Space Shuttle and Galileo Mission: Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, United States Senate, Ninety-sixth Congress, First Session : Special Hearing, Department of Housing and Urban DevelopmentU.S. Government Printing Office, 1980 - 132 pagina's |
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accomplish additional costs agency ANSWER Apollo Associate Administrator atmosphere believe budget capability Centaur Chairman changes Committee Congress continue contractor delay dollars estimate expendable launch vehicles fiscal year 1980 FROSCH Galileo mission Galileo orbiter Galileo Probe Galileo program Galileo project Galileo spacecraft geosynchronous orbit IMAGING TEAM impact increase Inertial Upper Stage INTERDISCIPLINARY INTERDISCIPLINARY INTERDISCIPLINARY Jovian Jupiter launch opportunity LILLY magnetospheric main engine major margin Mars million NASA NASA's operations options orbiter and probe payloads percent performance planetary missions planetary program planets planning probe carrier problems QUESTION recommendations response result satellites science objectives scientific Senator BELLMON Senator MATHIAS Senator PROXMIRE Senator SCHMITT shuttle development Shuttle/IUS single launch solar system solid rocket Space Science Board Space Shuttle Space Shuttle Program Space Transportation System spacecraft Spacelab statement status structure STS/IUS subcommittee submitted subsystems technical thrust augmentation tile understanding users
Populaire passages
Pagina 81 - ... the primary objectives in the exploration of Jupiter and its satellites for the period 1975-1985 in order of importance are (1) determination of the chemical composition and physical state of its atmosphere, (2) the chemical composition and physical state of the satellites, and (3) the topology and behavior of the magnetic field and the energetic particle fluxes. In order to carry out this program, it will be necessary to utilize orbiting spacecraft and probe-delivering spacecraft.
Pagina 112 - Member or employee who receives an authorization under paragraph (1) from the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the President of the Senate, the...
Pagina 16 - In my view most of these have really been symptoms of the basic problem — underbudgeting by successive administrations coupled to a progressively overoptimistic view of what work should be attempted on reduced resources. NASA, flush from their outstanding achievement of putting men on the moon and convinced that a shuttle program was vital to our nation, probably had tended to underestimate the degree of some of the technical challenges of the STS and, as problems became more obvious, probably...
Pagina 22 - STS was inadequate for the planned annual work program in the early years of the project. NASA chose to respond to funding shortages by slipping the schedule, by pulling production funding forward into DDT&E years and by adjusting work programs to available funds levels. So long as STS had no specific mission to fulfill on a firm date that schedule-slipping and dollar-shifting process was hard to criticize. We must recognize, however, that the NASA habit of proposing overly-ambitious work programs...
Pagina 16 - ... likely the magnitude of the contingency requested but denied at the program's birth. 3. Technical. The status of development and testing does not appear to be unusual for a program of this nature. Though real technical challenges remain (especially with regard to the thermal protection system -tile launch survivability, main engine performance and reliability, and the hydraulic power unit of the orbiter) and concern is high, there are no obvious "show stoppers
Pagina 17 - N'SC/DOD) than to some major programatic or organic weakness in NASA. All those involved (in and out of NASA) have been, or should have been, reasonably aware of budget problems and what has transpired over the past several years. If NASA has a credibility problem, I believe it is more due to a tendency to be overly accommodating to budget pressure for the sake of preserving a national commitment to a STS rather than to a lack of candor. Backbiting and finger-pointing will serve no useful purpose...
Pagina 16 - ... NASA to reduce its annual costs below those required to maintain program schedule and management efficiency. The impact of this approach, inevitably, has been to push NASA towards a higher risk and less efficient program where qualification testing is done concurrently with vehicle manufacture and work performance shortfalls are pushed into succeeding years — in essence, schedule slip was substituted for adequate funding levels and contingency. This, in turn, has led to a need for continual...
Pagina 42 - ... to date. Any management system introduced to accomplish this objective must necessarily depend in part on Input from program contractors. It is Important, however, that such a system be capable of independent assessment of program status Including contractor performance. 5. The organization for the Shuttle Program appears to be functioning well from a technical standpoint, but is not functioning acceptably in the areas of schedule and budget. Strengthening of the organization at all levels is...
Pagina 15 - I was a*midwife" to its birth I feel I am in a relatively good position - seven years later - to measure how the program is meeting its objectives. Operating as an individual, I could only examine the broader questions and problem areas. But, rather than a disadvantage, I believe this has helped give me a perspective that has served the main purpose for the request for a fresh and independent general assessment. My ability to obtain the necessary information for my evaluation has been due to the...
Pagina 84 - Our preliminary estimate of the change in the funding for a 1984 launch is an increase of approximately $153 million over the $450 million original estimate for both the Galileo development ($295 million), and the Mission Operations and Data Analysis ($155 million) or a 34 percent increase.