Johannes Clauberg (1622–1665)

Voorkant
Springer Science & Business Media, 30 nov. 1999 - 207 pagina's
In this book twelve outstanding historians of early modern philosophy undertake a study of the philosophy of Johannes Clauberg (1622-1665). Clauberg was not only among the first followers of Descartes (whose philosophy he taught from 1650 in Herborn and from 1652 until the end of his life in Duisburg) but also assured its survival as an academic philosophy by giving it a more traditional and more didactic expression. A first group of articles deals with Clauberg's early metaphysics as it found its expression in his Ontosophia of 1646 (republished with very considerable changes in 1664), the way it was influenced by Comenius (Leinsle), its relation to Malebranche (Bardout) and Wolff (École) and the way in which it illustrates the difficulties of a Cartesian ontology in general (Carraud). A second group of articles deals with problems of knowledge: knowledge of God (Goudriaan), perceptual knowledge (Spruit) and causality (Pätzold). There are also articles on Clauberg's curious attempt to deal philosophically with the etymology of the German language (Weber), Clauberg as a teacher of Descartes' Principia (Verbeek), Clauberg's conception of corporeal substance (Mercer), and Clauberg's relation to later, more radical developments in Cartesian philosophy, especially in Lodewijk Meyer (Albrecht). The volume is completed by a biographical introduction and a short title bibliography of Clauberg's works, which allows an appreciation of Clauberg's lasting international influence. It is the first study on this scale of one of the most influential philosophers of the seventeenth century.
 

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Inhoudsopgave

Johannes Claubergs Behandlung des Kausalitätsproblems in der 1 und 3 Auflage seiner Ontosophia
123
Clauberg et Malebranche de lOntosophia à la vision en Dieu
135
Johann Clauberg Corporeal Substance and the German Response
147
Einengung und Befreiung als Wirkungen des Cartesianismus am Beispiel Lodewijk Meyers
161
Johannes Clauberg A Biobibliographical Sketch
181
General Index
201
Copyright

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Populaire passages

Pagina 37 - Mais , pour imparfaite que soit cette façon d'être par laquelle une chose est objectivement ou par représentation dans l'entendement par son idée, certes on ne peut pas néanmoins dire que cette façon et manière là d'être ne soit rien , ni par conséquent que cette idée tire son origine du néant.
Pagina 86 - Haec exemplaria rerum omnium deus intra se habet numerosque universorum, quae agenda sunt, et modos mente complexus est; plenus his figuris est, quas Plato ideas appellat, immortales, immutabiles, infatigabiles.
Pagina 148 - Similarly because each one of us is conscious that he thinks, and that in thinking he can shut off from himself all other substance, either thinking or extended, we may conclude that each of us, similarly regarded, is really distinct from every other thinking substance and from every corporeal substance.
Pagina 32 - Je n'y ai point mis de titre, mais il me semble que le plus propre sera de mettre Renati Descartes Meditationes de prima Philosophia; car je ne traite point en particulier de Dieu et de l'âme, mais en général de toutes les premières choses qu'on peut connaître en philosophant.
Pagina 149 - Secondly, we need to recognize that body, taken in the general sense, is a substance, so that it too never perishes. But the human body, in so far as it differs from other bodies, is simply made up of a certain configuration of limbs and other...
Pagina 17 - Deum occupata est scientia : ita haec, quae non circa hoc vel illud ens speciali nomine insignitum vel proprietate quadam ab aliis distinctum, sed circa ens in genere versatur, non incommode Ontosophia vel Ontologia dici passe videatur (Opera omnia, Amstelodami, 1691 t.
Pagina 148 - ... have the idea of it, we may be assured that such may exist ; and, if it really exists, that every part which we can determine by thought must be really distinct from the other parts of the same substance. In the same way, since every one is conscious that he thinks, and that he in thought can exclude from himself every other substance, whether thinking or extended, it is certain that each of us thus considered is really distinct from every other thinking and corporeal substance. And although...
Pagina 51 - Respondeo dicendum quod, cum intellectus humanus, secundum statum praesentis vitae non possit intelligere substantias immateriales creatas, ut dictum est (art. 2), multo minus potest intelligere essentiam substantiae increatae. Unde simpliciter dicendum est, quod Deus non est primum quod a nobis cognoscitur; sed magis per creaturas in Dei cognitionem pervenimus, secundum illud Apostoli: Invisibilia Dei per ea quae facta sunt, intellecta conspiciuntur (Rom., I, 20).
Pagina 157 - ex hoc solo, quod unusquisque intelligat se esse rem cogitantem et possit cogitatione excludere a se ipso omnem aliam substantiam, tam cogitantem quam extensam, certum est unnmquemque, sie spectatum, ab omni alia substantia cogitante atque ab omni substantia corporea realiter distingui...