certainly conduct its votaries at laft to all the happiness of their natures, however dark and troublesome the present circumstances of adhereing to it may appear.

THESE principles, plain and obvious as they are, have unavoidable confequences, far from being always allow'd, or however obferved; of great ufe in regulating our zeal and application in the advancement of truth. Thus, zeal for any particular parties or opinions cannot promote truth: no, though the parties may be useful, and the opinions true. It is a very different thing to have a concern for truth, and for any principle whatever. He that wishes the advancement of truth, is not fo much concerned what is true, as that what is so may prevail; and therefore labours only that truth may be discovered, and that the evidences of it may appear; and ever prefers it to any principles or opinions that he may have entertained. He would willingly exchange any or all his prefent perfuafions for truth, and would think himself thereby a great gainer. Whereas, he who contends only for the prevalence of particular opinions, however true or important, feeks not evidence, nor confiders the principles as true; but only ftrives to promote them. He rather fears inquiry and examination, left they should appear doubtful or erroneous: and fo that they do but fucceed, or are propagated, he cares not whether they are well understood, or really believed. This confideration, I fear, will de

ftroy the merit, if not expofe the vice of much religious zeal.

AGAIN, integrity, conftancy, refolution and faithfulness even unto death, in the profeffion of any principles, muft receive its merit and praise only from the love of truth and liberty. If it be a zeal and fondness for any opinion not confidered as truth, however excellent and ufeful; it is rather obftinacy, or perhaps an ill-judg'd benevolence. Let a man try this reflection in his own breaft. Where is the virtue, or indeed the fenfe, of facrificing life or any other valuable intereft, that certain opinions may prevail, whether they appear true or not? An honeft man, that is a faithful lover of truth, will not indeed part with his principles, or deny his perfuafion for any reward, or thro' the fear of any fuffering, even of death itself. But then, his zeal and concern, is not that his principles may prevail, whether true or falfe, but that he may maintain his integrity, and bear a teftimony to the caufe of truth and liberty: that he may affert by his behaviour in all extremities, the general obligations of truth, and the right of all moral agents to profefs and practice what appears to them to be true and reasonable. Here then we may observe that all true courage and heroifm, even when it proceeds to martyrdom itself, muft be in defence of truth and liberty, and not of any particular opinions. This is rather fondnefs and obftinacy. It is well if this confideration does not spoil the religion

religion of many professors, and the honour of fome martyrs.

I fhall only farther obferve this general confequence of these principles, That all freedom of inquiry and undisturbed profeffion of what men believe, must ever promote the intereft of truth; as on the contrary, whatever prevents or discourages a fearch after truth, or tends to hurt men in an honest and confcientious practice of their perfuafions, muft of neceffity, fo far, stop the progrefs and advancement of truth, and tempt men to infincerity and vice. This is plain in the very nature of things.

I will not pretend to fay how confiftent fuch a liberty might be made with the flourishing condition of a religious eftablishment, or the peace and order of fome civil governments. One wou'd think, indeed, by the practice of all ages, that a toleration of truth and liberty was look'd upon, as of all public evils, the moft intolerable; fince all ecclefiaftical and civil focieties have more or lefs reftrain'd or prohibited them. But fince truth and liberty are really in themselves. the most invaluable bleffings that can be enjoy'd by rational minds; and fince they are the only privileges that can juftly be contended for among men, there must be fome latent mistake in this proceedure. It cannot be the interest of the people, or of the fociety in general, that truth and liberty fhou'd be obftructed. It must be fome partial intereft of bigotry and tyranny, fome Ee 4

un.

unreafonable dominion over the confciences
and properties of men, that must be intend-
ed by all perfecution and oppression. I am
perfuaded, that if once the experiment was
made (which by the way has never yet been
try'd) of giving a fair toleration to truth.
and liberty; altho' many evils and errors
will ever attend all imperfect states and con-
ditions, nevertheless upon the whole, true
religion and virtue wou'd greatly prevail,
and the order, peace and happiness of society
wou'd be more effectually established. This
is just as likely to be the event, as truth has
a better chance to be received than falfhood
upon a fair inquiry, and an impartial undi-
fturbed judgment; and as government is
moft likely to ftand fecure and unfhaken,
whilft it most firmly and univerfally pro-
yides for, and maintains the rights and liber-
ties, that is, the focial happiness of mankind.

Perfecution and tyranny are very nearly
allied, and generally go hand in hand to-
gether they are founded on the fame ab-
furd principles, and the like falfe pretences;
and they are equally deftructive of the true
ends of religion and government ; which
ought furely to be the affiftance and support
of virtue, and the happiness of fociety.

Tour bumble Servant,

PHILALETHES.

TO THE

SECOND VOLUME.

A

A

Bfolution, Form of, Objections against it, 343.
Adwick in Yorkshire, for what memorable, 417.
Aliance between Church and State, Remarks on that
Treatife, 2 15. The Scheme destroys itself,
16, 17. Is inconfiftent and felf-contradictory, 18, 19.
Deftroys all Establishments of Religion, inftead of de-
fending them, 20. What publick Utility ariling from
an establish'd Religion, it proposes, 22.
Amballadors, their Rife, 135.

Ambajadors from God, who, and England congratulated
upon the Number of them, 128. The Contempt they
are under, and a fine Method for establishing the Re-
fpect due to them, 136.
Good Effects of it, 137.

Objections against them, 139. Answer'd, 140.
Ambition, the Gofpel an Enemy to it, 143, 144, &c.
Antichrift, his Character, 53.

Apocryphal Books, Objections against reading them in
Churches, 277.

Articles of the Church of England, of Subfcribing to
them, 295. The Nature of it, 296. Whether as Ar-
ticles of Peace, 297. Farther Remarks upon Subscrip-
tion to them, 324. Subftance of them, 328. Addrefs
to the Clergy thereupon, 330. An Addition propos'd
to the Form of Subfcription, 332. Farther Objecti-
ons against subscribing them, 351, 362, 374. Of a
Treatife concerning Subfcribing them in different Sen-
fes, 359. How our Clergy fubfcribe them, 392.
Apology for them on this Head, 407. See Subfcription.
Atheism lets dangerous than Superftition, 121.

B.

An

Bacon, Lord, his Obfervations about Superftition, 121,
122, 124. Concerning Controverfies in Religion,
371. Concerning the impofing Clergy, 372.
Beveridge, Bishop, his Account of the Power and Au
thority of Bishops and Presbyters, 65. A Paffage
about the Trinity, in his Private Thoughts upon Religion,
examined, 79. Another Paffage of his upon the fame
Subject, cenfur'd, 82.

Bigotry, its Caufes, Nature and Confequences, 404, 405,
406.
Bishop,