 | George Boole - 1854 - 464 pagina’s
...which have nothing in common cannot be understood by means of each other ; or the conception of the one does not involve the conception of the other. 6. A true idea ought to agree with its own object. (Idea vera debet cum suo ideato convenire.) 7. Whatever can be... | |
 | George Boole - 1854 - 442 pagina’s
...which have nothing in common cannot be understood by means of each other ; or the conception of the one does not involve the conception of the other. 6. A true idea ought to agree with its own object. (Idea vera debet cum suo ideato convenire.) Other definitions are... | |
 | John Watts - 1857 - 210 pagina’s
...that have nothing in common with each other cannot be understood by means of each other — that is, the conception of one does not involve the conception of the other. VI. A true idea must agree with its original in nature. VII. Whatever can be clearly conceived as non-existent... | |
 | George Henry Lewes - 1867 - 692 pagina’s
...follows from Def. 3 ; for each Substance must be conceived in itself and through itself; in other words, the conception of one does not involve the conception of the other. PROP. III. Of tilings which have nothing in common, one cannot be the cause of the other. Demonet.... | |
 | George Western Thompson - 1869 - 468 pagina’s
...Things that have "nothing in common with each other cannot be understood by means of each other, i. e , the conception of one does not involve the conception of the other. VI. A true idea must agree with its object (idea vera debet suo ideato convenire). VII. Whatever can... | |
 | 1869 - 844 pagina’s
...Things which have nothing in common with each other cannot be understood through one another ; ie, the conception of one does not involve the conception of the other. 5. To understand an effect implies that we understood the cause of it. 6. A time idea is one which... | |
 | Charles Bradlaugh - 1874 - 274 pagina’s
...that have nothing in common with each other, can not be understood by means of each other — that is, the conception of one does not involve the conception of the other." PROPOSITIONS. — Existence is prior to its modes. This follows from definitions 1 and 3, because modes... | |
 | Charles Maurice Davies - 1874 - 444 pagina’s
...that have nothing in common with each other, cannot be understood by means of each other—that is, the conception of one does not involve the conception of the other.' " PROPOSITIONS.—Existence is prior to its modes. This follows from definitions 1 and 3, because modes... | |
 | Benedictus de Spinoza - 1876 - 394 pagina’s
...have nothing in common with each oiher cannot be understood the one by the other ; or, in other words, the conception of one does not involve the conception of the other. VI. A true idea must agree with its ideate (image or conception of a thing). VII. When a thing can... | |
 | Constance E. Plumptre - 1879 - 364 pagina’s
...— very existence, conceived as following necessarily from the sole definition of an eternal thing. Axioms. 1. All that is, is either in itself or in...non-existing does not in its essence involve existence. Propositions. Proposition 1. Substance is prior in nature to its affections. Demonstration. This is... | |
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The knowledge of an effect depends on and involves the knowledge of a cause. V. Things which have nothing in common cannot be understood, the one by means of the other ; the conception of one does not involve the conception of the other. 
