1 really a friend if he serves him with an eye to profit. But, generally speaking, well-wishing is grounded upon some kind of excellence or goodness, and arises when a person seems to us beautiful or brave, or endowed with some other good quality, as we said in the case of the athletes. and 6. Unanimity [or unity of sentiment] also seems Friendship to be an element in friendship; and this shows that unanimity. it is not mere agreement in opinion, for that is possible even between people who know nothing of each other. Nor do we apply the term to those who agree in judgment upon any kind of subject, e.g. upon astronomy (for being of one mind in these matters has nothing to do with friendship); but we say that unanimity prevails in a state when the citizens agree in their judgments about what is for the common interest, and choose the same course, and carry out the decision 2 of the community. It is with regard to practical matters, therefore, that people are said to be of one mind, especially with regard to matters of importance and things that may be given to both persons, or to all the persons concerned; for instance, a state is said to be of one mind when all the citizens are agreed that the magistracies shall be elective, or that an alliance be made with Sparta, or that Pittacus be governor, Pittacus himself being willing to accept the office. But when each wishes the government for himself, like the brothers in the Phoenissæ of Euripides, then they are at discord: for being of one mind means that each not merely thinks of the same thing (what Why benefactors love more than they are loved ever it be), but thinks of it under the same conditions-as, for instance, if both the populace and the upper classes agree that the best men shall govern; for thus they all get what they want. Unanimity, then, seems to be, as it is called, the kind of friendship that prevails in states; for it has to do with what is for the common interest, and with things that have a considerable influence upon life. This kind of unanimity is found in good men; 3 for they are of one mind with themselves and with each other, standing, so to speak, always on the same ground for the wishes of such people are constant, and do not ebb and flow like the Euripus; they wish what is just and for the common interest, and make united efforts to attain it. But people who are not 4 good cannot be of one mind, just as they cannot be friends except for a little space or to a slight extent, as they strive for more than their share of profit, but take less than their share of labours and public services: but every man, while wishing to do this himself, keeps a sharp eye upon his neighbour, and prevents him from doing it; for if they are not thus on their guard, the community is ruined. The result is that they are at discord, striving to compel one another to do what is just, but not willing to do it themselves. 7. Benefactors seem to love those whom they have 1 benefited more than those who have received benefits love those who have conferred them; and as this appears irrational, people seek for the cause of this phenomenon. Most people think the reason is that the one is in 2 3 4 the position of a debtor, the other in the position of a creditor; and that, therefore, just as in the case of a loan the debtor wishes his creditor were out of the way, while the lender, on the other hand, is anxious that his debtor may be preserved, so here the benefactor desires the existence of him whom he has benefited in hopes of receiving favours in return, while the other is not at all anxious to repay. Epicharmus, indeed, might perhaps say that this is only the view of "those who have bad places at the play," but it seems to be true to life; for the generality of men have short memories, and are more eager to receive benefits than to confer them. But the real cause would seem to be something that lies deeper in the nature of things, and not like that which operates in the case of creditors: for the creditors have no real affection for their debtors, but only a wish that they may be preserved in order that they may repay; but those who have conferred benefits have a real love and affection for those whom they have benefited, even though they are not, and are never likely to be, of any service. The same phenomenon may be observed in craftsmen; for every craftsman loves the work of his own hands more than it would love him if it came to life. But perhaps poets carry it furthest; for they love their own poems to excess, and are as fond of them as if they were their children. Now, the case of the benefactors seems to resemble theirs; those whom they have benefited they have made, so to speak: that which they have made, then, Epicharmus was a Sicilian dramatist. they love more than the work loves its maker. And the reason of this is that we all desire existence and love it: but it is in the exercise of our faculties, or in the realization of ourselves, that our existence lies; for it lies in living and doing. But that which a man makes is, in a way, a realization of his self; therefore he loves it, because he loves existence. But this is in accordance with the nature of things; for it is a law of nature that what a thing is as yet potentially is exhibited in realization by that which it makes or does. Moreover, the manifestation of his action is beau- 5 tiful to the benefactor, so that he delights in the person that makes it manifest; but to him who has received the benefit there is nothing beautiful in the benefactor, but at the most something useful; and such an object is less pleasing and less lovable. Again, we take pleasure in realizing ourselves in 6 the present, in hopes for the future, and in memories of the past; but that in which we are realizing ourselves is the most pleasant, and likewise the most lovable. Now, for the benefactor what he has done endures (for that which is beautiful is lasting), while for him who has received the benefit the advantage soon passes away. Again, the memory of beautiful deeds is pleasant, of profitable actions not at all pleasant, or not so pleasant; but with expectation the reverse seems to be the case. Again, loving seems like doing something, being loved like having something done to you. Those * Reading Ενεργείᾳ δ ̓ ὁ ποιήσας τὸ ἔργον ἐστί πως. 7 who have the better part in such transactions then naturally feel and show more love. Again, we all have more affection for what we have achieved with toil, as those who have made money love it more than those who have inherited it; now, receiving a benefit seems to involve no labour, while conferring one seems to be troublesome. And for involve action this reason mothers have more affection for their children than fathers; for they have more trouble in giving them birth, and fuller assurance that they are their own. But this would seem to be a charac-teristic of benefactors also. 1 8. Another question which is raised is, whether In what we ought most to love ourselves or others. 2 We blame, it is said, those who love themselves most, and apply the term self-loving to them as a term of reproach: and, again, he who is not good is thought to have regard to himself in everything that he does, and the more so the worse he is; and so we accuse him of doing nothing disinterestedly. The good man on the other hand, it is thought, takes what is noble as his motive, and the better he is the more is he guided by this motive, and by regard for his friend, neglecting his own interest. But this theory disagrees with facts, nor is it surprising that it should. For it is allowed that we ought to love him most who is most truly a friend, and that he is most truly a friend who, in wishing well to another, wishes well to him for his (the other's) sake, and even though no one should ever know. But all these characteristics, and all the others which go to make up the definition of a friend, sense it is one's self. |