29.

ART.

IX.

Ezek. xviii.

20.

so that the whole effect of this discourse is taken away, if the imputation of Adam's sin is denied. And this explication does certainly quadrate more entirely to the words of the Article, as it is known that this was the tenet of those who prepared the Articles, it having been the generally-received opinion from St. Austin's days downward.

But to many other divines this seems a harsh and unconceivable opinion; it seems repugnant to the justice and goodness of God, to reckon men guilty of a sin which they never committed, and to punish them in their souls eternally for that which is no act of theirs and though we easily enough conceive how God, in the riches of his grace, may transfer merit and blessing from one person to many, this being only an economy of mercy, where all is free, and such a method is taken as may best declare the goodness of God: but in the imputation of sin and guilt, which are matters of strict justice, it is quite otherwise. Upon that head God is pleased often to appeal to men for the justice of all his ways: and therefore no such doctrine ought to be admitted, that carries in it an idea of cruelty, beyond what the blackest tyrants have ever invented. Besides that in the Scripture such a method as the punishing children for their Jer. xxxi. fathers' sins, is often disclaimed, and it is positively affirmed, that every man that sins is punished. Now though, in articles relating to the nature of God, they acknowledge it is highly reasonable to believe, that there may be mysteries which exceed our capacity; yet in moral matters, in God's fœderal dealings with us, it seems unreasonable, and contrary to the nature of God, to believe that there may be a mystery contrary to the clearest notions of justice and goodness; such as the condemning mankind for the sin of one man, in which the rest had no share; and as contrary to our ideas of God, and upon that to set up another mystery that shall take away the truth and fidelity of the promises of God; justice and goodness being as inseparable from his nature, as truth and fidelity can be supposed to be. This seems to expose the Christian religion to the scoffs of its enemies, and to objections that are much sooner made than answered: and since the foundation of this is a supposed covenant with Adam as the representative head of mankind, it is strange that a thing of that great consequence should not have been more plainly reported in the history of the creation; but that men should be put to fetch out the knowledge of so great and so extraordinary a thing, only by some remote

IX.

consequences. It is no small prejudice against this opi- ART. nion, that it was so long before it first appeared in the Latin Church; that it was never received in the Greek; and that even the Western Church, though perhaps for some ignorant ages it received it, as it did every thing else, very implicitly, yet has been very much divided both about this, and many other opinions related to it, or arising out of it.

As for those words of St. Paul's, that are its chief, if not its only foundation, they say many things upon them. First, it is a single proof. Now when we have not a variety of places proving any point, in which one gives light, and leads us to a sure exposition of another, we cannot be so sure of the meaning of any one place, as to raise a theory, or found a doctrine upon it. They say farther, that St. Paul seems to argue, from that opinion of our having sinned in Adam, to prove that we are justified by Christ. Now it is a piece of natural logic not to prove a thing by another, unless that other is more clear of itself, or at least more clear by its being already received and believed. This cannot be said to be more clear of itself, for it is certainly less credible or conceivable, than the reconciliation by Christ. Nor was this clear from any special revelation made of it in the Old Testament: therefore there is good reason to believe, that it was then a doctrine received among the Jews, as there are odd things of this kind to be found among the Cabbalists, as if all the souls of all mankind had been in Adam's body. Now when an argument is brought in Scripture to prove another thing by, though we are bound to acknowledge the conclusion, yet we are not always sure of the premises; for they are often founded upon received opinions. So that it is not certain that St. Paul meant to offer this doctrine to our belief as true, but only that he intended by it to prove our being reconciled to God through the death of Christ; and the medium by which he proved it might be, for aught that appears from the words themselves, only an opinion held true among those to whom he writes. For he only supposes it, but says nothing to prove it: which it might be expected he would have done, if the Jews had made any doubt of it. But farther they say, that when comparisons or oppositions, such as this, are made in Scripture, we are not always to carry them on to an exact equality: we are required not only to be holy as God is holy, but to be per- 1 Pet. i. 15, fect as he is perfect: where by the as is not to be meant a true equality, but some sort of resemblance and conformi

16.

Mat. v. 48.

IX.

ART. ty. Therefore those who believe that there is nothing imputed to Adam's posterity on the account of his sin, but this temporary punishment of their being made liable to death, and to all those miseries that the fear of it, with our other concerns about it, bring us under, say that this is enough to justify the comparison that is there stated: and that those, who will carry it on to be an exact parallel, make a stretch beyond the phraseology of the Scripture, and the use of parables, and of the many comparisons that go only to one or more points, but ought not to be stretched to every thing.

10. and through the whole

Old Testa

ment.

1 Thess. ii.

40.

These are the things that other great divines among us have opposed to this opinion. As to its consonancy to the Article, those who oppose it do not deny, but that it comes up fully to the highest sense that the words of the Article can import: nor do they doubt, but that those who prepared the Articles, being of that opinion themselves, might perhaps have had that sense of the words in their thoughts. But they add, that we are only bound to sign the Articles in a literal and grammatical sense: since Ex. xxxii. therefore the words, God's wrath and damnation, which are the highest in the Article, are capable of a lower sense, temporary judgments being often so expressed in the Scriptures, therefore they believe the loss of the favour of God, the sentence of death, the troubles of life, and the Mat. iii. 7. corruption of our faculties, may be well called God's 16. wrath and damnation. Besides, they observe, that the Luke xxiii. main point of the imputation of Adam's sin to his posterity, and its being considered by God as their own act, not being expressly taught in the Article, here was that mode1Pet. iv. 17. ration observed, which the compilers of the Articles have Rom. xiii. shewed on many other occasions. It is plain from hence, that they did not intend to lay a burthen on men's consciences, or oblige them to profess a doctrine that seems to be hard of digestion to a great many. The last prejuRom. xiv. dice that they offer against that opinion is, that the softening the terms of God's wrath and damnation, that was brought in by the followers of St. Austin's doctrine, to such a moderate and harmless notion, as to be only a loss of heaven, with a sort of unactive sleep, was an effect of their apprehending that the world could very ill bear an opinion of so strange a sound, as that all mankind were to be damned for the sin of one man: and that therefore, to make this pass the better, they mitigated damnation far below the representation that the Scriptures generally give of it, which propose it as the being adjudged to a place of torment, and a state of horror and misery.

1 Cor. xi. 29.

2.

2 Cor. vii.

3.

Joh. viii.

10, 11.

23.

Thus I have set down the different opinions in this point, ART. with that true indifference that I intend to observe on such IX. other occasions, and which becomes one who undertakes to explain the doctrines of the Church, and not his own; and who is obliged to propose other men's opinions with all sincerity, and to shew what are the senses that the learned men, of different persuasions in these matters, have put on the words of the Article. In which one great and constant rule to be observed is, to represent men's opinions candidly, and to judge as favourably both of them and their opinions as may be: to bear with one another, and not to disturb the peace and union of the Church, by insisting too much and too peremptorily upon matters of such doubtful disputation; but willingly to leave them to all that liberty, to which the Church has left them, and which she still allows them.

ARTICLE X.

Of Free-Will.

The Condition of Pan after the Fall of Adam is such that he cannot turn and prepare himself by his own natural strength and good works to Faith and calling upon God. Wherefore we have no power to do good works pleasant and acceptable to God, without the Grace of God by Christ preventing us, that we may have a good will, and working with us when we have that good will.

WE

E shall find the same moderation observed in this Article, that was taken notice of in the former; where all disputes concerning the degree of that feebleness and corruption, under which we are fallen by the sin of Adam, are avoided, and only the necessity of a preventing and a cooperating grace is asserted, against the Semipelagians and the Pelagians. But before we enter upon that, it is fitting first to state the true notion of free-will, in so far as it is necessary to all rational agents, to make their actions morally good or bad; since it is a principle that seems to rise out of the light of nature, that no man is accountable, rewardable, or punishable, but for that in which he acts freely, without force or compulsion; and so far all are agreed.

Some imagine, that liberty must suppose a freedom to do, or not to do, and to act contrariwise at pleasure. To others it seems not necessary that such a liberty should be carried to denominate actions morally good or bad: God certainly acts in the perfectest liberty, yet he cannot sin. Christ had the most exalted liberty in his human nature, of which a creature was capable, and his merit was the highest, yet he could not sin. Angels and glorified saints, though no more capable of rewards, are perfect moral agents, and yet they cannot sin: and the devils, with the damned, though not capable of farther punishment, yet are still moral agents, and cannot but sin: so this indifferency to do, or not to do, cannot be the true notion of liberty. A truer one seems to them to be this, that a rational nature is not determined as mere matter, by the impulse and motion of other bodies upon it, but is capable of thought, and, upon considering the objects set before it, makes reflection, and so chooses. Liberty there