concerned, is, to restrain the appetites and passions of man within those limits, that shall conduce to his happiness, on the whole; and so to control the impulse of self-love, that the individual, in the pursuit of his own happiness, shall never interfere with the rightful happiness of his neighbor. Each one, under such a system, and governed by such an impulse, would enjoy all the happiness which he could create by the use of the powers which God had given him. Every one doing thus, the whole would enjoy all the happiness of which their constitution was susceptible. The happiness of man, as an individual, and as a society, would thus be, in the best conceivable manner, provided for. And thus, under the relation which we have suggested; that is, conscience being supreme, and governing both selflove and passion; and self-love, where no higher principle intervened, governing passion; man individual, and man universal, considered as an instrument for the production of happiness, would best accomplish the purpose for which he was created. This, then, is the relation between nis powers, which was designed to be established by his Creator.

It can, in the same manner, be shown, that, if man, individual and universal, be considered as an instrument for the production of power, this end of his creation can be accomplished most successfully by obedience to the relation here suggested; that is, on the principle, that the authority of conscience is supreme.* This is conclusively shown in Butler's Analogy, Part 1, Chapter 3. And thus, And thus, let any reasonable end be suggested, for which it may be supposed that man has been created; and it will be found, that this end can be best attained, by the subjection of every other impulse to that of conscience; nay, that it can be attained in no other way. And hence, the argument seems conclusive, that this is the relation intended by his Creator to be established between his faculties.

* Vis consili expers, mole ruit sua.
Vim temperatam, dî quoque provehunt
In majus; idem odere vires

Omne nefas animo moventes.

H R. Lib. 3, Car. 4.

If the preceding views be correct, it will follow:

1. If God has given man an impulse for virtue it is as true, that he has designed him for virtue, as for any thing else; as, for instance, for seeing or for hearing.

2. If this impulse be the most authoritative in his nature, it is equally manifest, that man is made for virtue more than for any thing else.

3. And hence, he who is vicious, not only acts contrary to his nature, but contrary to the highest impulse of his nature; that is, he acts as much in opposition to his nature as it is possible for us to conceive.

SECTION IV.

THE LAW BY WHICH CONSCIENCE IS GOVERNED.

Conscience follows the general law, by which the inprovement of all our other faculties is regulated. It is strengthened by use, it is impaired by disuse.

Here it is necessary to remark, that, by use, we mean the use of the faculty itself, and not of some other faculty. This is so plain a case, that it seems wonderful that there should have been any mistake concerning it. Every one knows, that the arms are not strengthened by using the legs, nor the eyes by using the ears, nor the taste by using the understanding. So, the conscience can be strengthened, not by using the memory, or the taste, or the understanding; but by using the conscience, and by using it precisely according to the laws, and under the conditions, designed by our Creator. The conscience is not improved by the reading of moral essays, nor by committing to memory moral precepts, nor by imagining moral vicissitudes; but by hearkening to its monitions, and obeying its un pulses.

If we reflect upon the nature of the monition of conscience, we shall find that its office is of a threefold character.

1. It enables us to discover the moral quality of actions. 2. It impels us to do right, and to avoid doing wrong. 3. It is a source of pleasure, when we have done right, and of pain, when we have done wrong.

Let us illustrate the manner in which it may be improved, and injured, in each of these respects.

I. Of the improvement of the discriminating power of conscience.

1. The discriminating power of conscience is improved by reflecting upon the moral character of our actions, both before and after we have performed them. If, before we resolve upon a course of conduct, or before we suffer ourselves to be committed to it, we deliberately ask, Is this right? Am I now actuated by appetite, by self-love, or by conscience? we shall seldom mistake the path of duty. After an action has been performed, if we deliberately and impassionately examine it, we may without difficulty decide whether it was right or wrong. Now, with every such effort as this, the discriminating power of conscience is strengthened. We discern moral differences more distinctly; and we distinguish between actions, that before seemed blended and similar.

2. The discriminating power of conscience is improved, by meditating upon characters of pre-eminent excellence, and specially upon the character of God our Creator, and Christ our Redeemer, the Fountain of all moral excellence. As we cultivate taste, or our susceptibility to beauty, by meditating upon the most finished specimens of art, or the most lovely scenery in nature, so conscience, or our moral susceptibility, is improved, by meditating upon any thing eminent for moral goodness. It is hence, that example produces so powerful a moral effect; and hence, that one single act of heroic virtue, as that of Howard, or of illus trious self-denial, gives a new impulse to the moral char acter of an age. Men cannot reflect upon such actions, without the production of a change in their moral susceptibility. Hence, the effect of the Scripture representations of the character of God, and of the moral glory of the neavenly state. The Apostle Paul refers to this principle, when he says, "We all, with open face, beholding, as in a

gass, the glory of the Lord, are changed into the same image, from glory to glory, even as by the Spirit of the Lord."

On the contrary, the discriminating power of conscience may be injured,

1. By neglecting to reflect upon the moral character of our actions, both before and after we have performed them. As taste is rendered obtuse by neglect, so that we fail to distinguish between elegance and vulgarity, and between beauty and deformity; so, if we yield to the impulses of passion, and turn a deaf ear to the monitions of conscience, the dividing line between right and wrong seems gradually to become obliterated. We pass from the confines of the one into those of the other, with less and less sensation, and at last neglect the distinction altogether.

Horace remarks this fact:

Fas atque nefas, exiguo fine, libidinum
Discernunt avidi.

This is one of the most common causes of the grievous moral imperfection which we every where behold. Men act without moral reflection. They will ask, respecting an action, every question before that most important one, Is it right and, in the great majority of cases, act without putting to themselves this question at all. "The ox knoweth his owner, and the ass his master's crib; but Israel doth not know, my people do not consider." If any man doubt whether this be true, let him ask himself, How large is the portion of the actions which I perform, upon which I deliberately decide whether they be right or wrong? And on how large a portion of my actions do I form such a decision, after they have been performed? For the want of this reflection, the most pernicious habits are daily formed or strengthened; and, when to the power of habit is added the seductive influence of passion, it is not wonderful that the virtue of man should be the victim.

2. The discriminating power of conscience is impaired by frequent meditation upon vicious character and action By frequently contemplating vice, our passions become excited, and our moral disgust diminishes. Thus, also, by

becoming familiar with wicked men, we learn to associate whatever they may possess of intellectual or social interest, with their moral character; and hence our ahorrence of vice is lessened. Thus, men who are accustomed to view, habitually, any vicious custom, cease to have their moral feelings excited by beholding it. All this is manifest, from the facts made known in the progress of every moral reformation. Of so delicate a texture has God made our moral nature, and so easily is it either improved or impaired. Pope says, truly,

Vice is a monster of so frightful mien,
As, to be dreaded, needs but to be seen;
But, seen too oft, familiar with her face,
We first endure, then pity, then embrace.

It is almost unnecessary to remark, that this fact will enable us to estimate the value of much of our reading, and of much of our society. Whatever fills the memory with scenes of vice, or stimulates the imagination to conceptions of impurity, vulgarity, profanity, or thoughtlessness, must, by the whole of this effect, render us vicious. As a man of literary sensibility will avoid a badly written book, for fear of injuring his taste, by how much more should we dread the communion with any thing wrong, lest it should contaminate our imagination, and thus injure our moral sense!

II. The impulsive power of conscience is improved by use, and weakened by disuse.

To illustrate this law, we need only refer to the elements of man's active nature. We are endowed with appetites, passions, and self-love, in all their various forms; and any one of them, or all of them, may, at times, be found impelling us towards actions in opposition to the impulsion of conscience, and, of course, one or the other impulse must be resisted. Now, as the law of our faculties is universal, that they are strengthened by use, and weakened by disuse, It is manifest, that, when we obey the impulse of conscience, and resist the impulse of passion, the power of cor science is strengthened; and, on the contrary, when we obey the impulse of passion, and resist that of conscience, the power