos be regarded by us as only a temporary form of thought, the enunciation of a real Christian truth expressed in a form suited to the times, which was rather intimated than immediately expressed in the language used. The idea of the hypostatic personality of the Logos arose in its time out of the tendency of the ancients, especially the Hebrews, harmless in itself, to personify abstract ideas. Another source of it, however, as is manifest in Philo, was the polytheistic and demonologistic mode of thinking of the times. The unconscious power of the truth may be implied in the tendency to conceive of all spirit-life in the world as personal. But it is one thing to conceive of an angel, and quite another to conceive of the absolute personality of the Logos as different from the absolute personality of God. If, now, Philo himself could not otherwise complete this last conception than by comparing the absolute Logos with an archangel, or a second God, (still being unable, as a monotheist, to concede truth to this last representation,) - if it be found also, that, notwithstanding the emphasis which he appears to place upon the personality of the Logos, the more general conception of hypostasis, in the sense of Plato's "idea," will yet sometimes show itself in his writings, then may we well maintain that the hypostatic personality of the Logos was in his time only the clearest and strongest expression of the truth, that the Logos, both in God and in the world, was not mere ἔμφασις, or ἐπίνοια, but a true hypostasis, a necessary entity in the idea of God; and that it was, though not of the world, yet the world-creating, eternal, revealing power, or revealing action, of the personal God. The more all action, every attribute, and all power of the personal God is personal, - that is, independent of the world, in itself free, the more, in order to express this, might the Logos be conceived of as a personal hypostasis, or an hypostatic personality in this sense, no clear distinction being made between personification and real personality. . . . . . * * I omit here a page or two of remarks on a peculiar theory of Weisse. - TR. 1849.] Explanation of Texts. 431 In this explanation of John's representation of the Logos, we have a twofold advantage: first, that the phrase o óyos oùos éyéveTo becomes intelligible without any Docetic transmutation of a Divine person into a human one, and without giving up the immediate creative and revealing power of God, the incarnation of the Logos; secondly, that the conception of the Logos, freed from the gnostic form which it assumed in the time of John, is brought back to its true Old Testament ground and import, and consequently, to its permanent, dogmatic, that is, its essential, religious value. It is true, that, in the expressions of Christ concerning his personal preexistence (John viii. 57, xvii. 5) there may appear to be an insuperable objection to the view which has been given. For how, it may be asked, can these expressions be reconciled with our view of the Logos, without abandoning their original signification? It would seem to be becoming in a Christian theologian to leave the Logos of John, in its original expression, as an inexplicable mystery, rather than, by a forced interpretation, to weaken the meaning of the words of Christ. But the question is, whether John's mode of understanding those words, conformed as it is to the prevailing doctrine of the Logos in his day, was the original sense in which Christ understood them. If we have no right to assume that Jesus spoke in conformity with the prevailing doctrine of the Logos, then we are allowed to distinguish the sense in which John understood those expressions from that in which Christ used them. But we are not allowed to suppose that Jesus uttered any thing essentially different from what John has recorded. If, then, we trace back those expressions of Christ to the Old Testament ground on which he stood, and remember that there was in him a perfect human consciousness, we may understand the essential meaning of them to be, that Jesus, in the full consciousness of the Divine glory of the only-begotten, which dwelt in him from his birth, conceived of it in its eternal reality in the past, as well as in the future and present (comp. iii. 13); or rather, that, although existing in a human, and of course a finite, temporal* personality, he was yet conscious of being a perfect organ, or a perfect possessor, not only of the light and life, but of the eternal revealing power of God. If Christ could not have meant that he eternally preëxisted as the historical Son of God, then he * That is, not existing as a person before his birth. - TR. could have understood his eternal preëxistence only in an ideal sense, that is, in reference to the eternal word, as this phrase is used in the Old Testament. I acknowledge the difficulties which attend this interpretation of the passage; but they vanish before the impossibility of conceiving of a double real personality in Christ, -the one eternal and Divine, and the other finite and human, - whether regarded as distinct, or as fused into each other without distinction. This supposition makes a specific difference of nature between Christ and us his brethren, which renders not only the true Son of man, but the truly redeeming Son of God, inconceivable to me. I fear not the Church, but love and honor it from my heart. But I love and honor it, because it is the Church, not of the letter and form, but of Christian truth and regulated freedom. In this it is implied that she has a certain and sure word of God in the Scriptures, and that she has also well-founded laws of human thought and language. But to understand the former in its fulness, and to apply the latter with correctness in their living freedom, is an infinite problem, to the solution of which unremitted labor is necessary, In this consideration is my justification and defence, not indeed for taking away any permanent truth from the prologue of John, but for departing in its explanation from the formularies of the Church. G. R. N., TR. James Hind ART. V.-BRAZER'S SERMONS.* WE gladly welcome another valuable addition to the many volumes of sermons which the affection and veneration of surviving relatives and friends for the memory of their authors have given to the public, urged, usually, by the request of grateful parishioners, and the expressed wishes of others, who were occasional hearers and admirers of the living utterances of the men whose voices have ceased to be heard in the pulpits they occupied, and whom we no longer meet in the places that have known them, and that are to know them *Sermons, by JOHN BRAZER, D. D. Boston: Crosby & Nichols. 1849. 12mo. pp. 367. 1849.] no more. Unitarian Writers. 433 However we may rejoice over these spolia opima, these rich trophies, which follow in the train, and in a measure console us for the triumphs, of the universal conqueror, we cannot look back without a painful sense of bereavement upon the ravages which, within a few years, have been made in the ranks of our ministerial brotherhood, who have been the expounders, defenders, and ornaments of "the faith once delivered to the saints," as we have learned it from the teachings, example, and spirit of its Divine "author and finisher," as transmitted to us in the Gospel records and epistles. Within these few years have been called to their heavenly rest and reward most of those who stood in the front rank of reformers of the popular faith, and who had to make their defence against a host of assailants that began the controversy which, some thirty or forty years since, gave occasion for the assumption, or acceptance, by the assailed, of the name of Unitarians, and for "a statement of reasons" for rejecting the Trinitarian and kindred dogmas, as held and taught by Calvinists, or the so-called Orthodox. Freeman, Kirkland, Channing, Greenwood, the Wares, father and son, the Whitmans, and, near to each other, Peabody of Springfield and Brazer of Salem, with many others, in no long interval from the present, have left us; who, by their public ministries and writings during their lives, and in the volumes, like that at the head of this article, published by their friends after their decease, have, in conjunction with many living brethren, long may they live!-given form and definite expression to the catholic and heart-cheering faith justly cherished and held most precious by a large, and everywhere increasing, community of believers. In the writings of these men may be found, expressed with clearness and power, both the negative and positive aspects of the Unitarian faith, and the doctrinal views they entertained, with their practical application to the government of the heart and life, or to the formation of the Christian character; defended, urged, and enforced with equal strength and fairness of reasoning, with fervid and persuasive eloquence, with a broad and comprehensive charity, a serious, devout, and earnest spirit, a Christ-like compassion and love to the souls of men, a fearless fidelity of warning and tenderness of entreaty to the sinful, and "beseeching" of all men to be reconciled to God, with a uniform reference to the Divine authority of Christ, and a resting of all they teach or require upon |