Art. 15.-NATIONAL SERVICE.

THE retreat of the Russian armies before the flood of Teutonic invasion roused a great part of the nation to the grave danger which would confront the country if a similar misfortune should befall the Allied armies in France. Six months ago the Russians had entered on a career of conquest in the Carpathians; and their positions on the remainder of the front, having withstood repeated attacks, seemed impregnable. The change was sudden and dramatic. Within two days of the first boom of the German guns on the Dunajetz, the great retreat which still continues had begun.

Many people, who for months had lived in a world of dreams and illusions, created by optimists who depicted Germany as in a state approaching military and economic exhaustion, and Russia as possessing unlimited resources, began to wonder whether it was wise to rely on our Allies to win the war for us, and to ask what we had done to help them. It had already been publicly asserted that a deficiency of munitions had hampered our army in the field and exposed it to excessive loss; and inconsistent and evasive ministerial utterances did not allay anxiety. The public statement referred to was corroborated by the information, which leaked out from private sources at the front, that the shortage of artillery ammunition was so great that batteries had been placed on a very limited allowance per diem, which they could not exceed without special orders. It was realised that, just as our preparations for war had been inadequate, so, after nine months of war, the arrangements for providing the army with means to fight were still seriously defective.

It was not to be supposed that the Government had been ignorant of this deplorable state of affairs; and they were blamed for their remissness in a matter so vital to the success, and even safety, of the army. A prominent member of the late Government made the astounding admission that, if our preparations had been defective, the people, and not the Government, were to blame, because the public had not made its voice heard on the subject. Those who should have led had waited

for a lead. Now, in response to public pressure, the Ministry was reconstructed and a Munitions Department was established, which took in hand the organisation of our manufacturing resources.

But public attention had been concentrated on the Army; and a great many who had been content to play at follow-my-leader along the pleasant path of selfdeception, began to think that leaders who had proved remiss in some important respects might be equally wanting in others. It was found that recruiting had fallen off, despite successive urgent appeals and the exercise of various forms of pressure. It was also found that numbers of skilled men had been taken from indispensable industries, restricting the output of munitions and the export trade; and that a large proportion of married men had been enlisted, causing hardship to individuals and a large expenditure on account of separation allowances; while thousands of young bachelors, who had responded neither to appeal nor pressure, were profitably filling the vacancies of the more patriotic Anxiety was felt as to the ability of a system so unfair and inefficient to provide and equip an army strong enough to fulfil our obligations to the Allies, and to safeguard our own interests in the struggle for the freedom of Europe. It was seen that we are fighting a great nation in arms with a fraction of our resources. If the Government wanted a lead they were given it by a section of the Press which asked whether it was wise to risk defeat, when, by developing our full power, victory might be made as certain as anything can be in war. Our Allies had accepted the obligation of personal service for all citizens of military age. We alone had untouched reserves. What right had we to evade a similar obligation?

The mention of obligatory service raised a storm of opposition in another section of the Press which had always opposed preparation for war, and which was pledged to the voluntary system as an article of political faith. Ignoring the fact that the question at issue was purely one of military expediency, they discussed it with all the heat and partiality which characterise political controversy. The more responsible papers on this side

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opposed the suggestion with time-worn academic arguments which, long since discredited, have been refuted by recent experience. We hear less of the once popular assertion that one volunteer is worth three pressed men,' for the so-called 'conscript armies' have shown their mettle on many battlefields, and it would imply too outrageous an insult to our valiant Allies. But other stock arguments were paraded in full strength. Compulsion, it was said, is opposed to the genius-presumably the inclination or prejudice-of the nation. But inclinations must yield to necessity; and our independence is more important than our prejudices. It was urged that National Service would dislocate our industries, the fact being ignored that this is precisely what the voluntary system has done; and that Germany, while keeping vast armies in the field, has worked her essential industries at far higher pressure than in peace, and maintained a superiority in all the material of war. was further objected that to alter our system during war would be as foolish as to change horses when crossing a stream. This objection, like the proverbial philosophy on which it relies, leaves untouched the vital question, What should be done if the horses break down? Is it better to leave the waggon in mid-stream, and fall to wringing one's hands helplessly on the bank, or to make a manly effort to replace the exhausted team? Again, it was pointed out that the voluntary system had done much more than had been expected; that a great army had been raised by voluntary effort; that we had already done more for the Alliance than we had undertaken to do; and lastly, that it was not proved that the system had failed to supply our needs. It was, however, obviously irrelevant to point to what had been done, the question being, Had we done enough to ensure victory? and if not, what more could be done? And it was clearly impossible for the Government to give proofs of either the adequacy or inadequacy of our recruiting system without disclosing information concerning the state of our resources, present and prospective, which would be of infinite value to the enemy.

When argument had failed, a less scrupulous section of the Press set itself to oppose the new movement tooth and nail, regardless of consequences. Finding that the

working classes were more inclined to listen to the appeals of responsible speakers than to academic arguments, and showed a disposition to respond to any call the Government might make, these papers strove to rouse the prejudices of the ignorant and undiscerning. The movement was denounced as an attempt to Prussianise the nation, in which the Munitions Act was the first step and the National Register a second. The failure of the Munitions Act to cope with the strike in South Wales was cited as an example of the inability of the Government to oppose the more powerful forces of organised labour; and, having thus pitted Trades Unions against the Government, they proclaimed that any attempt to introduce what they called 'conscription would divide the country into hostile camps. who advocated National Service were vilified and abused; and finally, to counteract any tendency that might remain to listen to rational and patriotic counsel, they concocted scandalous and unfounded rumours of plots in the Cabinet, in order to undermine such influence as the Government might possess, and equally unfounded rumours of plots outside, in order to blacken the character of 'conscriptionists' by attributing motives of personal ambition or party rancour.

Those

It would be superfluous to notice this sordid campaign were it not for its effect in unbalancing the public mind with regard to a question which involves vital issues and needs calm consideration. Its ostensible motive was to prevent the Government from being influenced in favour of National Service. Its actual result has been to let loose forces which are little amenable to reason, and to cause serious embarrassment to those responsible for the conduct of the war. Some of its effects were seen at the Trades Union Congress, where several speakers appealed to prejudice and passion, and, while the Congress declared itself resolved to help the Government to win the war, gave the impression that organised labour would reject, at any cost, the principle of legal obliga. tion to render personal service.

It would be rash for a mere soldier, who has no liking for politics and its controversial methods, to venture into such a political tornado were it not that the question, calmly considered, is a purely military one. It is not to

be supposed that any sane Englishman would regard with equanimity the prospect of Germany being victorious, or object to any measures that might be necessary to avert such a calamity. Unhappily, the efforts of those who oppose a complete organisation of our resources, military and other, have been assisted by statements, till lately frequent in the Press, that Germany was near the end of her resources, statements which, though disproved by events, have left their impress on minds that cannot readily rid themselves of preconceived ideas. There are still many who do not realise that Germany, having organised all her resources for war, is practically self-contained and self-supporting; while we are using only a portion of our strength, and are largely dependent on other countries for supplies, payment for which constitutes a strain on our finances which, with a growing reduction in our exports, cannot be indefinitely sustained.

Those who ask for proof that the voluntary system is inadequate to supply our needs forget that there is no certainty in war, and that the prudent course is to provide for possibilities. It cannot even be said that superior numbers will win, for many victories have been gained with inferior forces. At the outset of the present war Russia had nearly as many trained men as Germany and Austria combined; and the Triple Entente had a considerable superiority in numbers. The participation of Italy increased the disparity. Yet Russia has been invaded; a deadlock has existed in France and Flanders for many months; and the Italians have made little progress. During thirteen months of war the enemy have been continuously on the offensive in one or other of the two principal theatres, and have gone nearer to achieving decisive success than have the Allies. What number of men and what amount of material accessories are required to reverse this state of affairs, and to drive the Germans out of Russia, France and Belgium, no mortal can say.

The only safe course is to do as others have done; to mobilise all our resources, and concentrate our whole strength on the prosecution of the war. It is said that the voluntary system will prove equal to the occasion, but results do not bear this out. Recruiting is almost at