Denefactor to a recipient, from those of a recipient to a Denefactor: and both of them differ from that of a brother to a brother, or of a master to a servant. But, different as these may be from each other, they are all pervaded by the same generic feeling, that of moral obligation; that is, we feel that we ought to be thus or thus disposed, and to act in this or that manner.

4. This I suppose to be our constitution, in regard to created beings; and such do I suppose would be our feelng, irrespectively of any notion of the Deity. That is, upon the conception of these and such like relations, there would immediately arise this feeling of moral obligation, to act towards those sustaining these relations, in a particular

manner.

5. But there is an Uncreated Being, to whom we stand in relations infinitely more intimate and inconceivably more solemn, than any of those of which we have spoken. It is that Infinite Being, who stands to us in the relation of Creator, Preserver, Benefactor, Lawgiver, and Judge; and to whom we stand in the relation of dependent, helpless, ignorant, and sinful creatures. How much this relation involves, we cannot possibly know; but so much as this we know, that it involves obligations greater than our intellect can estimate. We cannot contemplate it without feeling that, from the very fact of its existence, we are under obligations to entertain the disposition of filial love and obedience towards God, and to act precisely as he shall condescend to direct. And this obligation arises simply from the fact of the relation existing between the parties, and irrespectively of any other consideration; and if it be not felt, when the relations are perceived, it can never be produced by any view of the consequences which would arise to the universe from exercising it.

6. This relation, and its consequent obligation, involve, comprehend, and transcend every other. Hence it places obligation to man upon a new foundation. For if we be ourselves thus under illimitable obligations to God, and if, by virtue of the relation which he sustains to the creation, he is the Protector, Ruler, and Proprietor of all, we are under obligations to obey him in every thing. And as

every other being is also his creature, we are bound to trea that creature as he its Proprietor shall direct Hence we

are bound to perform the obligation under which we stano to his creatures, not merely on account of our relations to them, but also on account of the relations in which we and they stand to God.

And hence, in general, our feeling of moral obligation is a peculiar and instinctive impulse, arising at once by the principles of our constitution, as soon as the relations are perceived in which we stand to the beings, created and uncreated, with whom we are connected.

The proof of this must rest, as I am aware, with every man's consciousness. A few illustrative remarks may, however, not be altogether useless.

I think, if we reflect upon the subject, that the manner in which we attempt to awaken moral feelings, confirms the view which I have taken. In such a case, if I mistake not, we always place before the mind the relation in which the parties stand to each other.

1. If we wish to awaken in ourselves gratitude to another, we do not reflect that this affection will produce the greatest good; but we remember the individual in the relation of benefactor; and we place this relation in the strongest possible light. If this will not produce gratitude, our effort, of necessity, fails.

2. If we desire to inflame moral indignation against crime, we show the relations in which the parties stand to each other, and expect hence to produce a conviction of the greatness of the obligation which such turpitude violates.

3. So, if we wish to overcome evil with good, we place ourselves in the relation of benefactor to the injurious per son; and, in spite of himself, he is frequently compelled to yield to the law of his nature; and gratitude for favors, and sorrow for injury, spontaneously arise in his bosom.

4. And, in the plan of man's redemption, it seems to me that the Deity has acted on this principle. Irrespectively of a remedial dispensation, he is known to us only as a Creator, all wise and all powerful, perfect in holiness, justice, and truth. To our fallen nature, these attributes could

minister not ing but terror. He, therefore, has revealed himself to us in the relation of a Savior and Redeemer, a God forgiving transgression and iniquity; and thus, by all the power of this new relation, he imposes upor us new obligations to gratitude, repentance, and love.

5. And hence it is, that God always asserts, that as, from the fact of this new relation, our obligations to him are in creased; so, he who rejects the gospel is, in a special man ner, a sinner, and is exposed to a more terrible condemnation The climax of all that is awful in the doom of the unbe lieving, is expressed by the terms, "the wrath of the Lamb."

Again I am not much accustomed to such refined speculations; but I think that obedience or love to God, from any more ultimate motive, than that this affection is Jue to him because he is God, and our God, is not piety. Thus, if a child say, I will obey my father, because it is for the happiness of the family; what the character of this action would be, I am not prepared to say; but I think the action would not be filial obedience. Filial obedience is the obeying of another, because he is my father; and it is FILIAL obedience, only in so far as it proceeds from this motive. This will be evident, if we substitute for the love of the happiness of the family, the love of money, or some other such motive. Every one sees, that it would not be filial obedience, for a child to obey his parent because he would be well paid for it.

Now, it seems to me, that the same principle applies in the other case. To feel under obligation to love God, because this affection would be productive of the greatest good, and not on account of what he is, and of the relations in which he stands to us, seems to me not to be piety; that is not to be the feeling, which a creature is bound to exercise towards his Creator. If the obligation to the love of God can really arise from any thing more ultimate than the essential relation which he sustains to us, why may not this nore ultimate motive be something else, as well as the love of the greatest good? I do not say that any thing else would be as benevolent; but I speak metaphysically, and say that. if real piety, or love to God, may truly spring

from any thing more ultimate than God himself, I do not see why it may not spring from one thing as well as from: another; and thus, true piety might spring from various and dissimilar motives, no one of which has any rea! reference to God himself.

My view of this subject, in few words, is as follows:

1. We stand in relations to the several beings with which we are connected, such, that some of them, as soon as they are conceived, suggest to us the idea of moral obligation.

2. Our relations to our fellow-men suggest this conviction, in a limited and restricted sense, corresponding to the idea of general or essential equality.

3. The relation in which we stand to the Deity suggests the conviction of universal and unlimited love and obedience. This binds us to proper dispositions towards Him; and, also, to such dispositions towards his creatures, as he shall appoint.

4. Hence, our duties to man are enforced by a twofold obligation; first, because of our relations to man as man: and, secondly, because of our relation to man as being, with ourselves, a creature of God.

5. And hence an act, which is performed in obedience to our obligations to man, may be virtuous; but it is not pious, unless it also be performed in obedience to our obligations to God.

6. And hence we see that two things are necessary, in order to constitute any being a moral agent. They are, first, that he possess an intellectual power, by which he can understand the relation in which he stands to the beings by whom he is surrounded; secondly, that he possess a moral power, by which the feeling of obligation is suggested to him, as soon as the relation in which he stands is understood. This is sufficient to render him a moral agent. He is accountable, just in proportion to the opportunity which he has enjoyed, for acquiring a knowledge of the relations in which he stands, and of the manner in which his obligations are to be discharged.

CHAPTER SECOND.

CONSCIENCE, OR THE MORAL SENSE.

SECTION 1

IS THERE A CONSCIENCE?

By conscience, or the moral sense, is meant, that faculty by which we discern the moral quality of actions, and by which we are capable of certain affections in respect to this quality.

By faculty, is meant any particular part of our constitution, by which we become affected by the various qualities and relations of beings around us. Thus, by taste, we are conscious of the existence of beauty and deformity; by perception, we acquire a knowledge of the existence and qualities of the material world. And, in general, if we discern any quality in the universe, or produce or suffer any change, it seems almost a truism to say, that we have a faculty, or power, for so doing. A man who sees, must have eyes, or the faculty for seeing; and if he have not eyes, this is considered a sufficient reason why he should not see. And thus, it is universally admitted, that there may be a thousand qualities in nature, of which we have no knowledge, for the simple reason, that we have not been created with the faculties for discerning them. There is a world without us, and a world within us, which exactly correspond to each other. Unless both exist, we can never be conscious of the existence of either.

Now, that we do actually observe a moral quality in the actions of men, must, I think, be admitted. Every human being is conscious, that, from childhood, he has observed it We do not say, that all men discern this quality with