nations: but the law itself has no locality. It is the duty of the person who sits here to determine this question exactly as he would determine the same question if sitting at Stockholm;-to assert no pretensions on the part of Great Britain which he would not allow to Sweden in the same circumstances, and to impose no duties on Sweden, as a neutral country, which he would not admit to belong to Great Britain in the same character. If, therefore, I mistake the law in this matter, I mistake that which I consider, and which I mean should be considered, as the universal law upon the question; a question regarding one of the most important rights of belligerent nations relatively to neutrals.—Cases determined in the High Court of Admiralty— The Maria.

6. The Law of Marriage.

WHAT is the law of marriages, in all foreign establishments settled in countries, professing a religion essentially different? In the English Factories at Lisbon, Leghorn, Oporto, Cadizand in the Factories in the East; Smyrna, Aleppo, and others? in all of which, (some of these establishments existing by authority under treaties, and others under indulgence and toleration) marriages are regulated by the law of the original country, to which they are still considered to belong. An English resident at St. Petersburgh does not look to the Ritual of the Greek Church, but to the Rubric of the Church of England, when he contracts a marriage with an English woman. Nobody can suppose, that whilst the Mogul empire existed, an Englishman was bound to consult the Koran, for the celebration of his marriage. Even where no foreign. connection can be ascribed, a respect is shewn to the opinions and practice of a distinct people. The validity of a Greek marriage, in the extensive dominions of Turkey, is left to

depend, I presume, upon their own canons, without any reference to Mahometan ceremonies. There is a jus gentium upon this matter,—a comity, which treats with tenderness, or at least with toleration, the opinions and usages of a distinct people in this transaction of marriage. It may be difficult to say, a priori, how far the general law should circumscribe its own authority in this matter; but practice has established the principle in several instances; and where the practice is admitted, it is entitled to acceptance and respect. It has sanctioned the marriages of foreign subjects, in the houses of the Embassadors of the foreign country, to which they belong: I am not aware of any judicial recognition upon the point; but the reputation, which the validity of such marriages has acquired, makes such a recognition by no means improbable, if such a question was brought to judgment. In the case which has now occurred,—the case of a conquering force, stationed in a conquered country or colony, for the purpose of enforcing the reluctant obedience. of the natives, and composing, for the present, a distinct and immisceable body,-can it be maintained, that the success of their arms, and the service of vigilant control in which they are employed, lays them at the feet of the civil jurisdiction of the country, without any exception whatever? In a former case, the Court intimated Its opinion, (for the case never reached a decision) that the law of France would not apply to an officer of the English Army of Occupation, marrying an English lady; on the ground that, at that time, and under such circumstances, the parties were not French subjects, under the dominion of French law; and surely the condition of a garrison of a subdued country, is not more capable of impressing the domestic character, and all the obligations it carries with it, than the situation of the Army of Occupation at that time in France.

Much of the order of a society, so peculiarly placed, depends upon a discreet application of general principles to particular institutions; this can hardly be specified before hand. But that the whole mass of law, formed for another state of things, and for a status personarum widely different, is to be immediately forced down upon these foreign guardians, in their own separate transactions, and without any reserve or limitation, is a proposition much too inconvenient in its consequences, to be perfectly just in its principle.Judgments in the Consistory Court.




DUGALD STEWART was born at Edinburgh in 1753. He was educated at the High School of that city, where, under the instruction of Dr. Adams, was laid the foundation of those classical tastes and accomplishments which he cherished through life. From the High School Dugald Stewart passed into the University of Edinburgh, where he studied for four Sessions. He next entered the University of Glasgow, partly with a view to obtaining a Snell Exhibition to enable him to pursue his studies at Oxford, but also for the sake of attending the prelections of Dr. Thomas Reid, who was then rising into fame as the inaugurator of a new æra in the history of philosophy. In 1722 he was recalled, when only twenty years of age, to Edinburgh to assist his father, the eminent geometrician, Matthew Stewart, in the duties of the mathematical chair. He conducted the classes with marked ability, and after three years was appointed conjoint Professor of Mathematics in 1775. In the Session of 1778-9 Mr. Stewart lectured to the classes of Moral Philosophy during the absence in America of the Professor. His brilliant appearances in this new capacity obtained much favour from his audience; and on the resignation of Dr. Fergusson, in 1785, he was transferred to the Chair of Moral Philosophy in the University of Edinburgh, and held that office until 1820, when he formally resigned it, having ceased to lecture for some years previously. He died in 1828.

Dugald Stewart was at one time the most popular and widely read of British philosophical writers, and he is still the typical represen

tative of what is called the Scottish School. In ethics he maintained with Bishop Butler, whose views he did much to illustrate and unfold, the primitive and absolute authority of conscience. In mental philosophy his plan was to distinguish, describe, and analyze the faculties of the mind as they exist in mature and civilized beings; he never attempted, as is done by the psychologists and physiologists of the present day, to 'take the clock to pieces,' to trace back these faculties to their earliest germs, to examine them in connection with their physiological accompaniments, and thus to compare them with analogous manifestations in infants, savages, and brutes. His lectures on Political Economy, which formed a part of his course, are in a somewhat fragmentary condition, as he did not live to revise them for publication. They are founded mainly on the views of Adam Smith. Though perhaps not a very profound, and certainly not an original thinker, he is acute, judicious, and learned, and his style is always elegant and refined. Those who desire, by the study of a single author, to obtain a succinct account of the principal ancient and modern philosophical systems, can hardly be directed to any better source than his lectures on the Active and Moral Powers, and his Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind. A compendium of these lectures, which fill five octavo volumes, is given in an unusually attractive form, considering its brevity, in his Outlines of Moral Philosophy. It has thence become an extremely popular textbook of mental and moral science. His Philosophical Essays appeared in 1810, shortly after he had withdrawn from the active duties of his chair, and are perhaps the ablest and certainly the most interesting of his works.

1. The Rapidity of Thought in Interpreting Language.

WHEN I Consult Johnson's Dictionary, I find many words of which he has enumerated forty, fifty, or even sixty different significations; and, after all the pains he has taken to distinguish these from each other, I am frequently at a loss how

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