In colleges and halls, in ancient days,
There dwelt a sage called Discipline.
His eye was meek and gentle, and a smile
Played on his lips; and in his speech was heard
Paternal sweetness, dignity, and love.
The occupation dearest to his heart

Was to encourage goodness. Learning grew,
Beneath his care, a thriving, vigorous plant.
The mind was well informed, the passions held
Subordinate, and diligence was choice.

If e'er it chanced, as sometimes chance it must,
That one, among so many, overleaped
The limits of control, his gentle eye
Grew stern, and darted a severe rebuke.
His frown was full of terror, and his voice
Shook the delinquent with such fits of awe,
As left him not, till penitence had won
Lost favor back again, and closed the breach.
But Discipline at length,

O'erlooked and unemployed, grew sick, and died.
Then study languished, emulation slept,

And virtue fled. The schools became a scene
Of solemn farce, where ignorance in stilts,
His cap well lined with logic not his own,
With parrot tongue, performed the scholar's part,
Proceeding soon a graduated dunce.

What was learned,

CLASS THIRD.

DUTIES TO MAN, AS MEMBER OF CIVIL SOCIETY

To this class belong the duties of magistrates and citizens. As these, however, would be but imperfectly understood, without a knowledge of the nature of civil society, and of the relations subsisting between society and the individual, it will be necessary to consider these latter, before entering upon the former. I shall, therefore, attempt to explain, first, The Nature and Limitations of Civil Society; secondly, Government, or the Manner in which the Obligations of Society are Discharged; thirdly, The Duties of Magis trates; fourthly, The Duties of Citizens.

CHAPTER FIRST

t

OF CIVIL SOCIETY.

As civil society is a somewhat complicated conception, may be useful, in the first place, to consider the nature of a society in its simplest form. This chapter will, therefore, be divided into two sections. The first treats of the constitution of a simple society; the second, of the constitution of civil society.

SECTION I

OF A SIMPLE SOCIET Y

I. Of the nature of a Simple Society.

1. A society of any sort originates in a peculiar form of contract, entered into between each several individual forming the society, on the one part, and all the other members of the society on the other part. Each party promises to do certain things to or for the other, and puts itself under moral obligation to do so. Hence, we see that conscience, or the power of recognising moral obligation, is, in the very nature of things, essential to the existence of a society. Without it, a society could not be formed.

2. This contract, like any other, respects those things, and those things only, in which the parties have thus bound themselves to each other. As the individual is under no obligation to belong to the society, but the obligation is purely voluntary, he is bound in no other manner, and for no other purpose, than those in and for which he has bound

himself. In all other respects, he is as free as he was before.

3. Inasmuch as the formation of a society involve he idea of a moral obligation, each party is under moral obligation to fulfil its part of the contract. The society is bound to do what it has promised to every individual, and every individual is bound to do what he has promised to the society. If either party cease to do this, the compact, like any other mutual contract, is dissolved.

4. Inasmuch as every individual is, in all respects excepting those in which he has bound himself, as free as he was before, the society has no right to impose upon the individual any other obligation than those under which he has placed himself. For, as he has come under no such obligation to them, they have no more control over him than any other men. And, as their whole power is limited to that which has been conferred upon them by individuals, beyond this limit, they are no society; they have no power; their act is really out of the society, and is, of course, binding upon no member of the society, any more than upon any other man.

5. As every member of the society enters it upon the same terms, that is, as every one comes under the same obligations to the society, and the society comes under the same obligations to him, they are, by consequence, so far as the society is concerned, all equals or fellows. All have equal rights, and all are subject to the same obligations.

6. That which defines the obligations under which the individual and the society have come, in respect to each other, is called the constitution of the society. It is intended to express the object of the association, and the manner in which that object is to be accomplished: that is to say, it declares what the individual promises to do for the society, what the society promises to do for the individual, and the object for which this association between the parties is formed.

7. As the union of individuals in this manner is voluntary, every member naturally has a right to dissolve the connection when he pleases and the society have also a cor

responding right. As, however, this would frequently expose both parties to inconvenience, it is common, in the articles of the constitution, or the form of compact, to specify on what terms this may be done. When this par of the agreement has thus been entered into, it of course becomes as binding as any other part of it.

II. Of the manner in which such a society shall be gov erned.

The object of any such association is to do something. But it is obvious that they can act only on one of three suppositions: by unanimity, by a minority, or by a majority. To expect unanimity in the opinions of a being so diversified in character as man, is frivolous. To suspend the operation of many upon the decisions of one, is manifestly unjust, would be subversive of the whole object of the association, and would render the whole society more inefficient than the separate individuals of which it is composed. To suppose a society to be governed by a minority, would be to suppose a less number of equals superior in wisdom and goodness to a greater number, which is absurd. It remains, therefore, that every society must of necessity be governed by a majority.

III. Of the limits within which the power of the majority is restricted.

The majority, as we have just seen, is vested, from necessity, with the whole power of the society. But it derives its power wholly and exclusively from the society, and of course it can have no power beyond, or diverse from, that of the society itself. Now, as the power of the society is limited by the concessions made by each individual respectively, and is bound by its obligations to each individual, the power of the majority is manifestly restricted within precisely the same limits.

Thus, to be more particular, a majority has no right to do any thing which the individuals forming the society have not authorized the society to do:

1. They have no right to change the object of the soety. If this be changed, another society is formed, and the individual members are, as at first, at liberty to unite with it or not.