in their nature to the ideas of which they are the consequences, a similarity will naturally prevail among them, while those ideas have all an obvious relation to the sensation by which they are suggested. True it is, that trains of varied and desultory thought may arise in consequence of this suggestion. In such a case, however, there will soon cease to be any connexion between the suggesting sensation and the suggested idea. Where, with the same sensation, ideas themselves essentially different, and productive of dissimilar emotions, are associated-where it suggests, at different times, different trains of thought, which, although they are dissimilar, yet agree in giving rise to the sentiments of beauty-or where, in the same way, a number of simpler elements are blended in one delightful complex feeling-we conclude that the object from which the impression is received is possessed of beauties, various, or, as we not unfrequently express ourselves, unnumbered. Each species of beauty is, however, conceived of as distinct from the rest; and although we may, in the moment of passion, talk about the provoking charm of Calia altogether,"* we never, I believe, soberly and seriously think of this " provoking charm" as an indivisible whole, unsusceptible of analysis. I do not certainly intend to assert that the case of female beauty affords an exactly fair parallel to that which is more immediately under consideration. I only mean to say, that where a sensation suggests either distinct or complex trains of thought, and of pleasing emotion-each of these trains is characterized by some predominant feature; and is popularly ascribed to some peculiar beauty possessed by that object which occasioned the original impression. At any rate, where the suggested emotions are totally dissimilar in their general character, they will never constitute such a train of harmonious and delightful feelings, as attracts and fixes our attention. "When," says Mr. Stewart, "a train of thought takes its rise from an idea or conception, the first idea soon disappears, and a series of others succeeds, which are gradually less and less related to that with which the train commenced; but, in the case of perception, the existing cause remains steadily before us; and all the thoughts and feelings which have any relation to it, crowd into the mind in rapid succession, strengthening each other's effects, and all conspiring in the same general impression." They would *Phil. Essays, part ii. essay i. part i. chap. 6. 1 + Philosophy of the Human Mind, chap. 5. part i. sect. 1. not, however," conspire in the same general impression," and "strengthen each other's effects," if they could at once stand in this common relation "to that with which the train commenced;" and yet themselves be entirely destitute of similarity or coincidence. This uniformity of character, therefore, being necessarily inherent in those trains of thought and emotion, to the external exciting causes of which the term beauty was at first applied-the signification of that term is subsequently extended to nothing which does not excite trains distinguished by similar uniformity. I have not, therefore, taken earlier notice of this circumstance, because I conceive it to be rather a necessary inference from what has been already stated, than a part of that idea which the term beauty was originally invented to express. I have thus stated my notions on this important subject. For the great leading principles, I am chiefly indebted to Mr. Alison's elegant and philosophical writings; and to those writings I must refer for the elucidation and establishment of these principles. As I have little time to spare on the discussion of a question, which, although important, is collateral, or, at best, preliminary-I have taken these principles for granted; and have confined myself to the consideration of those points which, not being defended by the authority or by the reasonings on which I have in other cases depended stand in need of argument for their illustration and support. BEAUTY, then, in its most extensive sense, I conceive to be nothing more than the power of occasioning ideas productive of pleasing emotions all of which are possessed of a general uniformity of character. The word beauty is, however, restricted to those cases in which these emotions are of the less violent order; and are not calculated to produce any considerable degree of mental agitation. SUBLIMITY appears to differ from beauty, in the character of the emotions excited by a contemplation of the objects in which it exists. All these emotions are of a violent nature, and the train of thought which is accompanied by them, is of such a kind as to be productive of great mental agitation. This I prefer to that theory which considers the sublime as a modification of the terrible. That the emotions which accompany a sense of danger are the most violent of which the human constitution is susceptible, I am ready to admit: but I do not see sufficient reason to believe that these emotions always enter into the feeling of sublimity. It occasionally requires, at all events, great ingenuity to discover this ingredient; and the more comprehensive, therefore, appears the preferable definition. This, however, I merely mention in passing, without attaching to it any great degree of importance.* After this long, but necessary digression, we propose to proceed to the more immediate consideration of our subject. Our present object, it will be remembered, is to ascertain the sense in which Taste can be justly termed correct. After having attempted to shew that the emotions of Taste are preceded by an intellectual operation, and that beauty and sublimity in objects are nothing more than the power of suggesting particular trains of thought, which are productive of certain peculiar emotions we shall prosecute, with regard to these previous trains of thought, the inquiry that has presented itself; and notice some of those difficulties which attend the investigation. CALENDAR OF THE JEWS. AN APPENDIX TO THE Essay on the Agriculture of the Israelites. THE first idea of the following Calendar was taken from one in Mr. Bickersteth's excellent Scripture Help, in which it occupies four duodecimo pages, or rather two leaves, consisting of two opposite pages each, divided into seven columns, five being in the first page, and two in the second. The first five in Mr. B's. contain the same heads as the first five in the following, and the other two are in the second page. But, as it was an object with the compiler of the following, to get as much space as possible for the subjects connected with his Essay on Agriculture, the weather, productions, &c. he thought that, by making the 2d, 3d, 4th and 5th columns narrower, he might get the 6th into the first page, leaving In the following passage, Mr. Burke expresses an opinion, apparently coincident with the sentiments which are offered above. "Whatever is fitted in any sort to excite the ideas of pain and danger that is to say, whatever is, in any sort, terrible, conversant about terrible objects, or operates in a manner analogous to terror, is a source of the sublime; that is, it is productive of the strongest emotion which the mind is capable of feeling." (See Sub. and Beaut. part i. sect. vii.) the whole of the second page to the agricultural matters; and likewise, by putting only three months into a page, or leaf, instead of six, it would again double the space for those, and likewise allow more for the festivals, &c. Another alteration has been made in the second column. Mr. B. has represented our months as corresponding exactly with the Jewish months, as September to Tisri, Marchesvan to October, and so on; whereas we are informed, that it is the latter part of September and beginning of October which answer to Tisri. To point this out, therefore, the horizontal lines of division in the second column do not correspond with those in the first, but the line in the second column is placed against the middle of the month in the first column, and is only dotted, to distinguish it from the former. The notices of festivals, &c. are enlarged from a calendar given by Calmet at the end of his Dictionary of the Bible; and from one given by Mr. Horne, taken from that, and Father Lamy's Apparatus Biblicus, in the third volume of his very valuable Introduction to the Study of the Holy Scriptures, 2d edition, p. 174. The notices of the weather, productions, &c. are enlarged from Buhle's Calendar of Palestine, in the Fragments added to Calmet's Dictionary, (the source whence Mr. Bickersteth professes to have taken his,) Dr. Clarke's Travels, and other sources. Since first drawing up the Calendar (in March, 1822,) the writer finds, from the Investigator, No. viii. vol. iv. p. 379, that Mr. Allen, in his book on Modern Judaism, has controverted the hitherto established notion, that the Jews kept two reckonings of the year, one of the civil, beginning in September, the other of the ecclesiastical year, beginning in March. This he has done with much force of argument. But, as the other is the usually received mode, he has not thought proper to alter it, but to make this remark, that the question may be borne in mind; and the beginning of the year at Tisri, or in September, suits best with the agricultural year, which usually is considered as beginning with Michaelmas or sowing-time, and ending with the ingathering or harvest. CALENDAR |