upon the outer brink, and can only look from thence upon am unsolved personal being. No reason, then, can be given why the progress of civilisation or science should expunge from the human mind the ideas of conscience, sin, repentance, judgment, which, as a matter of fact, lead to the Christian belief and feed the Christian Church. But when reasoning ceases, prophecy begins. There are no more persistent and determined prophesiers in the world than infidels; they make sure of the future. Mankind do not at present think with them, but they will do. The day is coming; the edifice of superstition will fall; principles long rooted in man will disappear; it will be seen that their lurid and misty light is a deception; the human mind will be, rescued from the thraldom of them. This will be the issue of civilisation; this will be the history of mankind. Thus when logic fails, they foresee; and when science refuses to contradict religion, they discern the rupture in a vision. We have two great prophets among us who prophesy resolutely and prophesy perpetually, the Infidels and Millenarians. We could wish, however, that Dr. Newman had treated the exceptional case of those who, while they would profess a code of natural religion approaching to his own, still do not proceed thence to the acceptance of the Christian evidences. There are those who believe in morals and in religious morals, but shrink from miracles or doctrines. There are those even who accept Roman morals, who admire the ascetic type, who embrace counsels of perfection, who still decline to believe either in the Gospels or the Epistles. The Gospels deter them by their outward miracles, and the Epistles by their inward-by forgiveness, justification, and salvation, through the blood of an Atoning Sacrifice. The acceptance, indeed, of an ascetic standard of morals by persons is quite compatible with cowardice and weakness in the acceptance also of the yoke of physical impression and a dogmatic imagination binding their sense of possibility to the routine of material laws, and disabling them from believing miracles in Nature or mysteries in truth. The more we know of practical human nature, the more we become alive to its piecemeal composition, and to the mistake of taking men as consistent wholes. They are often collections of fragments, reflecting a past succession of different and discordant influences, like geological compounds, which represent the action of past disturbing forces. We could wish, again, that Dr. Newman had treated the case of some who even admire the distinctive mysteries of Christianity, but who have not come to an understanding with themselves whether whether those mysteries are sublime truths or sublime fictions. They are captivated by devotion, and by devotion founded on certain ideas and upon the existence of a certain supernatural world; but whether the truths exist or the world exists anywhere else than in the worshipper's own mind they are not prepared to say. They will follow, with even the enthusiasm of partisans, the devotional assertions of a high religious rite, while they do not, at the same time, think it particularly signifies whether these assertions are true or not: their intellect inclines to the latter alternative. The doctrine of the Atonement is true to them in a ritual, and false as a statement in Scripture or in a Creed. The appeal to the 'Lamb of God that taketh away the sin of the world' is quite correct in a litany; but when they meet with the same truth in a theological book, they turn away from an assertion with which their intellect is not in harmony. Our own Eucharistic Service and the Roman mass alike are founded upon the doctrine of an Atoning Sacrifice: that doctrine is the very fibre of them, and they are utterly hollow and mere unmeaning structures of words without it; yet one of these minds will respond to the service and reject the doctrine. Why so? The dignity of language is its truth; and if an idea is false it ought not to be in a ritual-if it is true, it ought to be accepted as a statement. Why should ritual enjoy the very unenviable privilege of false assertion? And why should the language of prayer and supplication be esteemed noble and sublime, if it issues out of the worshipper's mouth, directed to a Personage who does not exist, on account of an office which does not exist? The fact is, however, that ritual is regarded by this class of minds only as the expression of subjective religious truth. It relieves the worshipper's mind by the vocal and symbolic utterance of certain religious conceptions, profoundly poetical, and stimulative of deep emotion; and the whole adoration of the congregation goes out toward a Mysterious Personage, who has done a mysterious work for them: but whether there are in the invisible world any realities which correspond to these ideas; whether there is any such Personage or any such work; whether there is any objective truth which answers to this subjective is another question, which they prefer not having to deal with. A statement in Scripture, a Creed, or an Article, puts this question before them, and therefore they dislike a statement in Scripture, a Creed, or an Article. A Creed asserts an objective truth, a ritual to them asserts a subjective one; and subjective truth is interesting to them as revealing the fertility and wealth of the human mind, its poetry and its fancy; objective truth is a dull dry formula. Even a Resurrection and Eternity are dull and insipid to these minds as articles in a Creed: if they are are ideas enriching a ritual, they welcome them; if they are really to be believed, they give them but a freezing reception. Yet it was in this very character, as the vehicle of objective truth, that the formulary of faith appealed of old to Christian poetry and imagination. It was not treated like a dry skeleton and framework of words, but the statement was glorious and elevating because a positive statement; it asserted the objective reality of the thing stated; it gave an opening into another world, and an absolutely real world. Contemplate the grave, precise, and formal statements of a Christian Church in this aspect, and they lighten up with beams from the very fountain of light. They represent the faith of generations of Christians in the ineffable condescension of God and the highest destiny of man. They announce by their very rigidity the external seat of truth; that truth is a fact which exists independently of us, our own belief, or our own imagination. We do not profess to have given our readers more than a slice of Dr. Newman's elaborate and acute investigation into the processes of the reasoning faculty; and the part we have taken has been that which combines the writer's application of the general principles he has laid down in the body of the treatise to the particular case of the evidence of Revelation. For Dr. Newman's treatment of the whole department of reasoning we must refer our readers to the treatise itself, which brings to the subject the subtlest discrimination and most penetrating force, and an eye for the nicest distinctions, aided by the richest imagination and the most inexhaustible fertility of illustration. We cannot part from Dr. Newman without assuring him how glad we are to meet him on common ground. We do not, of course, agree either with all his philosophical positions, or with various particular observations which we come across in the treatise. He sometimes speaks from the basis of his own communion, and of course all his defence of the Christian Revelation he considers himself to belong to the Roman interpretation of that Revelation. We have preferred, however, to call attention to agreement rather than to differences; and we have treated his Essay as what it really and in substance is, a defence, and powerful defence, of a common Christianity; which has filled up a vacant place in Christian apologetics, and has given a substantial position to a part of the Christian argument which had only received an informal and allusive notice before, viz. the antecedent and introductory principles which lead to the acceptance of the Christian evidences. ART. ART. VI.-1. De Balneis omnia quæ extant apud Græcos, Latinos et Arabes, &c. &c. Venetiis apud Juntas, 1553. 2. De Thermis, Lacubus, Fontibus, Balneisque totius Orbis. Andreas Baccius. Venetiis apud Valigrisium, 1571. 3. Gallus oder Römische Scenen. Von W. A. Becker. Leipzig, 1840. 4. Sämmtliche Heilquellen Italiens, &c. Von C. Harless. 18461848. Berlin. 5. Geschichte der Balneologie, &c. Von B. M. Lersch. Würzburg, 1863. 6. The Baths and Wells of Europe, &c. By John Macpherson, M.D. London, 1869. N many matters regarding material comforts and even public We do not allude to mere self-indulging luxury, in which the Romans probably far exceeded us; but in some of the most important improvements of the present day-in the supply of good drinking water and in the construction of public baths-we are now only going over the same ground as ancient Rome. That city and indeed all the Roman colonies were well supplied with water, often brought from a distance at a vast expense; and the remains of the public baths in Rome and in large provincial cities, of those attached to private villas in Rome and even in its more remote settlements, are on a scale quite beyond anything attempted in modern times. But that the Romans also thought like the moderns on other points connected with questions of health is very clearly shown by the following passage from the Epistles of Horace : 'Of Velia and Salernum tell me pray The climate, and the natives, and the way; Once its staunch friend am now its enemy Epist., i. 15, Conington's Transl. Here we find our modern fashion portrayed which makes a place place popular for a few seasons and then neglected. Here we find in Horace's account of a cold bath in winter, which he evidently did not like, an allusion to the cold-water cure which came into fashion under Musa, the physician of Augustus, as a revulsion from the excessive luxury of hot baths. Pliny tells us how he had seen aged gentlemen of consular dignity making an ostentation of shivering in their cold baths, and we read how the advocates of the system agreed with the ancient Germans in immersing newly-born children in cold water- a practice alluded to by Virgil.t. We learn also from Horace how the Romans had their favourite health resorts, whether in the mountains or along the coast. Martial and many other writers give whole lists of such places; but the limpid Baia was the great favourite for many centuries. No Montpellier, or Nice, or Pau, has enjoyed nearly as long-lived a reputation, or has offered such attractions to visitors. Horace, too, mentions the vapour and the sulphur baths of Baiæ, but no drinking-wells. It was, in truth, hot bathing in its various forms of heated air, hot vapour and hot water, that the Romans were so fond of. They had borrowed its use from the Greeks, while they improved on their simpler arrangements, the Greeks themselves having probably only followed the usage of Asia Minor and more Eastern nations, among whom bathing has always been regarded as a matter of primary importance. From the earliest ages, indeed, all peculiarities of smell, of taste, or of temperature in the wells attracted the attention of mankind; and, like all things that were unusual and incapable of ready explanation, they were referred to the immediate influence of the gods. The idea of a local deity dwelling in the spring is well illustrated, by the fact of the word lympha 'water' being only a variety of nympha, or water goddess. Most oracles of importance were situated close to sacred springs or to natural escapes of gas. The temple of Jupiter Ammon, in its Libyan oasis, had an intermitting fountain.‡ Delphi had not only its fountain of Cassotis, but the Pythoness, when delivering her responses, seems to have been placed on a tripod over a cleft in the rock,§ whence issued a gas that inspired her, and, in case of accident, three priestesses were always present. || There was something similar at the oracle of Trophonius, in Boeotia, where Pausanias ¶ says, from personal experience, that a gas was extricated which caused people to become insensible at Herodot. iv. 181. Plutarch, Quæst. Græc. c. 9; De Orac. Def. c. 51. Tix. 39, 5, seqq. |