 Inhesion in something is supposed to be requisite to support the existence of our perceptions. Nothing appears requisite to support the existence of a perception. We have therefore no idea of inhesion. What possibility then of answering that question,...  The Anthropological Review - Pagina 396door Anthropological Society of London - 1869Volledige weergave - Over dit boek
 | David Hume - 1826 - 508 pagina’s
...condemn even the question itself. We have no perfect idea of any thing but of a perception. A substance is entirely different from a perception. We have therefore...perceptions. Nothing appears requisite to support the exr istence of a perception. We have therefore no idea of inhesion. What possibility then of answering... | |
 | Charles Bray - 1866 - 182 pagina’s
...support their existence." And again, "We have no perfect idea of anything but a perception. A substance is entirely different from a perception. We have therefore...of inhesion. What possibility, then, of answering that question, Whether perceptions inhere in a material or immaterial substance, when we do not so... | |
 | 1867 - 586 pagina’s
...quotes with approval Hume's dictum, " We have no perfect idea of anything but a perception. A substance is entirely different from a perception ; we have therefore no idea of a substance." Mr. Bray, apparently, does not see the fallacy in this argument, in the substitution of " no idea"... | |
 | Alexander Bain - 1868 - 902 pagina’s
...as one wholly devoid of meaning. Wo have no perfect idea of anything but a perception. A substance is entirely different from a perception. We have therefore no idea of a substance. ' The doctrine of the immateriality, simplicity, and indivisibility of a thinking substance is a true... | |
 | Alexander Bain - 1868 - 578 pagina’s
...as one whelly devoid of meaning. We have no perfect idea of anything but a perception. A substance is entirely different from a perception. We have therefore no idea of a substance. ' The doctrine of the immateriality, simplicity, and indivisibility of a thinking substance is a tme... | |
 | Alexander Bain - 1870 - 304 pagina’s
...universal affirmations. Hume says: — ' We have no perfect idea of anything but a perception . A substance is entirely different from a perception. We have therefore no idea of substance. ' The first step is to resolve the conclusion into its two terms. As often happens, in Logic,... | |
 | Charles Bray - 1871 - 390 pagina’s
...Mind," p. 67. •f Hume says : " We have no perfect idea of anything, but a perception. A substance is entirely different from a perception. We have,...possibility, then, of answering the question, Whether perceptions inhere in a material or immaterial substance, when we do not so much as understand the... | |
 | Charles Bray - 1871 - 398 pagina’s
...the Mind," p. 67. f Hume says: " We have no perfect idea of anything, but a perception. A substance is entirely different from a perception. We have )...possibility, then, of answering the question, Whether perceptions inhere in a material or immaterial substance, when we do not so much as understand the... | |
 | Charles Bray - 1871 - 386 pagina’s
...perfect idea of anything, but a perception. A substance is entirely different from a perception. We havef therefore, no idea of a substance. Inhesion in something...possibility, then, of answering the question, Whether perceptions inhere in a material enimmaterial wbttance, when we do not so much as understand the question?"... | |
 | David Hume - 1874 - 604 pagina’s
...condemn even the question itself. We have no perfect idea of any thing but of a perception. A substance is entirely different from a perception. We have,...therefore, no idea of a substance. Inhesion in something is suppos'd to .be requisite to support the existence of our perceptions. Nothing appears requisite to... | |
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