Robust Ethics: The Metaphysics and Epistemology of Godless Normative RealismOxford University Press, 2014 - 196 pagina's Erik J. Wielenberg draws on recent work in analytic philosophy and empirical moral psychology to defend non-theistic robust normative realism and develop an empirically-grounded account of human moral knowledge. Non-theistic robust normative realism has it that there are objective, non-natural, sui generis ethical features of the universe that do not depend on God for their existence. The early chapters of the book address various challenges to the intelligibility and plausibility of the claim that irreducible ethical features of things supervene on their non-ethical features as well as challenges from defenders of theistic ethics who argue that objective morality requires a theistic foundation. Later chapters develop an account of moral knowledge and answer various recent purported debunkings of morality, including those based on scientific research into the nature of the proximate causes of human moral beliefs as well as those based on proposed evolutionary explanations of our moral beliefs. |
Inhoudsopgave
Intrinsic Value Reasons
and Obligations | 1 |
Answering Theistic Challenges | 40 |
3 Moral Psychology Meets Reliabilism | 86 |
4 Answering the Evolutionary Debunkers | 134 |
| 177 | |
| 193 | |
Overige edities - Alles bekijken
Robust Ethics: The Metaphysics and Epistemology of Godless Normative Realism Erik J. Wielenberg Gedeeltelijke weergave - 2014 |
Robust Ethics: The Metaphysics and Epistemology of Godless Normative Realism Erik J. Wielenberg Gedeeltelijke weergave - 2014 |
Robust Ethics: The Metaphysics and Epistemology of Godless Normative Realism Erik J. Wielenberg Geen voorbeeld beschikbaar - 2017 |
Veelvoorkomende woorden en zinsdelen
According Adams Adams’s view argues argument from morally atheistic base properties Brown’s brute causal challenge chapter cognitive faculties conscious moral judgments consider Craig d-judgments deontological discussion disgust sensitivity distinct divine command theory EDAs emotion empirical ence Enoch entails epistemic justification ethical properties evolutionary debunking argument evolutionary explanation example existence explained without appealing Garcia and King given God’s Greene Greene’s Haidt Harman’s Huemer human moral beliefs implies instantiated intrinsic value intuitive Joyce justified least m-possess Mackie’s meaning meta-ethical moral barriers moral cognition moral facts moral knowledge moral obligations moral principles moral properties moral psychology moral realism moral rights moral skepticism Moral Truth morally wrong MoRM mysterianism non-conscious classifications non-moral properties non-theistic robust normative normative reasons objective moral one’s Parfit person philosophers plausible relation relevant reliabilism reliable robust normative realism Ruse S’s moral belief Shafer-Landau Sinnott-Armstrong skepticism sort suggests supervenience System 1 cognition theistic things tion worry