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they could exercise the right of the peerage to sit in parliament. The new act admitted those individuals to the full rights of the peerage. He asked, then, whether, as the king's prerogative was to have full effect under this statute, the privileges of the people should not also have effect? The privileges of the people ought to be equally potential with the prerogative of the Crown. The second section of the clause to which he had referred declared, that any Catholic "returned as a member of parliament after the commencement of the act," should be entitled to sit and vote. Under the second section of this clause, therefore, it was clear, that any Catholic returned as member of parliament subsequently to the passing of the act, was clearly entitled to the benefit of the act. And here he would make one observation. If he was included in the second section of the clause, he certainly was not excluded by any thing in it: if it did not contain the affirmative of the right for which he contended, it did not negative it by any legal declaration or enactment. There was one point of view only in which the clause could be considered. It was a point of legal subtilty. It depended on the authority of the House to give him the benefit of the act upon the construction of that clause. He would abstain from entering into merely technical arguments; which he considered unfitted for the popular assembly he was addressing. He would, however, just observe, that an important decision had lately been come to, with respect to the construction of wills; namely, that property given to children to be born might be shared by children born long before the making of the will. Whilst he pointed out this technical distinction to hon. members, he really hoped they would never understand it at their own expense. The second section of the clause applied, he considered, to a person claiming, like the earl of Surrey; but it did not contain one negative word to exclude him; and he claimed the assistance of legal gentlemen in the House to put it beyond doubt, that if the words of the clause did not aid his case, they at least did not injure his right to sit and vote without taking the oaths.

He would now come at once to the tenth clause of the act; and he implored the House to forgive him for having trespassed so long on other matters when he had the tenth clause of the act to refer to, which

in his humble judgment rendered doubt impossible. The tenth clause was as follows:-" And be it enacted, that it shall be lawful for any of his majesty's subjects professing the Roman Catholic religion, to hold, exercise, and enjoy, all civil and military offices, and places of trust or profit under his majesty, his heirs, or successors, and to exercise any other franchise or civil right, except as hereinafter excepted, upon taking and subscribing, at the times and in the manner hereinafter mentioned, the oath hereinbefore appointed and set forth, instead of the Oaths of Allegiance, Supremacy, and Abjuration, and instead of such other oath or oaths as are or may be now by law required to be taken, for the purpose aforesaid, by any of his majesty's subjects professing the Roman Catholic religion." He claimed the benefit of that clause. Its meaning was plain and distinct. It required no technical subtilty to discover its meaning. It was impossible for technical subtilty to throw a cloud over that meaning. He would stand on the evident meaning of that clause alone; but not having the right of reply he felt bound to anticipate the objections which might be urged against it. If, in doing so, he adduced arguments which hon. gentlemen would disclaim, let it be ascribed solely to his anxiety to meet every possible objection, and not to any intention to undervalue the understandings of those whom he was addressing. The word "franchise" was introduced into the fifth clause, which provided that Roman Catholics should vote at all elections for cities, counties, and towns, upon taking the oath provided by the act. Again, "franchise," as relating to corporations, was mentioned in the fourteenth clause as relating to boroughs; and yet in the tenth clause, for fear any franchise had been omitted, for fear this statute should not be as beneficial in practice as it was intended, and as he hoped it would be,-parliament had wisely introduced the word "franchise" again. The clause then went on to give to Catholics all civil rights, "except as hereinafter excepted." The exceptions were contained in the twelfth clause, and were, the offices of Regent, lord chancellor of either kingdom, justices or guardians of the kingdom, Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, or high commissioner of the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland. And in the fifteenth clause, again, Catholic members of corpo

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under the twenty-third clause, which provided, "that from and after the passing of this act, no oath or oaths shall be tendered to, or required to be taken by, his Majesty's subjects professing the Roman Catholic religion, for enabling them to hold or enjoy any real or personal property, other than such as may by law be tendered to and required to be taken by his Majesty's other subjects." It was evident, therefore, that the words of the tenth clause did not mean franchise or property, but a just claim to protection, privilege, and immunity of any kind whatever. Thus, then, common sense showed what the law sanctioned, that the phrase "civil rights" must necessarily include the right to speak and vote in that House.

rations were excepted from voting as to |fications which was not more comprehenthe disposal of church livings in the gift of sive than he desired it to be. In reference corporations. Those were the exceptions to the signification of "just claim," Dr. mentioned in the bill; but they did not Johnson gave this definition:- "The include the right for which he contended. Roman citizens were by the sword taught He would not detain the House by going to acknowledge the Pope their Lord, minutely through the act. He would rest though they knew not by what right." his claim upon the tenth clause, which There was a plain definition of the meanconferred the right of exercising every civil ing of the language of the tenth clause right upon Catholics. If he should be where it spoke of "civil right." It could asked, whether the right of sitting and not mean "franchise;" for that was voting in parliament were a civil right, he already included. It could not mean would reply, if it might be permitted, by" property," for that was already included asking another question, namely, "If it be not a civil right, what is it?" He had looked through the law books, and he found that Blackstone divided the entire law into rights and wrongs, and amongst the civil rights he classed the privileges of sitting and voting in parliament. But he would appeal to the common sense and understanding of men. Was it not a civil right? Must it not be a civil right? In this very statute itself civil and military rights were contradistinguished. Thus there was in the act itself a clue to the meaning of the act. If he went out of the act, and referred to those authorities which decided the meaning of words in the English language, he found that the words "civil rights" included every right of the description for which he was now Another observation (continued the contending."Civil," according to Dr. hon. and learned gentleman), is, that this Johnson, was an adjective which meant section relates to the time and manner of "relating to the community; political; taking the Oaths; but suppose I were to relating to the city or government." Now, concede that no time and manner are political and civil were just the same expressed, yet the civil right being granted thing, only that one was derived from the under the oaths directed, and the time and Latin, and the other from the Greek. manner being the only condition, necesWhat he claimed was a political right. sarily would supply the condition. We No man could deny that it was a political have in the nineteenth section the mode of right to sit and vote in parliament. One taking the oaths for corporate offices, of the examples which Dr. Johnson gave, and in the twentieth, the time and manner showed that "civil" and "political" bore of taking the oaths for other offices; but the same meaning. The example was-- I will not detain the House upon that "But there is another unity which would point, because in the twenty-third section be most advantageous to our country, and the legislature has wisely provided for the that is your endeavour after a civil, a case; it declares, "That the oath herein political union in the whole nation." This appointed and set forth, being taken and definition proved that the tenth clause subscribed in any of the courts, or before any necessarily included such a right as that of the persons above mentioned, shall be of which he claimed. He now came to the the same force and effect, to all intents definition of the word "right." Dr. and purposes, as, and shall stand in the Johnson said, it was a noun substantive, place of, all Oaths and Declarations, remeaning first a "just claim ;" next, "that quired or prescribed by any law now in which justly belonged to one;" next, force for the relief of his Majesty's Roman "property, interest;" next, "power, pre-Catholic subjects from any disabilities, inrogative;" next, "immunity, privilege." capacities, or penalties." That is the In short, there was not one of those signi- second portion of the twenty-third section, VOL. XXI. 2 Z

and in one mode of punctuation it will by various acts certain oaths and certain bear the meaning I attribute to it. How-declarations, &c. are or may be required ever, as there is no punctuation in acts of to be taken, made, and subscribed, by the parliament, I shall not trouble the House subjects of his Majesty as qualifications with any special pleading on particular for sitting and voting in parliament, and words; but come to the remaining and for the enjoyment of certain offices, frandistinct portion of the section: And chises, and civil rights; Be it enacted, the proper Officer of any of the Courts &c. that such restraints and disabilities above-mentioned in which any person shall be from henceforth discontinued." professing the Roman Catholic religion All are to be discontinued. What do I shall demand to take and subscribe the claim? That they shall be discontinued. oath herein appointed and set forth, is It is a maxim of law, that the recital of a hereby authorised and required to admin- statute shall not control the enactments; ister the said Oath to such person; and but with this qualification, that although such officer shall make, sign, and deliver, a particular recital cannot control a a certificate, of such Oath having been general enactment, there is no rule of law duly taken and subscribed." There is the that a general recital shall not explain a time, and that time is when it is demand- particular enactment. But I have a ded. The courts are also specified, viz. general recital, and a general enactment the King's-bench, Common-pleas, Exche- too, in my favour. If to sit and vote be quer, and Chancery. The time is as not a civil right, what civil right was inuniversal as the benefit of the statute was tended by the word; for every other is intended to be, and every thing is com- provided for? Why should this be explete for my purpose. The objection cluded? Look at the recital and look at vanishes, because the time is as extensive the intention of the statute; and shall I as can be demanded. I have taken that then be told that a doubt can arise as to oath in one of the courts named. I am the right to sit and vote? If I have not ready to prove it. I produced the certifi- that right, what is to be done? Is the cate at the table; and have taken that statute of Charles 2nd, enabling the House Oath, and produced that certificate, I now to exclude me, still in force? What is to turn round and respectfully ask, why I become of me? Am I to remain the am not to be allowed to exercise my representative for Clare? Will the House rights? Let it be remembered, that my not let me in, and is it not able to turn case cannot be drawn into precedent: it me out? What, I ask again, is to become can never occur again; and I ask the of me?-I call the attention of the House House, in construing the act, whether it to that-what is to become of me [hear! intends to make it an outlawry against a and a laugh]? The statute of Charles single individual [hear, hear!]? If the 2nd imposed penalties for not taking the act were meant to meet my case, why was oaths and signing the Declaration not my case specified in it? It existed among others there was a pecuniary when the act was passed; it was upon the penalty, and it' continued in force until records of the House, for a committee had the Union with Ireland. The first quessat while the bill was pending, and had tion I would ask the lawyers of the House, given in its report upon oath. Why, I then, is this-Did the Union Act continue ask again, was not my case specified? those penalties? I take upon me to say Simply, because it was not intended to be it did not. Then, I ask, can any penalty included. Where, then, is the individual or punishment be continued on a free-born who would think it ought to be included? British subject, when an act of parliament, Let me call the attention of the House to like that of the Union, is silent, and conthe recital of the statute :-" Whereas, by tains no enactment as to penalty? That various Acts of Parliament certain restraints is a question of constitutional law; and if and disabilities are imposed on the Roman I were sued to-morrow for the penalty of Catholic subjects of his Majesty, to which 5007. in a court of justice, I should, of other subjects of his Majesty are not course, instantly demur. If I am right in liable." It includes all restraints and dis- that position-if the penalty of 5001. abilities affecting Roman Catholics; and could not be recovered, shall the greater proceeds" And whereas it is expedient infliction remain? When courts of justice that such restraints and disabilities shall would refuse to enforce the fine, shall this be henceforth discontinued: and whereas House take the law into its own hands,

will you add it as an additional exception? It might have been said by some of those who supported the bill, that it was intended by that measure to compensate a nation for by-gone wrongs, and to form the foundation-stone of a solid and substantial building, to be consecrated to the unity and peace of the empire. But if what is certain may be disturbed; if what words

may be determined not to be civil rights; if we are to be told that, by some excuse or by some pretext, what is not uncertain may be made so we shall be put under an impossibility to know what construction we must hereafter place on the Statutes. have endeavoured to treat this House with respect. My title to sit in it is clear and plain; and I contend that the statute is

recital, and in its enactments. It comprebends every principle and measure of relief, with such exceptions as are thereinafter excepted. But while I shew my respect for this House, I stand here on my right, and claim the benefit of it.

The hon. and learned gentleman then bowed to the House and withdrew, amidst loud and general cheering.

and deprive me of what ought to be infinitely more precious-the right to sit and vote as the representative of a divided, a disinterested, and, I had almost said, a martyred people? The Union statute, I apprehend, would alone be sufficient; but I do not stand on that merely. This Relief Bill has abolished the oaths and Declaration, and abolished with it the punishment for not taking the one and sub-express may be erased; if civil rights scribing the other. If the Declaration be abolished, does the pecuniary penalty remain? I answer, no; and if the pecuniary penalty do not remain, does the heavier penalty of exclusion continue? Certainly not; and I respectfully submit to the House, that it has not now jurisdiction to prevent the exercise of my civil right of sitting and voting here. I acknowledge that I should take the oath pre-all-comprehensive in its intention, in its scribed by the Relief Bill; and, then, let any individual, by favour of justice, bring an action against me, and if the court should determine that I ought to pay the penalty of 5001., my exclusion follows as a matter of course, The House should consider that this is a large and comprehensive enactment; and I ask why this House should interfere in my case, and not leave it to the courts of justice? I do not want this House to submit its privileges to the decision of any court or tribunal in existence; but I wish to shew that the House, by deciding with me, could not preclude any body from trying the question legally. It is to put my case into that transfer of decision that I am arguing here; that is the utmost I struggle for. The question is: Is it not my right, on this return, to take the seat to which I have been duly elected? Is the question free from doubt? If there be a doubt, I am entitled to the benefit of that doubt. I maintain, that I have a constitutional right, founded on the return of the Sheriff and the voice of the people; and if there be a doubt on the subject, it should be removed. The Statute comes before us to be construed from the first clause. I did and I am not ashamed to own itI did defer to the opinions of others, and was averse from calling for that construction; and if it had not been for the interests of those who sent me here, my own right should have been buried in oblivion. But now I require the House to consider it. Will you decide, that a civil right does not mean a civil right? And if this case of mine be not excepted,

The Solicitor General said, that the hon. and learned member having withdrawn from the bar, after having stated his claim with the ability which might have been expected from so distinguished a member of his profession, and with a temper which did equal credit to his feelings as a man and a gentleman, it became the duty of the House to discuss the important point at issue with the same good temper and feeling with which it had been introduced, and, without reference to any party considerations, to come to a decision upon it as a matter which came judicially before them. Such was the temper with which he was disposed to look at it. He would view it as the construction of an act passed in times long by-gone, and of which all the actors had passed off the stage. He would, in as brief a compass as the nature of the case would admit, state his opinions upon it; and he believed the House would be disposed to go with him, unless they should hear stronger and more conclusive arguments in support of the view taken of it. by the hon. and learned member for Clare, His opinion was, that Mr. O'Connell, the member for Clare, had no right to sit without taking the Oath of Supremacy.

away the necessity of, or at least the penalty for, not taking those oaths before the Lord Steward, previously to taking a seat in the House. He took these to be the principal points at issue, and to these he would confine himself waving any detail as to minor subjects. He would contend, that the act of William and Mary did not dispense with the necessity of taking the Oaths of Supremacy and Allegiance before the Lord Steward or his deputy before entering the House, and that any member who should enter the House for the purpose of business, or taking any share in its proceedings, would by that act cease to be a member any longer; and according to this view of it, if the hon. member for Clare should, after this evening, come into the House to take any part in its business, without having taken those oaths, the House would be bound to deal with his case, according to that act, and to issue a new writ for that county..

The first point on which the hon. and as far as the necessity of taking the Oaths learned gentleman relied was, that the of Supremacy and Allegiance; and necessity of taking that Oath was done secondly, whether the Act of Union took away by the act of Union with Ireland; and the second was, that he had a right to sit under the Catholic Relief Bill. These were certainly very different grounds; but if either of them could be made out to the satisfaction of the House, there could be no doubt that the hon. member would have a right to sit and vote. If he understood the argument of the hon. and learned gentleman on' the first point, it was this-that the penalties enacted by the 30th of Charles 2nd, for not taking the Oaths, were done away with by the act of Union with Ireland, and that that act had placed us in a new state of things with respect to the necessity of taking those Oaths. He must own, that as far as he was personally concerned--and on general grounds he could wish to be able to view it in this light-it would be desirable if they could bring their minds to think that Catholics could have taken their seats in that House, without those Oaths before the late measure; for, in that case, much of the irritation, many of the differences and heartburnings which that measure had produced would be removed, when it was known that in conceding it, we had given up no securities whatever; but he was bound honestly to express his firm conviction, that the act of Charles 2nd was operative up to the passing of the late bill. Now, the difference as to the taking of the oaths, without reference to the late bill, resolved itself into two points only. It would be admitted by all, that by the statute of Elizabeth and down to the time of William and Mary, all persons, before taking their seats in either House of Parliament, were bound to take the Oaths of Supremacy and Allegiance before the Lord Steward or his deputy. It was contended by some --but he dissented from the opinion for the reasons which he should hereafter state that this act of the 1st of William and Mary was a repeal of the statute of Elizabeth in this respect; but the statute of Charles 2nd was, he presumed it would be admitted by all, binding as to the taking the oaths at the table before taking a seat in the House. The only questions, then, for the consideration of the House were first, whether by the operation of the statute of William and Mary, the act of Elizabeth was removed

He would now call the attention of the House to the circumstances under which the act of the 1st of William and Mary was passed. It was well known, that when William was coming to this country, letters missive were sent to various parts of the country, in the name of the prince of Orange, calling together an assembly as nearly resembling a parliament as could be. This assembly consisted of members from counties, cities, and boroughs, in all parts of the kingdom. It was necessary, of course, that they should take some oaths; but as they could not take those oaths to William or the late king, it occurred to several of the leading men of that day, that some provision should be made to render them as near a parliament as possible, and therefore the 1st of William and Mary was passed, which he would say turned a convention into a parliament. In that act, an alteration was made in the oaths to be taken at the table of the House; but it had no reference whatever to the oaths to be taken up stairs before the Lord Steward or his deputies. The object of the act was, to impose the necessity of taking in the House the Oath of Supremacy as it was then framed; but it had nothing whatever to do with the oaths to be taken out of doors. Let honourable members

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