2 They have no right to do any thing beyond, or different from, the object of the society. The reasons are the same as in the former instance.

3. Nor have they a right to do any thing in a manner different from that to which the members, upon entering the society, agreed. The manner set forth in the constitution, was that by which the individuals bound themselves, and they are bound by nothing else.

4. Nor have they a right to do any thing which violates the principle of the entire social equality of the members. As all subjected themselves equally to the same rules, any ac. which supposes a difference of right, is at variance with the fundamental principle of the compact.

And, hence, from the nature of the compact, it is obvious, tnat, while a majority act within the limits of the authority thus delegated to them, the individual is under a moral obligation to obey their decisions; for he has voluntarily placed himself under such obligation, and he is bound to fulfil it.

And, on the other hand, the society is bound to fulfil to the individual the contract which they have formed with him, and to carry forward the object of the association in the manner and in the spirit of the contract entered into. Nor is this a mere matter of form or of expediency: it is a matter of moral obligation voluntarily entered into; and it is as binding as any other contract formed under any other circumstances.

And, again, if the society or the majority act in violation of these engagements, or if they do any thing not committed to them by the individual, such act is not binding upon any member; and he is under no more obligation to be gov erned by it, than he would be if it were done by any other persons, or if not done at all.

If these principles be correct, they will, I think, throw some light upon the question of the durability of corporations. A corporation is a society established for certain purposes, which are to be executed in a certain manrer. He who joins it, joins it under these conditions; and the whole power of the society consists in power to do these things in this manner. If they do any thing else, they,

when doing it, are not this society, but some other. And of course those, whether the minority or the majority who act according to the original compact, are the society; and the others, whether more or less, are something else. The act of incorporation is governed by the same principles It renders the persons so associated a body politic, and recognised in law, but it does not interfere with the original principles of such an association. The corporation, therefore, are the persons, whether more or less, who adhere to the original agreement; and any act declaring any thing else to be the society, is unjust and void.

But suppose them all to have altered their sentiments. The society is then, of course, dissolved. They may, if they choose, form another society; but they are not another, of course, nor can they be such until they form another organization.

Again, suppose that they have property given under the original association, and for the promotion of its objects, and the whole society, or a majority of them, have changed its objects. I answer, If a part still remain, and prosecute the original object, they are the society; and the others, by changing the object, have ceased to be the society The right of property vests with those who adhere to the original constitution. If all have changed the object, the society is dissolved; and all ownership, so far as the property is concerned, ceases. It therefore either belongs to the public, or reverts to the heirs at law. A company of men united for another object, though retaining the same name, have no more right to inherit it than any other citizens The right of a legislature to give it to them by special act, is even very questionable. Legislatures are not empowered to bestow property upon men at will; and such grant, being beyond the power conceded to the legislator, seems to me to be null and void.

The principles of this section seem to me to demand the special attention of those who are at present engaged in conducting the business of voluntary associations. It should always be remembered, that he who joins a voluntary asso⚫ ciation, joins it for a specified object, and for no other The association itself has one object, and no other.

This

objec, and the manner in which it is to be accomplished, ought to be plainly set forth in the constitution. Now, when a majority attempt to do any thing not comprehended within this object thus set forth, or in a manner at variance with that prescribed, they violate the fundamental article. of the compact, and the society is virtually dissolved. And against such infraction of right it is the duty of the individual to protest; and if it be persisted in, it is his duty to withdraw. And it seems to me that, otherwise, the whole benefit of voluntary associations will be lost; and if the whole society do it, the society is changed, and it is changed in no manLer the less because its original name is retained. If the objects of such associations be not restricted, their increasing complication will render them unmanageable by any form of agency. If an individual, when he unites with others for one object, knows not for how many objects, nor for what modes of accomplishing them, he shall be held re sponsible, who will ever unite in a benevolent enterprise? And, if masses of men may be thus associated in every part of a country for one professed object, and this object may be modified, changed, or exceeded, according to the will of an accidental majority, voluntary associations will very soon be transformed into the tools of intriguing and ambitious men, and will thus become a curse instead of a blessing.

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SECTION II.

OF CIVIL SOCIETY.

In order to consider this subject correctly, it will be necessary to consider society as distinct from government. It may exist without a government. At some time it must have so existed. And in all cases, government is merely the instrument by which it accomplishes its purposes. Government is the agent. Society is the principal.

The first consi leration which meets us, in the discussion

of this subject, is, that CIVIL SOCIETY IS AN INSTITUTION OF GOD; or, in other words, it is the will of God that man should live in a state of society. This may be shown both from the original impulses common to all men, and from the necessities of man, arising out of the conditions of his present existence.

I. From the original impulses of man.

1. One of the strongest and most universal impulses of our nature, is a general love for society. It commences, as every one must have observed, with early infancy, and continues, unabated, to the close of life. The poets can conceive of no situation more afflictive, or more intolerable, than that of a human being in a state of perfect loneliness. Hence, solitary confinement is considered, by all mankind, as one of the severest forms of punishment. And, hence, a disposition to separate one's self from society is one of the surest indications of mental derangement. Now, the natural result of this intense and universal impulse is a disposition to control such other desires as shall be inconsistent with it. Wherever these dispositions exist, a num ber of human beings will as readily and naturally form a society as they will do any other thing on which their happiness depends. A constitution of this sort manifestly shows what is the will of our Creator concerning us.

2. The various forms of hunan attachment illustrate the same truth.

Thus, the attachment between the sexes at once forms a society, which is the origin of every other. Of this union, the fundamental principle is a limited surrender of the happiness of each to that of the other, and the consequent attainment of an increased return of happiness. From this arises the love of parents to children, and that of children to parents, and all the various modifications of affection resulting from collateral and more distant relationships.

Besides these, there must continually arise the feeling of friendship between individuals of similar habits and of correspondent pursuits; the love of benevolence towards those who need our succor, or who awaken our sympathy; and the love of approbation, which will stimulate us to deny ourselves for the sake of acquiring the good opinion of those

by whom we are surrounded. Now, the tendency of all these instincts is manifestly twofold: first, as in the former instance, as these propensities can be gratified only by society, we shall be disposed to surrender whatever will be inconsistent with the enjoyment of society; and, secondly, since it is, as we have seen before, in the very nature of affection, to surrender our own personal gratification for the happiness of those whom we love, affection renders such a surrender one of the very sources of our individual happiness. Thus, patriotism, which is only one form of the love of society, not only supposes a man to be willing to surrender something personal for the sake of something general, which he likes better, but also to derive happiness from that very surrender, and to be actually happier when acting from these principles than from any other. It is almost needless to add, that the Creator's intention, in forming beings with such impulsions, is too evident to be mistaken. II. The same truth is taught from the necessities imposed upon us by the conditions of our being.

1. Suppose the human race, entirely destitute of these social principles, to have been scattered abroad over the face of the earth as mere isolated individuals. It is evident that, under such circumstances, the race must quickly have perished. Man, thus isolated, could never contend, either with the cold of the northern, or with the wild beasts of the temperate and warmer, regions. He has neither muscular power, nor agility, nor instinct, to protect him from the one, nor any natural form of clothing to shield him from the other.

2. But suppose that, by any means, the race of man could be continued. Without society, the progressive relioration of his condition would be impossible.

Without society, there could be no division of labor. Every one must do every thing for himself, and at the greatest possible disadvantage. Without society, there could be neither any knowledge of the agents of nature, nor any application of them to the production of value. A man's instruments would be almost exclusively limited to his teeth and nails. Without society, there could be no acknowledged right of property. Hence, from these causes, there could be no accumulated capital; and each