THE ADVICE OF NUSHIREWAN TO HIS SON HORMUZ, JUST BEFORE HIS DEATH. From the Bostan, or Garden of the Persian Poet SADI. Hear, thou, my Son, the orphan's cries, Who lolls him on the couch of rest; When wolves are near, who guards the sheep? Secure thine empire, and thy throne; Thou art the tree, and they the roots, From which thy branch of grandeur shoots. β. THE SUSCEPTIBLE MIND. From "Moral Pieces, in Prose and Verse, by LYDIA HUNTLEY," of Hartford, Connecticut. Hast thou seen the Mimosa, within its soft cell, All shrinking and suffering stand, And draw in its tendrils, and fold its young leaves, Hast thou seen the young Aspen that trembles and sigh Oh! these are but emblems, imperfect and faint, LIFE. From the same. Life is like a painted dream, APRIL, 1824. On the Standard of Taste." An Essay intended to compete for a Prize, given by the University of Glasgow. By the late WILLIAM FRIEND DURANT.PART I.* "It is with good reason, says Sancho to the Squire with the great nose, that I pretend to have a judgment in wine: this is a quality bereditary in our family. Two of my kinsmen were once called to give their opinion of a hogshead, which was supposed to be excellent, being old, and of a good vintage. One of them tastes it; considers it; and, after mature reflection, pronounces the wine to be good, were it not for a small taste of leather, which he perceived in it. The other, after using the same precaution, gives his verdict in favour of the wine; but with the reserve of a taste of iron, which he could easily distinguish. You cannot imagine how much they were both ridiculed for their judgment. But who laughed in the end? On emptying the hogshead, there was found at the bottom an old key with a leathern thong tied to it!" WHAT is the Standard of Taste? Is it to be ascertained by attending to that constitution, in consequence of which the common_nature" appears at once "invariable" and "perfect?" Or, if "some particular forms or qualities from the original structure of the internal fabric are calculated to please, and others to displease;" and, "if in the sound state of the organ there be an entire or considerable uniformity of sentiment among men"-in what way can we so accurately determine the original constitution of the human mind, as to be justified, in considering decidedly erroneous every thing that deviates from one standard? Can we, from what we know of the human mind, safely deduce the prin * Our limits compel us to make a division which does not exist in the original Essay. Of that Essay, the father of its lamented author, gives the following account in his most interesting memoir of his singularly gifted son:-" Though the Essay could not be presented for competition, both Dr. Wardlaw and I thought it not undesirable, that a few of the professors, who knew and respected my son, should see it. In a letter, dated March 2, Dr. Wardlaw says, I have this morning sent the exercise on Taste to Mr. Mylne, accompanied with an explanatory letter. It is one, I think, which will more than maintain (dear lamented youth!) the high reputation he had acquired. Alas! that that reputation should now attach to the memory only, instead of attending, as we fondly but vainly hoped, the living author, through an active, and brilliant, and (what is best of all) useful career! The perusal of it has only served to awaken all my bitter, and, I had almost said, and I fear I might say, with too much truth, infidel regrets. But, oh! if all were as clear to us, as it is to the Supreme Disposer himself, where would be the trial of faith? where the room for the exercise of trust? Be still, and know that I am God."" + Elements of Criticism, cap. 25. Hume's Essays and Treatises part i. essay 23. VOL. VIII.--No. 2. L ciples of criticism? Is it strictly true, that "none of the rules of composition are fixed by reasonings a priori?"* Is "Taste a sort of compound power, in which the light of the understanding always mingles more or less with the feelings of sentiment?"+ Or, ought a line of distinction to be drawn between "Taste and the natural sensibility to beauty?" so that the presence of the latter "does not necessarily imply" the existence of the former? Such are a few of the questions, to which our attention is demanded. To avoid the perplexity which metaphysicians have introduced into this subject, I shall take the liberty of stating what I conceive to be the real object of our present inquiry. Thus throwing out the extraneous matter which disputants have so copiously introduced,-our labour will be considerably diminished. How can we, in any instance, ascertain the correctness of taste? Here the subject naturally divides itself into two branches; to each of which it will be necessary to devote a share of attention. Our first inquiry, then, shall be, In what sense can Taste be denominated correct? Our second, By what common standard is its correctness, in any particular instance, to be estimated? FIRST.-In what sense can Taste be denominated CORRECT. Dependent as Mind is, for her first ideas, on those material organs which are, from their nature, solely conversant with the phenomena of the material world, all our notions on the subjects of mental science have necessarily a very strong affinity to those trains of thought by which the attention is more usually occupied. Few things, however, have proved more injurious to the interests of knowledge, than has analogical reasoning from the movements of matter, to the operations of the thinking principle. Any attempt to elucidate the latter by a reference to the former, is apt, unless managed with extreme caution, to degenerate into a mere series of affected and unmeaning conceits. Never, I think, has the truth of this position been more fully displayed than by the writers who have discussed the question we are about to consider. These reasoners, not content with establishing a metaphysical doctrine on nothing better than the ambiguous meaning attached to a single worddetermined to push to its utmost extreme the fancied analogy between the external senses and the internal. Finding themselves pressed by unconquerable difficulties, they have Hume, ibidem. + Blair's Rhetoric, lecture ii. Stewart's Phil. Essays, Essay iii. on Taste, chap. 3. recourse to reasonings as inconclusive as they are unnecessary; and, at last, are satisfied with evasion instead of reply. The analogy between the sensations of the palate, and the emotions of beauty-incomplete as it is-might, had it been steadily prosecuted, have conducted them to a correct result. But when met by objections, they attempt to account, on principles already admitted, for facts apparently irreconcileable; and never seem to have examined the foundation of their system, or to have suspected any defect in the premises, of which their whole argument presupposed the correctness. I ought, perhaps, to apologize for speaking so strongly with reference to men of such undoubted superiority, as were some of those to whose sentiments I have alluded. If, therefore, I am occasionally compelled to express my decided convictions on so delicate a subject, let it be understood that my reflections are intended to apply, not to individuals, but to opinions. No maxim seems to have been at once more offensive, and more perplexing, than the proverb, that "there is no disputing about tastes." The analogy, which some writers have been at such pains to verify, seems here completely to fail. It may, however, throw no little light on the subject, if, without entirely deserting an illustration which is by no means inappropriate, we spend some time on the previous consideration of this particular proposition. In the first place, then, neither an emotion nor a sensation can be, in strict philosophical accuracy, denominated correct, or incorrect. "If any one," (I quote from Dr. Blair) "should assert that sugar was bitter, and tobacco was sweet, no reasoning could avail to prove it."* Nor, I would add, to disprove it; if the assertion mean no more than that the substances referred to, produce, in the particular instance of the individual who makes that assertion, the effects here ascribed to them. If he be, however, paradoxical enough to assure us that the taste of others resembles his own; in what way do we answer him? Not by appealing to some common standard, of which he is so constituted as immediately to recognize the authority; but by referring him to facts. The question, we should say, is one that must be decided by experience; and, to reason about it, is foolish and unnecessary, because the testimony of all mankind is against you. With the emotions of Taste, the cause is exactly similar. Were any man to tell me that a Chinese temple, with its * Blair's Lectures on Rhet. &c. lee. ii. frippery ornaments, appears to him more beautiful than the simple and majestic elegance of the Parthenon; I would not attempt to disprove the asserted fact. The fact is, with him, a matter of consciousness; and, feeling as he does,he can no more doubt that the Chinese temple is, as far as his sentiments are concerned, the more beautiful building of the two; than, in the case above mentioned, he could question the sweetness of tobacco, or the bitterness of sugar.If he were, however, to go any farther, and to assert, that the object of his admiration excited the same emotions in the breasts of others, I should again say, that this is a question of individual consciousness; and that his statement is opposed to the almost universal experience of mankind. How then does it happen, it will be asked, that, in cases so strictly analogous, such different modes of treatment are adopted? No argument will alter the taste of my friend, in the one case; and, however convinced he may be, that the peculiarity of his sensations arises from some malformation of the organ, those sensations remain unaltered. In the other case, however, argument or thought may, and probably will, be effectual in removing the first impression, and in producing a relish for purer and simpler beauties: so far from despairing of my object, I exert myself with the hope of effecting it. I endeavour to shew him, that his present sentiments are inconsistent with his feelings under analogous circumstances; and deduce the conclusion, that his mistake arises from some unmarked association that has influenced his decision. I point out the proofs of wisdom which he may previously have overlooked. I shew him the intended expression, to which his habits of thought may have rendered him hitherto insensible. I trace, in every portion of the edifice, the marks of superior intelligence; and display, in the united whole, harmony of parts, and uniformity of design. If I am able to convince his understanding, a new emotion succeeds to that which he before cherished; his bosom swells with sentiments of admiration; and his feelings undergo a change corresponding to that which has taken place in his intellectual habits. The reason of this is sufficiently obvious: impressions on the external organ are uniformly succeeded by sensation. Emotion, on the contrary, is never excited without a previous intellectual operation. The same impression on the material organ, uniformly produces the same sensation; and the same judgment, or conception of the mind, is as |