Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral SystemsCambridge University Press, 28 mrt 1997 - 340 pagina's Popular elections are at the heart of representative democracy. Thus, understanding the laws and practices that govern such elections is essential to understanding modern democracy. In this book, Cox views electoral laws as posing a variety of coordination problems that political forces must solve. Coordination problems - and with them the necessity of negotiating withdrawals, strategic voting, and other species of strategic coordination - arise in all electoral systems. This book employs a unified game-theoretic model to study strategic coordination worldwide and that relies primarily on constituency-level rather than national aggregate data in testing theoretical propositions about the effects of electoral laws. This book also considers not just what happens when political forces succeed in solving the coordination problems inherent in the electoral system they face but also what happens when they fail. |
Inhoudsopgave
Introduction | 3 |
Duvergers propositions | 13 |
STRATEGIC VOTING | 35 |
On electoral systems | 37 |
Strategic voting in singlemember singleballot systems | 69 |
Strategic voting in multimember districts | 99 |
Strategic voting in singlemember dualballot systems | 123 |
Some concluding comments on strategic voting | 139 |
COORDINATION FAILURES AND DEMOCRATIC PERFORMANCE | 223 |
Coordination failures and representation | 225 |
Coordination failures and dominant parties | 238 |
Coordination failures and realignments | 251 |
CONCLUSION | 267 |
Conclusion | 269 |
Formulaic structures in 77 democracies circa 1992 | 279 |
Notation and proofs for Chapter 6 | 303 |
STRATEGIC ENTRY | 149 |
Strategic voting party labels and entry | 151 |
Rational entry and the conservation of disproportionality evidence from Japan | 173 |
ELECTORAL COORDINATION AT THE SYSTEM LEVEL | 179 |
Putting the constituencies together | 181 |
Electoral institutions cleavage structures and the number of parties | 203 |
Data and sources for Chapter 11 | 308 |
References | 312 |
| 329 | |
| 339 | |
Overige edities - Alles bekijken
Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral Systems Gary W. Cox Geen voorbeeld beschikbaar - 1997 |
Veelvoorkomende woorden en zinsdelen
bipartism cartels cast chapter coalition conservative constituency coordination failure coordination game d'Hondt method democratic didates district level district magnitude Duverger Duverger's Law Duvergerian effective number elec electoral laws electoral structure electoral system elites endorsement ENPV entry equilibrium example exclusive expectations first-round fused vote Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem Hare quota incentives instrumentally rational Japan joint lists labels leftist legislative elections Liberal Lijphart list order list votes Lists Candidates LRPR majority runoff national level number of candidates number of competitors number of parties number of seats number of viable outcome party system party's plurality rule polls PR-d'Hondt preferences presidential election Primary districts quota rational expectations realignment Sartori seat allocation Seats awarded Secondary district SF ratio Shugart simple plurality single-member districts SMSP SNTV strategic desertion strategic voting Taagepera Tactical Voting tion upper bound Uruguay variables viable candidates vote shares vote strategically vote totals voters wasted vote