ceding our redemption, yet follow the sonship of the Redeemer. There is equal proof that Christ was the Son of God before he was made of a woman, as that he was the Word before he was made flesh. The phraseology is the same in the one case as in the other. If it be alleged that Christ is here called the Son of God on account of his being made of a woman; I answer, If so, it is also on account of his being made under the law, which is too absurd to admit of a question.. -Moreover: To say that God sent his own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh, is equal to saying that the Son of God assumed human nature: he must therefore have been the Son of God before his incarnation.

Fifthly: Christ is called the Son of God antecedent to his being manifested to destroy the works of the devil: but he was manifested to destroy the works of the devil by taking upon him human nature; consequently he was the son of God antecedent to the human nature being assumed. There is equal proof from the phraseology of 1 John iii. 8. that he was the Son of God antecedent to his being manifested to destroy the works of the devil, as there is from that of 1 Tim. iii. 16. that he was God antecedent to his being manifested in the flesh; or from 1 John i. 2, that that eternal life which was with the Father, was such antecedent to his being manifested to us.

Sixthly: The ordinance of baptism is commanded to be administered in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit*. The terms, Father and Holy Spirit, will be allowed to denote divine persons; and what good reasons can be given for another idea being fixed to the term Son?

Seventhly: The proper deity of Christ precedes his office of Mediator, or High Priest of our profession, * Matt. xxviii. 19.

and renders it an exercise of condescension. But the same is true of his sonship: He maketh the Son a High Priest-Though he was a Son, yet learned he obe. dience*. His being the Son of God, therefore, amounts to the same thing as his being a divine person.

Eighthly: It is the proper deity of Christ which gives dignity to his office of Mediator: but this dignity is ascribed to his being the Son of God. We have a GREAT High Priest, Jesus, the Son of GoDt. His being the Son of God therefore amounts to the same thing as his being a divine person.

Lastly: It is the proper deity of Christ which gives efficacy to his sufferings-By HIMSELF he purges our sinst. But this efficacy is ascribed to his being the Son of God-The blood of Jesus Christ, HIS SON, cleanseth us from all sin§. His being the Son of God therefore amounts to the same thing as his being a divine person.

Those who attribute Christ's sonship to his miraculous conception, (those however to whom I refer,) are nevertheless constrained to allow that the term implies proper divinity. Indeed this is evident from John v. 18, where his saying that God was his own Father, is supposed to be making himself equal with God. But if the miraculous conception be the proper foundation of his sonship, why should it contain such an implication? A holy creature might be produced by the overshadowing of the holy Spirit, which yet should be merely a creature; i.e. he might, on this hypothesis, profess to be the Son of God, and yet be so far from making himself equal with God, as to pretend to be nothing more than a man.

* Heb. vii. 28. v. 8. † Heb. iv. 14. Heb. i. 3. § 1 John i. 7.

It has been objected, that Christ, when called the Son of God, is commonly spoken of as engaged in the work of mediation, and not simply as a divine person antecedent to it. I answer, In a history of the rebellion in the year 1745, the name of his Royal Highness, the commander in chief, would often be mentioned in con nexion with his equipage and exploits; but none would infer from hence that he thereby became the king's

son.

It is further objected, that sonship implies inferiority, and therefore cannot be attributed to the divine person of Christ,-But whatever inferiority may be attached to the idea of Sonship, it is not an inferiority of nature, which is the point in question: and if any regard be paid to the Scriptures, the very contrary is true. Christ's claiming to be the Son of God, was making himself, not inferior, but as God or equal with God.

Önce more: Sonship, it is said, implies posteriority, or that Christ, as a Son, could not have existed till after the Father. To attribute no other divinity to him, therefore, than what is denoted by sonship, is attributing none to him; as nothing can be divine which is not eternal. But if this reasoning be just, it will prove that the divine purposes are not eternal, or that there was once a point in duration in which God was without thought, purpose, or design. For it is as true, and may as well be said, that God must exist before he could purpose, as that the Father must exist before he had a Son: but if God must exist before he could purpose, there must have been a point in duration in which he existed without purpose, thought, or design; that is, in which he was not God! The truth is, the whole of this apparent difficulty arises from the want of distinguishing between the order of nature

and the order of time. In the order of nature, the sun must have existed before it could shine; but in the order of time, the sun and its rays are coeval: it never existed a single instant without them. In the order of nature, God must have existed before he could purpose; but in the order of time, or duration, he never existed without his purpose: for a God without thought or purpose, were no God. And thus in the order of nature, the Father must have existed before the Son; but in that of duration, he never existed without the Son. The Father and the Son therefore are properly eternal.

In the Evangelical Magazine, Vol. iv.

QUERY 1. Did not the law of God require of Christ, considered as man, a perfect obedience on his own account? If it did, how can that obedience be imputed to sinners for their justification?

QUERY 2. How does it appear to be necessary that Christ should both obey the law in his people's stead, and yet suffer punishment on the account of their transgressions, seeing obedience is all the law requires?

To the first I should answer, The objection pro

ceeds upon the supposition that a public head, or representative, whose obedience should be imputable to

others, must possess it in a degree over and above what is required of him. But was it thus with the first public head of mankind? Had Adam kept the covenant of his God, his righteousness, it is supposed, would have been imputed to his posterity, in the same sense as the righteousness of Christ is imputed to believers; that is, God, to express his approbation of his conduct, would have rewarded it, by confirming him and his posterity in the enjoyment of everlasting life: : yet he would have wrought no work of supererogation, or have done any more than he was required to do on his own account.

But though, for argument's sake, I have allowed that the human nature of Christ was under obligation to keep the law on his own account; yet I question the propriety of that mode of stating things. In the person of Christ, the divinity and humanity were so intimately united, that perhaps we ought not to conceive of the latter as having any such distinct subsistence as to be an agent by itself, or as being obliged to obey, or do any thing of itself, or on its own account: Christ, as man, possessed no being on his own account. He was always in union with the Son of God; a public person, whose very existence was for the sake of others. Hence his coming under the law is represented not only as a part of his humiliation, to which he was naturally unobliged, but as a thing distinct from his assuming human nature; which one should think it could not be, if it were necessarily included in it. He was made of a woman, made under the law-made in the likeness of men, he took upon him the form of a servant*—being found in fashion as a man, he became obedient unto death. Gal. iv. 4. Phil. ii. 7, 8.

*See Doddridge's Translation of Phil. ii. 7.

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