265 CHAPTER X. THE LIFE AND TIMES OF SIMON WILLARD. (Continued.) THE notes of preparation among the English for the campaign of 1676 were now first sounded. The government seems to have taken no special pains to prepare for the defence of Lancaster, and the resources of that town were not equal to the emergency. Major Willard, as will appear in the sequel, was busily employed at this time in making such provision for the general defence of the frontier between Groton, Lancaster, and Marlborough, as the limited means placed at his disposal would allow. Early in February [1676], he received orders from the council to raise a body of troopers and dragoons to range the country between these towns.* This was a very insufficient force for such an extent of territory, but perhaps as large as the council could then call into the field to ward off the attack, which they knew, from the information given by the Indian spies, might be expected at an early day. It should be remembered, however, that, in this mid-winter season, foot-soldiers could not be supported for any length of time in the wilderness, and that an enemy trained like the Indians could easily elude them. As for horsemen, the whole Colony could not furnish a sufficient number to draw a cordon around the frontier; and nothing less would be of service. The principal security would consist in wellappointed garrisons in the frontier-towns, such as would be likely to hold out until the arrival of succor from abroad. * Shattuck's Concord, 51; Butler's Groton, 71. The committee of Groton, in a petition to the council, dated Feb. 6, 1676, draughted by the Rev. Samuel Willard, the minister of the town, say, "that whereas it seemeth it meet to your worships to commend unto our honoured Major Willard, and impose upon him, the maintaining a continued scout of forty troopers and dragoons to range between Groton, Lancaster, and Marlborough, and those parts, we make bold humbly to present our conceptions upon that account." The petition then proceeds to state that the Marlborough garrison is sufficient, and renders their scout an unnecessary burden; that the "long absence and distance of the scout gives but little safety" to Lancaster and Groton; that quarters must be provided for men and horses inconveniently to be drawn from several towns which are weak, especially Chelmsford and Billerica, that want more strength at home, and whose troopers, therefore, desire a release; that the associated towns were of the opinion, that a scout of a less number of garrisoned foot-soldiers, whom they might make dragoons in an emergency, would be more for their security. What was the result of this petition is not known. Probably, however, the attack upon Lancasterwhich occurred within four days afterwards-left no time to make any change. In either event, the force intrusted to the commander was too small to be of potential service in so wide a field; and, small as it was, could not be raised, or kept together, without difficulty at that inclement season. At the same time, Willard's friend, Captain Daniel Gookin, was directed to range between Marlborough and Medfield with another small company of troopers; but, as in the former instance, this force was insufficient for the purpose. The local garrisons, however limited, furnished a more competent defence. With such means as were placed at his disposal by the order of Feb. 2, Major Willard was constantly employed in endeavors to protect the inland towns. He was thus pre Butler's Groton, 71-2. vented, as he had been before, from taking his seat at the Council Board. Shortly before the destruction of Lancaster, he addressed a letter to the council in explanation of his absence from their meeting. I have not been able to find this letter among the public archives; but the subjectmatter appears by the answer which the council returned. I regret that his letter has not been discovered, as it might contain some remarks upon the state of affairs in his own neighborhood, especially his apprehensions with regard to Lancaster. The following is the council's letter, written the day after Lancaster's sore distress, but probably before the news thereof had been received: "SIR, The Council received your letter; and are sorry for your excuse for not coming to the Council, by reason of the state of Lancaster; which we desire you to endeavour to the utmost of your power to relieve and succour. We are useing our best endeavours to prepare more forces to send to distress the enemy. You shall hear more from us speedily; and, in the interim, we desire you to be in readiness if you should have a full command over the forces to be sent forth from this Colony. "11 Feb., 1675." "EDWARD RAWSON, Sec. I cannot state whether he was appointed to this command and declined the service, or whether Major Savage was originally placed over the forces. Perhaps, at the advanced age of seventy-one years, added to an inclement winter, he may have declined the service; but the more probable supposition is, judging from the remarkable vigor that he still retained, that Savage, who was several years his junior, and was of Boston, could be more easily spared than Willard, who, with his regiment, stood at the post of danger, where it would have been difficult to find one competent to assume his duties. Gookin could not be taken, because his services New-Hampshire Historical Society's Collections, vol. iii. p. 97. Communicated by Lemuel Shattuck, Esq. were demanded elsewhere; and no other commander occurs to me of sufficient prominence and experience. Major Savage, on taking the command, was joined by some Connecticut troops at Quaboag. The combined force missed their way, because they did not follow the direction of their Natick Indian guides; and thus failed in meeting with any considerable body of the enemy. Their presence, however, gave quiet to the western towns. Further to the north, Chelmsford began to be greatly alarmed. Two of the inhabitants,* after leaving Major Willard's house at Nonaicoicus, were fired upon by the Indians, and one of them was wounded. The "Committee of the Militia" of Chelmsford, on the same day (Feb. 15), wrote to the Governor and Council in terms of great distress, and implored assistance. They represented that they were the more enfeebled, because "part of their men were abroad with Major Willard upon public service." This is another instance to show the insufficient defences - perhaps unavoidable afforded to these Middlesex towns, and the increased duty, difficulty, and anxiety in which the commander was necessarily involved. Indeed, we are told, that after the flight of the Narragansets into the Nipmuck country in the latter part of January, 1675-6, they were pursued into the woods between Marlborough and Brookfield, towards Connecticut, by the Massachusetts troops, who "in the beginning of February, for want of provisions for themselves and horses, were constrained to turn down to Boston." The danger to the inland towns, in consequence of the Narragansets entering the Colony, was apparent to the council from the intimations given by the Indian spies : "but," says the historian, the council "were not well able to prevent it in that unseasonable time of the year, no way fit for marching of soldiers, and transporting of provisions; Joseph Parker and his son. The latter was badly wounded; but they both, being in the saddle, managed to make good their escape. - New-Hampshire Historical Society's Collections, vol. iii. pp. 97, 98. the winter then beginning to break up in this country." Hence the order to Major Willard to range along the frontier to defend it against the Nipmucks and Narragansetts. A new levy was consequently ordered by the government on the 1st of March; and the following directions concerning them were given to (Captain) Joseph Cook, of Cambridge; viz. : "You are hereby ordered and empowered to take the command of the dragoons and troopers now impressed out of Essex and Norfolk for the service of the country. You are to conduct them up to Major Willard; taking special care that they make no waste of their ammunition, and demean themselves silently and vigilently, so as may be for their own security, and gaining an opportunity — if Providence permit any - for destroying the enemy, and securing the English interest. All which you are carefully to intend. And all the said soldiers you are [to] take their names in a list, who are hereby required to obey you as their commander. And, when you shall come to the Major's quarters [at Nonaicoicus], you are required to attend to his further order; and, in so doing, this shall be your warrant; making return to the Council of what you shall do herein. 66 By order of the Council, "Date in Cambr., 16, 1, 1675, '6. "Essex, 48; Norff., 40." "D. G. [DANIEL GOOKEN.] This order was issued by the two Cambridge members of the council on an emergent occasion, and was approved by that body at their fext meeting on the 16th of March. How soon after the passage of the order the troops were set forward under the command of Captain Cook, does not appear. Had they been at Groton on the 2d of March, the fact could not have escaped notice, or failed of mention in contemporaneous history, especially as their presence would * Hubbard's Indian Wars. † Massachusetts Archives, vol. lxviii. p. 162. |